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ABSTRACT

The study investigated the existence of an explanatory conceptual framework for reasoning
about the mind called "belief-desire" psychology in eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and
unschooled Zimbabwean children. Two hundred children participated in the study. Three
measures for assessing the presence of a theory of mind framed by belief-desire psychology
were used to interview children. The measures were the Wellman and Bartsch mental states
attribution, Wimmer and Pemer false-belief and Pemer, Leekam, and Wimmer unexpected
change tasks. The study found that overall Zimbabwean children predominantly and
competently use a belief-desire framework. They invoked the mental states of belief and
desire to predict and explain every day, intentional, overt human actions. There were no
statistical differences in performance between and within ethnic groups on two measures; the
Wimmer and Perner, and the Pemer et. al. On the Wellman and Bartsch, there was a
significant difference in performance between schooled and unschooled children. The
schooled children performed better than unschooled children.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, research studies (Astington, Harris, & Olson 1988; Wellman, 1992; Lewis
& Mitchell, 1994) found that children from industrialized Western societies use a mode of

reasoning about the mind, a conceptual explanatory framework called "belief-desire
psychology." The purpose of this study was to investigate the existence of such an
explanatory/conceptual framework in children from a less industrialized, non Western, but
literate society. Specifically, the study sought to answer questions about the universality of
belief-desire reasoning, by searching for evidence of its existence in eight-year-old,
indigenous, schooled, and unschooled children in Zimbabwe. The topic emerged from the
field of "a child's theory of mind", an area of investigation that re-emerged in the eighties,
after its initial investigation by Piaget in the twenties (Feldman, 1992; Wellman, 1992;
Wellman & Estes, 1986).

1.1.

The meaning of a child's theory of mind.

In general, the field of"a child's theory of mind" deals with how children come to understand
the nature and function of the mind in every day, intentional, and overt human action. An
understanding of the mind, among other things, includes the knowledge and awareness that
in people's "heads" exists an unobservable entity, container, and processor of information
called the "mind." The child also learns that the contents of this mind include mental states
such as beliefs and desires about the world; that it is the causal link between an individual's
1
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beliefs and desires and his actions; and finally, that there is independence between the mind
and the external world (Pemer, 1991; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Wellman, 1991; 1992; 1993;
Astington & Gopnik, 1988, 1994; Flavell, 1988; Mitchell & Lewis, 1994; Wellman &
Hickling, 1994; Pemer & Davies, 1990; Wellman & Woolley, 1989 ).

1.2.

An overview of the field of a child's theory of mind.

From studies in Developmental Psychology carried out in North America and Europe, the
existence in children, of a mode of reasoning about the mind called belief-desire emerged
(Wellman, 1992; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Wellman & Bartsch,
1988; Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994; Wellman, 1988; Butterworths,
1994; Wellman & Woolley, 1989; Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Frye & Moore, 1991;
Leslie, 1987). This mode of reasoning develops over time and consists of three major phases.
According to Wellman (1988, 1991, 1992, 1993), and Bartsch and Wellman (1989) the first
stage is predominantly influenced by desires at the exclusion of beliefs (simple desire
psychology). The second reflects a predominance of desires with occasional reference to
beliefs (desire-belief psychology), and finally, reasoning that considers both beliefs and
desires (belief-desire psychology). Each phase reflects qualitatively different knowledge,
processes, and understandings of the nature and function of the mind in everyday,
intentional, and overt human actions. Together, these stages form an identifiable, definable,
and "theory-like" explanatory framework to account for phenomena about the mind in every
day, intentional, overt human action (Wellman, 1988, 1992; Bartsch & Wellman, 1988).

Within this explanatory framework, studies have examined the knowledge base (Beal, 1988;
Robinson, 1994; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Pemer, 1988), processes and developmental
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milestones such as understanding the representational nature of the mind (Wimmer & Pemer,
1983; Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Gopnik & Graf, 1988;
Ruffinan & Olson, 1989; Keenan, Ruffinan & Olson, 1994; Sodian, Wimmer, 1987; O'Neil
& Gopnik, 1991; Pemer & Ogden, 1988; Pemer, 1988; Gopnik, Slaughter, & Metzoff, 1994;

Yaniv, & Shatz, 1988; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Sodian, 1988; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1994;
Taylor, 1988; Gopnik, Slaughter, & Meltzoff, 1994; ), and phases through which children
pass towards an adult-like belief-desire explanatory system (Wellman, 1988, 1992, 1993;
Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Astington, 1993; Fodor, 1992, 1987; Wellman & Bemajee, 1991,
1995; Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994).

1.3.

Conceptual frameworks for a child's theory of mind.

Although there is a consensus that children develop a conception of the mind during
childhood, the theoretical explanatory perspectives framing and explaining its nature, origin,
and development are diverse. Astington and Gopnik (1991), Bower (1993), Pemer (1991),
and Wellman (1992) identify and outline these views as the theory-theory, innate
predisposition, enculturation, simulation, and information processing. The theory-theory
view suggests that during childhood, children construct a coherently organized theoretical
explanatory system, a mode of reasoning about the mind such as belief-desire. The
explanatory framework, they argue, is not innate but is gradually constructed by the child
from experience (Wellman, 1992; Pemer, 1991; Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Bower, 1993).
The proposition that children gradually construct an organized coherent body of knowledge,
an explanatory framework to think and reason about the mind is one of the reasons a child's
understanding of the mind is called a "theory", and the field as a whole , "a child's theory
of mind."
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The "innate predisposition" perspective espouses three similar, but separate views. First is
the view that maturation is responsible for the development of an understanding of the mind;
second, that human beings are born with a Theory of Mind Module (ToMM) responsible for
the development of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994; Baron- Cohen, 1991;
Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Bower, 1993; Leslie, 1991) and third, by
Fodor (1987) and Sterelny (1993). Fodor and Sterelny proposed and argued that a
conception and development of a theory of the mind is a universal phenomena in humans.
In fact, Premack and Woodruff, the researchers who launched the beginning of these
investigations in the late seventies, suggested from the outset, that a major aspect of theory
of mind, that of imputing and inferring from mental states, was universal in human beings
( 1978). The overall perspective of innate predisposition is reflected by the following quotes
from two of its strongest proponents:
There is so far as I know, no human group that doesn't explain human
behavior by imputing beliefs and desires to the behavior. And if an
anthropologist claimed to have found such a group I wouldn't believe
him ... (Fodor, 1987 cited in Avis & Harris, 1991:1)
... .A theory ofmind may be the next best candidate after language for
a cultural universal. .. Sterelny (1993:83).

The "enculturation hypothesis" suggests that modes of thinking, including reasoning about
the mind are by-products of culture. This position, although more popular with
anthropologists, nonetheless, has support from developmental psychologists such as
Robinson (1994), Rogoff (1990), and Butterworths (1994). Butterworths (1994) said that
culture is the basis for epistemological theory about the mind, because each culture and/or
environment defines the knowledge base from which a theory of mind is constructed; while
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Rogoff (1990) and Robinson (1994) believe culture defines the content, processes, tools,
goals, outcomes and priorities for understanding the mind. Anthropologists (Heelas & Lock,
1981; Kim & Berry, 1993) also hold the same views as Robinson (1994), Rogoff (1990), and
Butterworths (1994). These views put limitations on the generalization of a conception of
the mind across cultures including any attempts to assert its universality.

The last two, less comprehensive, views are the simulation and the information processing
theories. Both oppose the theory-theory proposition that children construct a theoretical
framework to reason about the mind. The simulation theory argues that children do not
construct a theoretical explanatory framework at all and need not do so. Their understanding
of self and other people's mental life is through introspection and projection of their own
mental life experiences onto other people (Johnson, 1988; Harris, 1990, 1992). The
information processing theory suggests that children's growth in their understanding of the
mind is not due to a gradual construction of more comprehensive and competent explanatory
framework such as belief-desire, but is an elaboration of the existing general cognitive
capacities such as memory, language and thought (Astington & Gopnik, 1991).

Of these perspectives, the theory-theory argument has been the most productive in terms of
research. The others have remained largely theoretical and speculative. The theory-theory
tradition therefore, guides this investigation, however, other perspectives also frame the
problem and justification for the study.

6

1.4.

Statement of the problem and justification for the study

The problem for this study is framed by three issues that emerge from Western based
research studies on children's understanding of the mind. The first issue relates to what
Feldman (1992) describes as a Kuhnian post-Piagetian paradigm shift from studying children
in isolation from their environments to situating development in social context. Feldman
(1992) believes that the social nature of, and/or basis for understanding the mental lives of
the self and other people demands that investigations about children's understanding of the
mind to be situated in cultural context. Leaming to understand the selfs and other people's
mental lives is embedded in culture because culture scripts the content, process, outcomes,
tools and/or medium and context for developing such understandings. One of those scripts
is "folk psychology," a socially constructed domain of knowledge (Heelas & Lock, 1981;
Kim & Berry, 1993; Forguson & Gopnik, 1988; Whiten, 1991). Although folk psychology
is a domain of knowledge concerned with the prediction and explanation of everyday,
intentional overt human action, competency in that "enterprise" depends on a competent
understanding of how one's own and other's minds work. For that reason, folk psychology
becomes not only a cultural tool for developing an understanding of the mind, but a context,
medium, and process through which that understanding is developed and may therefore be
examined. Developmental phenomena such as a child's theory of mind thus, need to be
situated in cultural context.

The second issue emerges from competing hypotheses such as the theory-theory and innate
predisposition. On one hand, it appears that an understanding of the mind has a social and

7

cultural basis, yet on the other, it is equally reasonable and appealing to assume that humans
as a species have common characteristics. These characteristics not only differentiate humans
from other species, but make them similar irrespective of cultural context. These competing
hypotheses create ambiguities for non Western cultural societies where studies have not yet
been conducted. Research in those cultures may help clarify such ambiguities.

Significant and intensive investigations about the child's theory of mind carried out in the last
decade have been confined to industrialized Western cultural contexts (Wellman, 1992;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Frye &
Moore, 1991; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994; Astington, Olson & Harris, 1988). From Feldman's
(1992) perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the nature of children's theories of mind
that emerged from these studies are by-products of industrialized Western socio-cultural
environments. In fact, Wellman (1992), a major contributor to this topic in the last decade,
clearly suggested that belief-desire reasoning may be a product of Western, rather than non
Western cultural environments. Few studies (Avis & Harris, 1991; Flavell, Zhang, Zou,
Dong, & Qi, 1983; Gardner, Harris, Ohmoto, & Hamasaki, 1988) on some aspects of a
child's theory of mind have been carried out in non Western cultural contexts. Avis and
Harris ( 1991) and Wahi and Johri ( 1995) presented contradictory findings on a child's
conception of the mind in other cultures. Avis and Harris found belief-desire reasoning in
a non-literate African society, while Wahi and Johri found culture to be a significant variable
in conceptions of the mind.
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Beyond issues of cultural context and universality of a theory of mind, the findings of this
study have significant implications for Zimbabwe, specifically its educational system.
Emerging from Western- based research is the suggestion that consequences of theory of
mind and/or its underlying processes have significant impact on schooling (Astington, 1993;
Astington & Jenkins, 1994). Astington (1993) suggested that it appeared that the product of
belief-desire reasoning, and the processes underlying its development such as representation
and metarepresentation are valued and rewarded by Western oriented systems of education.
Zimbabwe as a society, and its educational system in particular, has a "pervasive" Western
oriented cultural legacy resulting from colonialism. The implication from Astington (1993)
and Astington and Jenkins (1994) is that if belief-desire reasoning is a product of Western
enculturation, rather than a universal phenomena, or a product of interaction between
Western and indigenous psychologies, indigenous children with little or no Western cultural
experiences may struggle to learn in these systems. This struggle may be due to lack of
synchrony in expectations or modes of reasoning. For example, if indigenous cultures do
not use or encourage belief-desire reasoning, when children from those environments go to
school where such modes of reasoning are the dominant mode, they may lag behind their
counterparts or take time to learn using that mode of reasoning. It is important for Zimbabwe
to find out how such important phenomena develop in its children and how society can deal
with paradoxes created by mixed folk psychologies.

Overall, the need to situate a child's understanding of the mind in cultural context, competing
hypotheses, ambiguity in findings from crosscultural studies, lack of intensive cross cultural
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data in general, and the relevance of the study to Zimbabwe frames the problem and justifies
this crosscultural study. The nature and purpose of this investigation therefore, is to search
for evidence of the existence or non existence of "belief-desire psychology" as an organizer
of the child's understanding about the mind in children in a less industrialized and nonWestem cultural context such as Zimbabwe. This study is different from those of Avis and
Harris ( 1991) and Johri and Wahi ( 1995), in that Avis and Harris investigated the phenomena
in a preliterate society largely insulated from Western culture, as well as from other
subcultures of Cameroon, North Africa, and Wahi and Johri investigated a correlate of
reasoning about the mind called the mental-real distinction, and not the whole belief-desire
reasoning system. The broader question to be addressed by this study was whether children
everywhere and anywhere construct, develop, and use a belief-desire explanatory system to
reason about the mind, by searching for the evidence in eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled,
and unschooled children in Zimbabwe. The questions for the study were as follows:

1.5.

Research questions

1.5.1. The broader question
Is belief-desire reasoning a universal explanatory conceptual framework that is constructed,
developed and used by children to reason about the mind?

1.5.2. Specific question
Do eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled, and unschooled children in Zimbabwe construct,
develop, and use a belief-desire explanatory conceptual framework to reason about the mind?
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1.5.3. Sub-questions:
1.5.3.1.

What conceptual explanatory framework do eight-year-old, indigenous,
schooled, and unschooled children in Zimbabwe invoke to predict and
explain everyday, intentional, and overt human action?

1.5.3.2.

How well do eight-year old, indigenous, schooled, and unschooled children
in Zimbabwe perform on belief-desire reasoning tests?

1.5.3.3.

What differences (if any), exist in performance on belief-desire reasoning
tests, among different groups of children as defined by their ethnicity and
school experience?

1.5.3.4.

What is the relationship (if any), between ethnicity, school experience, and
belief-desire reasoning?

If children invoke a belief-desire framework and perform well on belief-desire measures,

they will be credited with the following understandings about the mind:
1.5.4.4.1.

its representational nature;

1.5.4.4.2.

the causal link between the mind (beliefs and desires) and one's action;

1.5.4.4.3.

the independence between mind and external reality; and

1.5.4.4.4.

understanding the role of representational change in understanding their own
and other people's minds.
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The design for this investigation reflects a post-Piagetian paradigm shift that situates
children's development in cultural context. Two variables often linked to, and believed to
influence, cognition and modes of thinking (Kim & Berry, 1993; Heelas & Lock, 1981;
Brown, 1978; Huttenlocker, 1976; Olson, 1977), were used to create categories/groups from
which to search for children's mode (s) of reasoning about the mind. These variables were
the experience of schooling and ethnicity. Three investigative designs (Wellman & Bartsch,
1988 and Bartsch & Wellman, 1989 mental state attribution; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983 falsebelief; and Pemer, Wimmer & Leekam, 1987, unexpected change), that use predicting and
explaining everyday, intentional, overt human action as a medium for investigating a child's
understanding of the mind were used to search for evidence of children's use of belief-desire
reasonmg.

1.6.

Definition of terms.

1.6.1. Since belief-desire reasoning will be used constantly in chapters IV and V, the
abbreviation B-D is used to stand for belief-desire reasoning.

1.6.2. In literature and research, theory of mind is interchangeably used with belief-desire
reasoning, and/or folk psychology. This study uses these terms interchangeably as
well.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews literature on a child's theory of mind carried out over the last decade.
It defines the field, provides an historical context, discusses the main findings and

explanations for them, and finally, gives a status report on crosscultural studies. To date,
research on a child's theory of mind has focussed on describing characteristics of, and
establishing norms for, understanding the mind during the preschool years. Ages three and
four have received the most attention. Other issues such as the role of the environment and
consequences for an advanced or poorly developed theory of mind received little or no
attention; these issues remain unexplored. This literature review, reflects this imbalance.

2.1.

The field of "a child's theory of mind"

To date, investigations on a child's theory of mind have been limited to knowledge,
understandings, and awareness about one's own and other people's minds. Adults, it is
assumed, are aware that there exists in people's "heads" something called the "mind", an
unobservable entity and phenomena that underlies people's everyday, intentional, and overt
actions. To live, survive, compete, and cooperate with other people in the social world, one
needs a competent understanding of how one's own and other people's minds work, because
the mind is linked to what individuals do and how they relate to others through their actions
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(Bryne & Whiten, 1991). A theory of mind is often an indispensable "Machiavellian" tool
in humans (Whiten, 1991; LaFreniere, 1988), because individuals come to learn about the
mind by participating in a socially and informally constructed domain of knowledge and/or
human life experience called "folk psychology" (Forguson & Astington, 1988; O'Neil &
Gopnik, 1991).

2.1.1. Folk Psychology and the development of a theory of mind
Folk psychology is a set of understandings about how one's own and other minds work often
characterized as a "naive" and "commonsense" way of knowing. Unlike other domains of
human experience in the modem world that rely on scientific development and are developed
by scientific experts, folk psychology is an "everyday commonsense understanding" of how
people's minds work. It is a socially and informally constructed domain of knowledge
developed over time by generations of lay members of a society (Astington & Forguson,
1988; O'Neil & Gopnik, 1991). That aspect of its development gives it an indigenous
character and defines how it is learned. It derives its indigenous character from the
uniqueness of the history of each generation. Over generations, each society "scripts" how
the mind works and what role it plays in predicting and explaining human actions. Folk
psychology is one such script.

Developed over generations, folk psychology becomes neither an everyday invention nor an
individual's personal construction, but a cultural script available to members of the culture
to facilitate a competent understanding of how self and other minds work. Because the
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development of the script evolves through generations, it changes over time.

Each

generation remodels, and refines the script to reflect its own history and understanding about
how minds work. The nature and development of folk psychology lends itself to an
apprenticeship learning system. As children grow up in a society, they learn from more
experienced members of the society and construct their theories from working alongside
them. They become participants in an indigenous folk psychology. They learn about how
minds work from what has been developed by generations before them and build on that
knowledge for future generations.

As a script for understanding the mind, folk psychology is not only a domain of knowledge
about the mind, but a cultural tool that plays multiple roles. The multiple roles of folk
psychology in developing a theory of mind are summarized by Forguson and Astington
(1988) as the "psychological" and "metaphysical" components. The psychological provides
the language, content, and function of a mind and the metaphysical component its
relationship with the external environment.

The language of the mind is mental state knowledge. Mental states are products of one's
experiences stored in the mind as representations. These mental states are unobservable,
private, insulated from sensory touch, and transient (Wellman & Estes, 1986; Estes,
Wellman, & Woolley, 1989). According to Wellman (1992), there are two categories of
mental states; those that relate to people's knowledge about the world and those about what
we want from it. Knowledge based mental states are "beliefs" about the world. Mental states
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of belief include states such as guessing, knowing, supposing, expecting, conviction, and
doubt about the world. For example, if an individual opens a container labelled "BOOKS",
the mind creates a mental state of "belief' about the location of the books. If the knowledge
of the location of the book was through inference or information from other sources, rather
than the individual's direct perception, the mental state will also reflect the individual's
degree of conviction about the location of the book. Mental states of" desire" emerge from
emotional and physiological body states such as love, hate, thirst, or hunger which in turn
create mental states such as wants, hopes, wishes, likes, dislikes, and preferences. Consider
an individual who tastes a wild fruit for the first time. That experience may create in the
individual mental states such as desire or disgust that may direct the individual's attitude
toward that fruit in future, should the individual come across it again.

In folk psychology, these two categories of mental states (belief, desire) are the language of
the mind and are therefore the central constructs for talking about the mind (Wellman, 1992;
1993). Together these two mental states constitute the content of the mind. The content of
the mind is the sum of mental states of belief and desire that one creates from contact with
the environment. Wellman (1992) also suggested that when the mind is viewed as the sum
of mental states, metaphorically, it also becomes the "container" or repository that "houses"
mental states. Because of the centrality of beliefs and desires in reasoning about the mind,
folk psychology is also sometimes called belief-desire psychology. Belief-desire reasoning
is an explanatory conceptual framework for reasoning about the mind.
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The role of the mind in understanding one's own and other people's mental life is twofold.
The first is derived from the content of the mental states. For example, an individual who
wants a book will be directed to its location by his mental state of "belief' (a container
labeled "BOOKS") and one who desires an apple, ratherthan an orange will search for apples
and not oranges. The second is derived from its constructivist or transformative role.
Consider an individual who has just moved to a new house, who before moving knows that
books were packed in several containers labelled "BOOKS". His mind will have a mental
state of belief and desire for those books. If the individual wanted (desire) a particular book,
the mental state of "belief' about the location of the book is processed together with the
individual's mental state of" desire", to provide more accurate information about the action
to take. When he wants a particular book, and has doubts about its exact location, the mind
weighs both beliefs and desires to generate data for the most appropriate action to take. For
example, "since you are desperate for this book, you are better off asking for a copy from
your classmate, rather than going through all those containers right now, but ifyou decide
to do so there is also a possibility that your classmate may also be using it. " After that
processing, the individual may decide to go and ask for a copy from his friend, rather than
going through several boxes. The alternative could be going through the boxes, rather than
relying on a classmate who may also be using the book. This nature and role of the mind is
described as the "homuncular" function (Wellman, 1992). It acts as a central processor of
mental states.
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Wellman (1992) Wellman and Hickling (1994) said that the homuncular role of the mind is
illustrated by how it is reflected in language; for example, "... his mind tricked him .. ", ... "the
mind's eye" (Wellman, 1992: 269).

Thus, adults personify the mind. In this mode,

individuals personify the mind by giving it an independent role that creates an artificial
separation from the individual who "carries" it. Wellman illustrated this role as follows:

........ by analogy, the mind can be viewed (in a crude but useful way)
as a person in the head: a person who can be fooled leading to
misinterpretations; a person who can direct and order, leading to
actions; an inner person who works with ideas, crafting them,
constructing them, sorting them out just as an outer person works
with objects .... (Wellman, 1992:269).

An individual who understands the nature and function of the mind as a central processor
shows a competent understanding of the nature and function of the mind. He has a powerful
theory of the mind.

In summary, four aspects of the nature and function of the mind emerge from the discussion
of the psychological component. First, as an entity (the sum total of mental states), second,
as a container or repository that stores mental states; third as the causal link between the
individual and his actions; and finally, as a processor of mental states. In combination these
characteristics make up what is referred to as the mind. A child, an apprentice of folk
psychology, has to discover and learn the language of mental states (unobservable, private,
transient), major constructs of talk about the mind (beliefs and desires), and the nature and
function of the mind as the sum total of mental states, container and/or repository, causal link
to actions and processor of mental states. Those understandings help the child to understand
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that A can predict the actions ofB if A knows B's mental state (s) about the situation X and
the active role of the mind in those states. Similarly, if A observed B's action, A can explain
that action by attributing or imputing certain mental states and mental activity about the
situation X to B, because of the understanding that those mental states and the mental
activity behind those actions underlie B's actions.

The metaphysical component is the understanding that there is independence between the
mind and the external world of reality. An individual may believe that there are books in a
container labeled "BOOKS", or depend on his conviction that there were books the last time
he checked, when in fact at that particular moment the container may be empty, or contain
something other than books. Similarly, one's desire to have something does not necessarily
guarantee its fulfillment. Thus, a mind (in Wellman's homuncular sense) may be correct
about its belief about, and desires for the world, but still miss the mark. The world of the
mind is different from the world of external reality. An understanding of this aspect of the
mind helps one understand people's actions when they appear to thwart their desires; for
example, looking for a book on the book shelf when in reality, the book is on the desk. The
metaphysical component therefore not only provides information about the possible
discordance between mind and action on one hand, and reality on the other, but again, tells
one that people depend on their minds to carry out appropriate actions. However, an
individual's mind is not necessarily a copy of the world, but a representation of it (Perner,
1991).

19

How children develop an understanding of both components of folk psychology is the
business of the research on a child's theory of mind. To say a child has a theory of mind, is
to suggest that he understands the nature and function of the mind in both the psychological
and metaphysical sense. Thus, in discussing a child's theory of mind, we refer to questions
about what knowledge and understandings children have about this entity called the mind.
We ask what they think it is, the role it plays in predicting and explaining intentional overt
action, how that knowledge emerges and develops; and what it looks like at different phases
or ages, its origins, and developmental path it takes to adult-like theories (Astington &
Gopnik, 1991; Bower, 1993).

2.2.

Historical context of the study of a child's theory of the mind: Landmark studies

2.2.J. Piaget and the study of a child's understanding of the mind.
The study of children's understanding of the mind was initially investigated by Piaget in the
twenties (Wellman, 1992; Feldman, 1992). Piaget investigated an aspect of intellectual
development called childhood realism; the child's inability to distinguish between mental
phenomena and real things. The understanding that mental phenomena are different from real
things is an important developmental milestone. It signals an individual's capacity to develop
an understanding of the mind because mental entities are products of the mind that share
common characteristics with it. For example, mental phenomena are private, unobservable,
and insulated from sensory touch, and so is the mind. A real book is different from an
imagined one. Piaget found that preschool children tended to "physicalize" mental things.
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That is, children believe that mental things existed out there in the world and could be seen,
touched, and collected as other physical things.

Contrary to Piaget's findings, Wellman and Estes (1986) and Estes et al. (1989) established
that by age three, children know that a real cookie can be touched and seen by other people,
and that it has continued existence, while the same is not true for an imagined cookie. These
findings implied that by age three, children had the capacity to deal with the nature and
function of the mind. Wellman and Estes (1986), Estes et al. (1989) linked the capacity to
make the mental-real distinction to the capacity to develop a theory of mind.

Although Piaget did not directly investigate the child's understanding of the mind, but rather
the physical world as distinctly different from the mental world, studies on childhood realism
marked the beginning of investigations about children's understanding of the mind. In the
eighties, a new wave of research on a child's understanding of the mind, separate from
studies on stages in intellectual development and cognitive research, but linked to them,
emerged in Europe and North America. This new research not only investigated childhood
realism, but other aspects of understanding the mind. It included such issues as the nature
and structure of knowledge underlying a child's understanding, processes underlying or
responsible for development, the norms for different ages, and developmental milestones
during the preschool years that are linked to the development of a theory of mind.

21
Differences exist between Piaget's work and later studies not only in scope, but also in the
method and context of investigation. Piaget's studies viewed the child as a "lone scientist"
grappling to understand the physical world. Studies in the eighties shifted the investigation
from the child's understanding of the physical world to the social world, and a child's
understanding of the mind was thought to be anchored in an indigenous, socially, and
informally constructed domain of knowledge. The approach was not to investigate the child's
understanding of a world that existed "out there" independent of the child, but one in which
he was "immersed." It situated the child in cultural context (Feldman, 1992).

Although Piaget did not specifically investigate children's theories of mind, some of the
cognitive milestones he investigated such as perspective taking have been found to link with
the development of theories of mind. Flavell (1988) found a relationship between theories
of mind and perspective thinking. Children operating at perspective thinking level II had
more developed theories of mind than perspective I thinkers. This finding appears to suggest
that there may be a general cognitive skill that children rely on in construction of theories of
mind and perspective thinking.

Another important developmental milestone that emerges from Piaget's earlier work is
representational change. Astington and Gopnik found a link between representational change
and perspective taking. Children with problems in perspective-taking have problems with
representational change and false belief, important markers for powerful models of theory
of mind because they ignore the mental states and thinking processes of other people. Overall
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therefore, Piaget's work and contribution to the field of a child's theory of mind cannot be
minimized. His work laid the foundation for the study of a child's theory of mind.

2.2.2. Premack and Woodruff: Primate studies
The re-emergence of research on a child's understanding of the mind after initial
investigation by Piaget can be traced back to a study by Premack and Woodruff (1978) with
primates. Premack and Woodruff (1978) initiated studies on primates' ability to infer mental
states to people. Their working premise was that if a primate can impute unobservable
mental states such as knowledge, purpose, intention, and belief to self and others, and use
those mental states to predict and explain overt human actions, it had a "theory of mind."
Premack and Woodruff found that although primates could impute intention to human
beings, they had problems predicting an individual's action based on knowledge.

These findings generated the debate about the criterion for crediting one with a theory of
mind. Plylyshyn (1978) and Dennet (1978) suggested that chimpanzees did not display a
"rich interpretation" of the forces behind intentional overt human actions, and therefore
could not be credited with a theory of mind. Recall the psychological and metaphysical
aspects of the mind attributed to it in folk psychology. These aspects require the ability to
represent. In testing for the presence of a theory of mind, examiners search for not only a
child's ability to represent his own and other people's minds, but also to metarepresent; the
ability to form secondary representations from other persons' representations. Plylyshyn
suggested the following design to test the presence of theory of mind:
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..... somebody who has a theory of mind does not only have a
representation about a state of affairs (X) and stands in certain
relationships to these relationships to these representations (e.g.,
wanting x, believing x,, etc.), but must also represent these
relationships explicitly... (Wimmer & Perner, 1983: 104).

Developmental psychologists took up the challenge and designed methods to test the
presence of a theory of mind in humans rather than primates. The challenge was initially
taken up by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) when they designed and used a "false belief'
paradigm.

2.2.3. Wimmer and Perner: Original false belief method
In 1983, Wimmer and Pemer introduced the false belief method of assessing the presence
of a theory of mind. In this design, a child (subject of the study) was presented with a
narrative about an actor in cooperative and competitive situations. The first part required the
child to predict the actor's actions under normal situations, and the second to reason about
his actions in the competitive and cooperative conditions. The story was acted out using toy
items. The premise was that if a child was able to predict the actions of the actor in the
normal, competitive, and cooperative situations, he had a competent theory of mind. A
theory of mind in this design is tested through the child's ability to reason about false belief,
a mode of reasoning that requires the ability to metarepresent his and the actor's mental
states. Metarepresentation involves a "rich interpretation" of one's understanding of the
nature and function of the mind.
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The Narrative
Cooperative situation
Competitive situation
{Scene with match boxes
{Scene with cassette
fixed high on the wall}
containers low on the wall}
''Mother returns from her shopping trip. She bought chocolate for a cake. Maxi may
help her put away the things. He asks: 'Where should I put the chocolate?' 'In the
blue cupboard', says the mother.
'Wait I will lift you up there, because you are too small. '
Mother lifts him up.
Maxi puts the chocolate into the blue cupboard {A toy chocolate is put into the blue
match box.} Maxi remembers exactly where he put the chocolate so that he could
come back and get some later. He loves chocolate. Then he leaves for the
playground {The doll is removed} Mother starts to prepare the cake and takes the
chocolate out ofthe blue cupboard She grates a bit into the dough and then she does
not put it back into the blue but into the green cupboard. {Toy chocolate is thereby
transferred.from the blue to the green match box.} Now she realizes that she forgot
to buy eggs. So she goes to her neighbor for some eggs. There comes Maxi back.from
the playground, hungry, and he wants to get some chocolate. {Boy doll reappears.}
He still remembers where he had put the chocolate. "
Part I of the task
{BELIEF-question} Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?
{Subject has to indicate one of the three boxes}
Wimmer and Perner (1983:109)

In the above scenario, to be credited with a theory of mind, the child has to display
representational and metarepresentational ability. First, the child has to demonstrate how to
deal with Maxi's belief that the chocolate is still in the blue cupboard because Maxi's mind
formed that mental state when he put it there. Thus, he has to form a belief about Maxi's
belief (metarepresentation) that the chocolate is in the blue cupboard. Second, he has to be
aware of his own mental life by acknowledging new knowledge about the current location
of the chocolate, which is counterfactual to Maxi's belief (which is now a wrong belief),
because Maxi's mother transferred the chocolate to another location. Thus, he not only has
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to form a belief about Maxi's belief, but has to simultaneously represent his belief, about
Maxi's belief, and Maxi's wrong belief which is counterfactual to his own.
Cooperative situation

Competitive situation

However, before Maxi gets
a chance to get at the
chocolate his big brother
comes into the kitchen.
He, too, is looking/or
chocolate. He asks Maxi
where the chocolate is. 'Good grief, thinks
Maxi, 'now big brother wants to eat up all the
chocolate. I will tell him something completely
wrong so that he won't find it, for sure"'
Part II of the task (cooperative and competitive situations)
{'UTTERANCE' -question} 'Where will Maxi say the chocolate is?'
{The box indicated is opened}
{'REALITY'-question} (asked only if the box opened is found empty)} 'Where is the
chocolate really?'
{'MEMORY'-question-} 'Do you remember where Maxi put the chocolate in the
beginning?'
Wimmer and Perner (1983:109)

"OK, there he'll look, but he is
too small to reach up there.
There comes Grandpa and Maxi
says: 'Dear Grandpa, please help
me get the chocolate from the
cupboard' Grandpa asks: 'Which
cupboard?'"

This part of the design requires a child to display an understanding of the independence
between mind and reality (metaphysical component of folk psychology) as well as the ability
to metarepresent. For example, in the cooperative scenario, the child has to be aware that
although Maxi wanted the chocolate, he was going to point to the wrong cupboard -an empty
cupboard, because his mother had transferred the chocolate to the green cupboard. In the
competitive situation, although Maxi did not want his brother to have the chocolate, he was
going to unintentionally show his big brother the right box, because he did not believe that
it was there.
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The major finding from Wimmer and Pemer (1983) was that most of four, five, and six year
olds, but not three-year-olds, displayed metarepresentational capacity and also the ability to
deal with counterfactual evidence. Those who displayed metarepresentational capacity were
credited with a theory of mind. Three year olds said that Maxi would search in the current
and new location rather than the previous location where he last saw or put it. These threeyear-olds failed to predict Maxi's actions based on his false belief, because they could not
represent counterfactual evidence simultaneously, or generate secondary representations
(metarepresentations) of their own and Maxi's about the location of the chocolate.

The potency of this design to test all the critical aspects of a theory of mind along with the
finding that four-year-olds, but not three-year-olds had a theory of mind, generated a lot of
interest in the field of a child's theory of mind. A large number of studies replicated the study
by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) and confirmed the findings. (See Astington Harris, & Olson;
Whiten & Pemer, 1988; Frye & More, 1991; Cohen-Baron, Flursberg & Cohen, 1993 for
reviews.) Over time, the false belief design became the "litmus test" for the presence of a
theory of mind (Clements & Pemer, 1994; Hogrefe & Wimmer, 1986; Wimmer &
Weichbold, 1994; Dalke, 1995; Wimmer, & Hartl, 1991; Gopnik & Astington, 1988;
Hongefe, Wimmer, & Pemer, 1986; Pemer, Leekam, & Pemer, 1987; Wimmer, & Pemer,
1983). Researchers using this design gradually modified it to improve its format as, for
example, video presentation, play acting, involving the child in deceptive tasks, shortening
the narrative, or rewording questions (Glenn, Johnson & Parry, 1993; Siegal, 1991). For
example, Pemer, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) used the same parameters to develop the
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"unexpected change task". In the unexpected change task, a child is presented with a familiar
confectionery box, e.g., SMARTIES for the UK, and M&Ms for the US. A child is asked to
predict the contents of the box. After the prediction the examiner shows the child the
unexpected and real contents of the box at that time, e.g. crayons. The child is further asked
what he originally thought was in the box before the real contents of the box were shown to
him. Finally, the child is asked to predict what another person with no knowledge of the
current contents would think was in the box. The design of predicting from false belief and
testing the child's metarepresentational ability remained the same. Only the content of the
task was changed.

The second design to test the presence of a theory of mind in young children came from
Wellman and Bartsch (1988) and Bartsch and Wellman (1989) who developed a method that
differs from Wimmer & Pemer in both design and findings.

2.2.4. Wellman and Bartsch : Mental state attribution method.
Wimmer and Pemer (1983) did not present a theoretical framework for children's reasoning
about the mind, but tested for the presence of a theory of mind within the broader theorytheory framework. Wellman and Bartsch (1988) and Bartsch and Wellman (1989), Wellman
and Bartsch (1988) began from a specific theoretical framework. They placed the child's
theory of mind within an adult folk belief-desire reasoning theoretical framework. Their
premise was that children understand the mind through belief-desire reasoning.

This

explanatory framework is a mode of reasoning and an organizer of all issues relating to the

28

child's understanding of the mind. Wellman and Bartsch hypothesized that children's
reasoning about the mind operated within a "belief-desire" framework of adult folk
psychology. Since adult folk psychology is a mode of reasoning about the mind, the presence
of a theory of mind could be tested and measured against how competently a child uses that
system. Wellman (1992) represents this framework as follows:
2.2.4.1.

Belief-desire framework of adult folk psychology

Scheme for depicting belief-desire reasoning: Source: Wellman (1992:100)

- believe, suppose
- know, expect
- doul:JI, suspect

- see, hear, smell
- touch, feel

Perception _ _ _ _
.,

Beller~

;>/

Basic Emotions __-1.... Desire
- want, desire
Physiology
- love, hate, fear
- hunger, th~st
- pain, arousal

Action -----ll!J•Reaction
- hi, grab

- happiness,

- travel
- search
- mtend to

sadness
- surprise,
puzzlement
- guilt, dismay

-wish, hope
- ought, should

Simplified scheme for depicting belief-desire reasoning. A version ofthis scheme was first
presented in Wellman and Bartsch (1988) .
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A competent user of this system understands that reasoning about people's actions is driven
by beliefs and desires and that there are significant differences between them. First, beliefs
emerge from perceptual experience, while desires come from physiological and emotional
states. Second, people's actions are dependent on their mental states which are the causal link
between the individual and his actions. Third, actions taken on the basis of beliefs and
desires cause emotional reactions, which are different for beliefs and desires. Belief based
reactions cause puzzlement, surprise, or expectancy, where as desire based outcomes result
in sadness, happiness, guilt, dismay, or disappointment. For example, if an individual wanted
a book and believed that the book was in the kitchen, he would go to the kitchen because of
the belief and conviction about its location. If he does not find the book he gets surprised or
puzzled because of the previous conviction that it was there. Because his wish (desire) was
not fulfilled, he gets disappointed or sad.

Bartsch and Wellman (1989) and Wellman and Bartsch (1988), suggested that two types of
reasoning constitute a belief-desire reasoning system. The first type is forward reasoning, and
the second, backward. In forward reasoning, an individual has the ability to predict actions
and emotional reactions given the other person's beliefs and desires. In backward reasoning,
an individual displays the ability to explain an observed behavior by imputing relevant
beliefs and desires to the person. From this theoretical framework, Wellman and his
colleagues designed a mental states attribution method based on the adult belief-desire
reasoning framework.
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2.2.4.2. The mental state attribution method
Two types of tests represented the two types of reasoning. Each battery of tests had built in
tasks to control for and rule out alternative reasoning strategies. For example the 'not-ownbelief task rules out simulation strategies. This implies that children do not operate from a
theoretical conceptual framework but that when they are faced with a problem requiring them
to predict other people's actions, they imagine what the other person would do. The not-ownbelief task places a child in a position where their own belief is different from the actor's,
thus controlling for simulation strategies (reference to mental states attribution) thinking.
These tasks were necessary to control for non representational and mentalistic thinking. Non
mentalistic non-representational thinking is when a child refers to activities outside an
individual's internal mental states such as beliefs and desires to predict or justify his actions.
For example in 2.4.2.2 below, a non mentalistic thinker may say that Jane is looking for her
kitten under the piano because it prefers to rest there, rather than that because Jane believes
that it might be under the piano. One of the reasons why children were not credited with a
theory of mind in the false-belief task was that three year olds reflected non mentalistic non
representational thinking (Perner, 1989; 1991 ). The full battery of the two types of reasoning
are in Appendix I. For the purposes of this discussion two examples are given and discussed
below:

Forward reasoning
Sam wants to find his puppy. It might be hiding in the garage or under the porch. Sam thinks
his puppy is under the porch. Where will Sam look for his puppy? (Garage or porch?).
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To be credited with a theory of mind, the child had to reason that, since Sam wants to find
his puppy and he thinks that it is under the porch, he will search under the porch. The child
had to attribute a mental state of belief (thinks it's under the porch) and desire (wants to find
his puppy) to Sam, in order to predict his actions.

Backward reasoning
Here is Jane. Jane is looking for her kitten under the piano. Why do you think Jane is doing
that?

To be credited with a theory of mind the child had to impute mental states of belief (she is
looking under the piano, she must think it's there) and desire (she is looking for it because
she wants to find it) to Jane to explain her actions.

Both forward and backward reasoning included a justification component. Children had to
justify their predictions and explanations. This component gave the child the opportunity to
evoke belief-desire or other alternative reasoning systems. The key for both kinds of
reasoning is the ability to impute and/or attribute mental states to another person and use
those states to predict or explain his actions. Using this method, three categories of findings
emerged. First, was the emergence of a coherently organized reasoning system similar to
adult folk psychology; second, was children's knowledge about and use of the major
constructs of beliefs, desires; and third, since the study by Wimmer and Pemer (1983), for
the first time, three year olds were credited with a theory of mind.
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2.2.4.3.

Invoking a belief-desire reasoning system: Children's reasoning about
beliefs and desires.

Through the mental state attribution method, Wellman and Bartsch carried out several
studies that showed that children invoked a belief-desire reasoning system to predict and
justify an individual's actions. Wellman (1988); Wellman and Woolley (1989), Bartsch and
Wellman (1989) and Wellman, and Bartsch (1988) asked children to predict and justify
character's actions using the instrument in Appendix I discussed above. They found that a
coherent, systematically organized body of knowledge in the form of stages or phases
reflecting modes of thinking within the belief-desire reasoning systems emerged. Later, other
studies replicated these findings (Wellman & Bemajee, 1991. Wellman and Woolley, 1990,
Wellman, 1993; Wellman & Bartsch, 1994). Each stage showed a coherently organized body
of knowledge reflecting qualitatively different ways of reasoning about beliefs and desires
and different modes of reasoning about the mind. This system was demonstrated by how
children used beliefs and desires and how they invoked them to justify their responses.
Children's use of beliefs and desires and the various modes of reasoning that seemed to
emerge were organized by and around the following stages of development: simple desire,
desire-belief, and lastly, belief-desire.

Simple desire
The first stage of belief-desire reasoning is "simple desire psychology." It is often a
preferred mode of reasoning for two-year-olds. Their reasoning reflects a predominance of
desires. Thus, instead of acknowledging and recognizing the role of both beliefs and desires
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in predicting and explaining people's actions, two year olds ignore beliefs and only take
account of a person's desires. This mode of reasoning is influenced by a two-year old's belief
that people always take actions that fulfill their desires (Wellman, 1992). Two year olds use
and rely on this mode of reasoning, but with limited success. It does not account for all
phenomena about the mind (Wellman & Woolley 1989; Wellman, 1991;1992). As they gain
experience in using folk psychology, they discover that desires fail to explain many
intentional overt human actions. For example, why would Maxi take an action that thwarts
his desire (showing the big brother where the chocolate really is, or grandpa an empty
cupboard), by searching for an item he wants in the wrong place rather than where it really
is? The failure of simple desire to account for some phenomena leads two-year-olds to
occasionally consider beliefs. Occasional reference to beliefs gradually develops them into
desire-belief psychology.

Desire-belie/psychology
Desire-beliefreasoning means that although the child is predominantly influenced by desires,
he occasionally makes reference to beliefs, especially when the simple desire system breaks
down as, for example, inability to understand why Maxi would show his big brother where
the chocolate is, rather than the empty cupboard. Because the mode of thinking is desire
driven, the two-year-old reasoned that Maxi should show his grandfather where the chocolate
really is because if he showed him the other place, it would no longer be there. Like wise
when Maxi shows his brother where the chocolate really is, in two-year-olds' eyes that action
seems to thwart Maxi's desire to have the chocolate. Belief, in either case is disregarded
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because at this stage the mode of reasoning is desire driven. Older twos and some younger
threes appear to rely on this mode of reasoning (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch &
Wellman, 1989; Wellman, 1988, 1991). At the end ofthis period the child gradually realizes
the centrality of beliefs and the necessity of considering mental states of desire and belief
equally in order to generate reliable data for successfully predicting and explaining
intentional overt human action. This realization leads the child into the belief-desire
reasoning phase.

Belief-desire reasoning
According to Wellman and Bartsch belief-desire reasoning is used by children from three
years to adulthood. This kind of reasoning considers beliefs and desires and understands the
distinctions between them, including their relative functions in reasoning about intentional
overt human action. However, three year olds are only beginning to understand this
reasoning framework. Their understanding of the system continues to grow throughout
childhood as they gradually acquire the basic understanding that people's actions are
dependent on their beliefs and desires, and if one is to understand those actions, one has to
understand the mental life and activity behind those actions.

In each of these stages Wellman and his colleagues suggested that children reflect
qualitatively different conceptions, understandings, and modes of reasoning about the nature
and function of the mind, and that later stages are more powerful and inclusive than earlier
ones. This finding was the first evidence from research that a child's reasoning about the
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mind may be theory-like. The findings by Wellman and his colleagues that three year olds
had a theory of mind sparked controversy about the age at which a theory of mind emerges.
Their work contrasted with Wirnrner's and Pemer's (1983) and subsequent studies that found
that three-year-olds did not possess a theory of mind. The major sticking point was whether
the three year olds in Wellman's studies had the ability to impute beliefs and desires, a
characteristic consistent with the capacity to represent and metarepresent. Recall that
representational and metarepresentational capacity, the ability to impute beliefs and desires
to self and others, is a major criterion for crediting one with a theory of mind.

Disagreements between Perner and Wellman and Bartsch.

Pemer (1988, 1989 1991) disputed the evidence from Wellman and his colleagues. He
suggested that children from Wellman and his colleagues were using alternative nonrepresentational strategies. Recall again that in the false belief method children who
succeeded at the task were credited with a theory of mind because of their ability to
demonstrate mentalistic representational and metarepresentational thinking. Pemer asserted
that three year olds in Wellman's studies were not necessarily reasoning about beliefs in a
mentalistic and representational fashion; rather, they were reasoning as "situational
theorists." According to Pemer (1991), a situational theorist arrives at the same answers as
Wellman and Bartsch's three-year olds by matching the individual's belief or substituting
mentalistic terms such as "thinking of'' in referring to the actor's preference. For example,
a statement such as .. "Jane thinks that the cat is under the piano is understood as .. Jane
prefers to look under the piano." Children using both types of understandings may correctly
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predict Jane's actions, although the latter's prediction is based on a misconception. When
matching is the strategy, the child need not invoke mentalistic thinking, representational and
metarepresentational thinking. Wellman and Bartsch (1989) discounted Pemer's proposition
by arguing that their designs included more than one task to control for strategies that Pemer
was referring to. (See Appendix I for example of a series of tasks in the design). Data from
the control tasks did not show situation theorist reasoning, but mentalistic representational
thinking, Wellman argues.

Linked to this controversy was why three-year-olds, including those in Wellman's studies,
consistently failed false belief tasks despite attempts to simplify them. In the mental state
attribution design, although three-year-olds could not predict (forward reasoning) from false
belief, they could explain action based on false belief (backward reasoning). I believe that
on one hand, this result appeared to support Pemer's argument that three-year-olds did not
possess a theory of mind. Recall that in Wellman's adult belief-reasoning scheme, a child
who possessed a competent belief-desire reasoning system was one who was able to carry
out both forward and backward reasoning. In this case, they passed tests for backward and
forward reasoning using beliefs and desires, but failed forward reasoning when it involved
false belief. On the other hand, these three-year-olds were able to demonstrate an
understanding of the two major constructs of the reasoning system. It is not clear yet whether
false belief is a separate or a major construct in the belief-desire reasoning system, or a
process underlying its development. Thus, failing forward reasoning from false belief may
not be a clear criterion for not crediting a child with a theory of mind when he can carry out
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the two major types of reasoning using the two major constructs within the belief-desire
reasoning framework, including backward reasoning of false belief.

Wellman (1992) appeared to provide a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy in these
findings. Wellman agreed with the false belief design proponents that three year olds
consistently failed to predict from false belief despite improvements in the medium of
presentation (Wimmer & Hartl, 1991 Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Hongrefe et. al., 1986;
Pemer et al, 1987; Wimmer, & Pemer, 1983; Sullivan, & Winner, 1991; Clements & Pemer,
1994; Wimmer & Weichbold, 1994; Dalke, 1995; Wimmer, & Hartl, 1991; Hala, Chandler,
& Fritz, 1991). However, what Wellman (1992) disputed was the conclusion that failure to

predict from false belief alone was evidence that three-year-olds did not possess a theory of
mind. For Wellman, three-year-olds' failure was not a reflection of their non possession of
a theory of mind. Rather, it could be an indication that "false belief' may be another
construct or underlying process responsible for other aspects of the belief-desire reasoning
scheme that children will need to acquire during their childhood years.

Wellman and his colleagues get support from evidence that children younger than three
possess representational and metarepresentational skills (Lillard, 1994; Leslie, 1987 (a), (b);
1988). The evidence is reflected in language and pretend play. If children did not have
metarepresentational skills by age four as Pemer suggested, how else could younger children
engage in pretend play or develop a language? On the other hand, it is possible that Pemer
was not referring to general metarepresentational capacity, but to one specific to
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understanding the mind. If so, then Wellman and his colleagues' explanation is even more
plausible because they suggested that false belief could be a specific construct or skill within
the belief-desire reasoning system that children may master later; its lack did not necessarily
disqualify them from being credited with a theory of mind. Children's development of an
understanding of the mind continues through childhood.

Finally, it is important to note that there is also the possibility that these disagreements
resulted from using different designs, that had different criterion for crediting one with a
theory of mind. For Wimmer and Pemer (1983), the criterion was metarepresentation. For
Wellman and his colleagues it was mental state attribution, which subsumed representational
and metarepresentational capacities. Thus, Wimmer and Pemer appeared to have focussed
on underlying processes for a theory of mind, while Wellman and his colleagues searched
for the content or underlying knowledge. These differences do not necessarily make either
wrong, but may be a reflection of different lenses used to examine the same problem.

2.2.5. Chandler, Hala and Fritz: The Deception method
Wellman and his colleagues were not the only group that disputed the conclusions of the
false belief method. Chandler et. al. (1986) suggested that the false belief design
underestimated children's competencies. It was not context sensitive in both task and in
children's involvement. They reasoned that if the task was more realistic and concrete, and
children were personally involved in it, rather than participating as observers, they would
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display a theory of mind. They designed and used a "deceptive method" to test for the
presence of a theory of mind.

The deceptive method involved a child's invitation to prevent a competitor from retrieving
a hidden item by deception. A child was presented with three containers in which to hide an
item. In addition, he was given a toy puppet to help him hide from a competitor. The puppet
left footprints along the path to the hidden item. The child and the puppet could either hide
the item and wipe off the tracks, or wipe off the clues to the correct container and lay them
out to the wrong one.

Deception, they argued, was a reliable and valid test for the presence of a theory of mind
because it tapped skills similar to those required by the standard false-belief paradigm but
in a different and more context-sensitive manner. For example, in order for A to deceive B,
A has to intentionally misinform B by manipulating B's mental state (mentalistic and
representational thinking). This behavior reflects A's awareness that supplying misleading
information will change B's previous representation, consequently resulting in a behavioral
action different from the one that would occur ifB was acting on correct information and/or
previous mental states. The deceiver targets mental states because of the realization that
those representations are the causal link to overt action. A has to deal with counterfactual
evidence, i.e. what A wants/desires the other to believe, and B's current mental state.
Furthermore, A has to form a belief about B's new belief (metarepresentation) once wrong
information is supplied. In this paradigm, if a child was able to deceive another by either
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wiping away or laying out false trails to deny a competitor access to the hidden item, he was
credited with a theory of mind.

Using this design, Chandler et al. (1986) found that children as young as two-and-half-yearsold demonstrated the ability to strategically misinform others by laying out false trails and
removing clues. Hala et al. (1989) replicated these findings. Contrary to earlier findings that
four year olds, but not younger children, had a theory of mind, in these studies, children
younger than three were credited with a theory of mind. These findings lowered the age still
further than in Wellman's studies, to two and a half.

These results again spurred controversy regarding the ages at which a theory of mind
emerged. The proponents of the false belief method refuted these findings (Pemer, 1991 ;
Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Pemer 1991). They (Pemer 1991; Sodian, Taylor, Harris, &
Pemer, 1991) charged that the analysis and conclusions from the Chandler et. al. (1986) and
Hala et al. (1989) studies were flawed. Their own studies suggested that although two and
three year olds laid out or wiped away trails, they did not realize the consequences of those
actions on their opponents' mental states. Two year olds did not make reference to changing
the other person's mental states as the purpose of wiping trails. That realization was a critical
understanding of the nature of the mind because it showed an individual's mentalistic
thinking (reference to mental states), understanding the causal link between mental states and
actions, as well as the representational nature of the mind. Four year olds were more aware
of the impact and consequences of their actions (changing mental states to affect behavior)
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than three year olds. Their results, Sodian et al ( 1991) suggested, provided further evidence
that an understanding of false belief and deception emerged at around four years of age.

The challenge to Chandler et al. (1986) and Hala et al. (1991) was not so much to their
methodology, because even in Wimmer and Pemer (1983) the competitive situation in the
false belief paradigm had used deception as a method for testing the presence of a theory of
mind. Rather, it was the finding and conclusions that children as young as two and half years
had a theory of mind that created skepticism. Other researchers agreed with the premise of
the deceptive method to test the presence of a theory of mind, but failed to replicate the
finding of Chandler and his colleagues (Sodian, 1991; Sodian, 1994). Consequently few
researchers used this method and the findings were and have been largely ignored.

2.3.

Explanations for the development of a child's theory of mind.

The number of studies searching for the presence of a theory of mind in preschool children
increased after the work of Wimmer and Pemer (1983), Bartsch and Wellman (1988) and
Wellman and Bartsch (1989). A consistent pattern of findings emerged from these studies:
There were differences in performance and/or theories of mind between three and four year
olds. Four year olds, but not three-year-olds, were credited with a theory of mind. Even
according to Bartsch and Wellman (1988) and Chandler et al.(1989), who credited three-year
and two-and-half year olds with a theory of mind, four-year-olds still out-performed threeyear-olds who in tum out performed two-and-half-year-olds. There were significant age
differences between groups of children. The performance showed age trends with older
children out-performing younger ones. In addition, it was also clear that the period between
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three and five years was a "watershed" for the development and/or emergence of a theory of
mind. These results requires some explanation.

Three categories of explanations emerge from research. The first relates to global,
conceptual, and theoretical explanations about the origins and development of a theory of
mind. The second emerges from research findings specifically focussing on explaining
differences in performance or understanding of the mind between age groups, and the third
from design issues. The research focus on explaining the differences between three and four
year olds' understanding is not surprising since most of the controversy and differences in
performance has surrounded that age group.

2.3.1. Theoretical conceptual explanations about a child's theory of mind.
Theoretical explanations about a child's theory of mind are diverse and include theorytheory, innate predisposition, enculturation, simulation, and information processing
(Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Bower, 1993; Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1992). These
explanations do not necessarily explain the data emerging from research, but rather the
theoretical perspectives in conceptualizing child's understanding of the mind. The theorytheory is the only conceptual perspective that has provided consistent evidence about the
differences in understanding between age groups.
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Theory-theory
The theory-theory view suggests that throughout childhood, children construct a theory-like
body of knowledge for accounting for a variety of phenomena about the mind. Belief-desire
reasoning is believed to be one such body. This theory-like knowledge is not similar to
scientific theories formulated and used by scientists, but is a commonsense understanding
of how the mind works and what role it plays in predicting and explaining everyday,
intentional overt human action. To the extent that the development of a child's theory of
mind is a gradual construction of a theoretical, coherent and integrated body of knowledge
from which principles, laws, and generalizations about predicting and explaining one's own
and others' actions can be drawn and used, it is referred to as a theory (Astington & Gopnik
1988; Bower, 1993. Wellman, 1992, Wellman & Woolley, 1989).

The theory-theory perspective provides the most comprehensive evidence for theory
construction by children (Lewis & Mitchell, 1994; Frye & Moore, 1991; Astington et al,
1988; Wellman, 1992). From this perspective, children's theories about the mind can be
discerned at various stages of development. Each phase of development (simple desire,
desire-belief, belief-desire) reflects a unique and qualitatively different mode of reasoning
about the two major constructs of belief-desire reasoning. With experience the child
constructs a more powerful model to account for a variety of phenomena about the mind in
this case belief-desire reasoning (Wellman, 1992; Pemer, 1991; Astington & Gopnik, 1988;
Bower, 1993; Astington, 1993; Astington et al.1988). The suggestion here is that a theory
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of mind is not innate, but is constructed by the child from experience and interactions with
others (Wellman, 1992; Pemer, 1991; Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Bower, 1993).

Other explanations about theory construction comes from Astington (1993). Astington
identifies and describes three levels of reasoning about the mind. The levels Astington
proposes are modes of reasoning that also reflect the child's sequential development in
understanding the mind and the construction of a system for reasoning about the mind, each
qualitatively different from the other.

The lowest or zero level is a mode of reasoning without the ability to attribute, infer and
impute mental states to self and others. As indicated earlier from studies by Wellman ( 1990),
Plylyshyn, (1978) and Premack and Woodruff (1978), one marker for the presence of a
theory of mind is the ability to impute or attribute mental states to self and other people.
Research with autistic children (Happe' 1994; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; BaronCohen et. al., 1993) suggested that autistic children operate at this level. There is the
suggestion that the majority of these children have special difficulties with mental state
knowledge. They fail to attribute or impute mental states to self and others resulting in an
inability to be aware of their own and other people's minds. The autistic child's failure to
"read" people's actions is attributed to a lack of theory of mind, a phenomena dependent on
an understanding of mental states. Recall that mental states is the "language" of the mind and
if an individual has problems understanding mental states, the capacity to develop a theory
of mind is severely constrained.
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The next or first order level considers beliefs and desires in predicting and explaining
intentional overt human actions. A child operating at this level is aware that individuals act
on the basis of their beliefs and desires, and that predicting or explaining overt actions
requires imputing beliefs and desires. I believe Wellman and his colleagues tested this level
of reasoning. The second order level focusses on understanding how an individual targets
other people's thinking to affect what they will do. This level of thinking appears to be the
same level of thinking tested for by the false belief and the deception methods which used
its presence as evidence of a theory of mind. Recall the differences between Wellman and
Pemer on their findings. If Astington's levels of thinking are layered over the argument, at
some level, it appears as if they were testing different levels of thinking. Wellman and his
colleagues may have credited three year olds with a theory of mind on the basis of
Astington's first order level. From Astington's position, children performing at this level can
be credited with a theory of mind. Pemer and Wimmer (1983) on the other hand, appear to
have tested second order level thinking which is probably the reason it was more evident in
three and four year olds. It is a higher level of understanding of the mind.

Because of the developmental approach in this tradition, explanations about the differences
between age groups take a deficit approach. Three year olds are viewed as operating at lower
levels or modes of thinking, while four year olds are credited with more powerful and higher
level modes. Three year olds are not viewed as having precursors to a theory of mind, but
as possessing no theory of mind, because of some conceptual deficits such as lacjk of
metarepresentation (Astington & Gopnik, 1991).
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Innate predisposition
The main focus of the innate predisposition is explaining the origins of the human's capacity
to understand their own and other people's minds. Three views exist within this perspective.
First is the view that maturation is responsible for the development of an understanding of
the mind. A child's emerging understanding of the mind is therefore viewed as a by-product
of a maturing brain that manipulates information in increasingly complex ways. The more
mature the brain, the more efficient it is in handling and accounting for data about the nature
and function of the mind. The second view is that human beings are born with a Theory of
Mind Module (To MM) which is responsible for the development of a theory of mind (Leslie,
Baron-Cohen, & Frith, 1985; Bower, 1993). The suggestion here is that in the human brain,
there is an area responsible for processing information about mental states that allows every
child to theorize about the mind. The implication therefore, is that, if the ToMM is damaged,
as it is in autism, deficits in understanding the nature of mental life are created. The third
view is a philosophic one, but one that has significant impact and implications for
developmental psychology. Fodor (1987) argued that all human beings irrespective of where
they live, are born with the capacity to reason in belief-desire terms and/or develop a theory
of mind.

This latter position supports the theory-theory data of evidence of a belief-desire reasoning
system in adults and children. Although studies have not been carried out, its contribution
to explanations about the origins of the capacity to understand the mind and inferences about
differences between children appear to lie in evolving maturation in normal children, and
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interrupted development in atypical children as those with autism. Thus, although there are
differences in conceptualization between the innate predisposition and theory-theory
perspectives, the explanations for differences in performance between age groups are similar
in some respects.

The Enculturation hypothesis
The "enculturation hypothesis" is in direct contrast to the idea of innate predisposition. It is
popular with anthropologists as its the major focus is the context and process of
development. The major suggestion from this perspective is that modes of thinking including
reasoning about the mind are a construction of the cultural environment. From this
perspective therefore, each culture and/or environment defines the content, processes, tools,
and priorities for understanding the mind, essentially creating diverse, rather than unitary
routes and outcomes (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Kim & Berry, 1993). Recall that folk
psychology is an indigenous script for reasoning about the mind. From this perspective,
assumptions of the universality of a belief-desire reasoning system such as those expressed
by Fodor and Sterelny, must include evidence from the cultural context and/or its indigenous
psychologies. For example, findings on a child's theory of mind that emerged from Western
based research cannot be generalized to other cultural contexts because folk psychologies or
scripts about the mind may be different. The argument is that Western cultures encourage
different types of reasoning systems from non-Western cultures. In fact, Wellman (1992),
a major contributor to the knowledge about the development of belief-desire reasoning,
appeared to support this view. He speculated that belief-desire reasoning may be a product
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of Western, rather than non Western cultural environments. Wellman (1992) suggested that
a belief-desire reasoning framework is tied to one's "self agency," and self agency is a
product of Western, rather than non Western cultural environments.

The implication and suggestion from the enculturation hypothesis, therefore, is that a mode
of reasoning such as belief-desire is a product of an indigenous folk psychology, and thus
caution needs to be exercised in asserting its universality. Diversity in cultures limits its
generalization. This position appears to be reasonable if one considers that folk psychology
is an indigenous and socially constructed domain of knowledge that is crafted and scripted
by societies to learn how the mind works. To posit a universal theory of mind is to suggest
a universal folk psychology. Such a proposition is open to question.

The simulation and information processing theories.
These last two theoretical explanations, the simulation and information processing theories,
are less comprehensive than those first described. These two explanations emerged as
critiques of the theory-theory suggestion that children's knowledge about the mind is theorylike. The simulation theory argues that children do not construct a theoretical explanatory
framework at all, and that they need not do so. Their understanding of their own and other
people's mental life is through introspection and projection of their own experiences onto
other people (Johnson, 1988; Harris, 1988). For example when a child is asked to explain an
individual's observed action, a child may say "... how would I act in that situation?" instead
of " ... people act on the basis of their beliefs and desires about certain events." The former
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mode of thinking about the cause behind people's actions is a simulation strategy while the
latter is based on invoking a general theoretical framework about why people do the things
they do.

The information processing theory also opposes the theory-theory suggestion that children's
growth in their theory of mind is not due to the gradual construction of a more
comprehensive and competent explanatory framework such as belief-desire. Rather,
information processors regard theory of mind as an elaboration of the existing larger general
cognitive capacities such as memory, language, and thought. Thus, as children develop more
efficient cognitive capacities to deal with information about mental life, they become more
efficient in reasoning about the mind as well.

The "theory-theory" perspective is represented in the largest body of research evidence about
a child's understanding of the mind produced in the last decade. This perspective provided
a conceptual framework for studying a child's theory of mind, explained and supplied
evidence on the origins of a theory of mind, identified important constructs and markers for
a competent theory of mind, and mapped out paths of development (Astington & Gopnik,
1988; Bower, 1993; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994; Frye & Moore, 1991). All these aspects of the
mind are organized by an explanatory conceptual and/or reasoning system called beliefdesire. The other conceptual frameworks have either remained largely theoretical and
speculative, and/or have attempted to challenge the evidence produced by the theory-theory.

50

2.3.2. Explanations from research evidence: The second generation of studies on a
child's theory of mind.

It is important to note from the outset that the studies to be reviewed in this section used the

theory-theory perspective as their conceptual framework. These are "second generation'
studies that followed the initial studies which found differences in performance between age
groups. Two categories of studies attempting to explain differences between three and four
year olds emerged from this research. The first category explains children's problems in
conceptualizing the mind as emerging from poor theories of knowledge (Astington &
Gopnik, 1988; Robinson, 1994; Wimmer, Pemer, & Hogrefe, 1988; O'Neil & Gopnik, 1991;
Keenan, Ruffman, & Olson, 1994; Ruffman, & Olson, 1989; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987;
Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Pemer, 1986) and underlying developmental processes which either
foster or hamper their understanding (Pemer, 1991; Taylor 1988; Pemer & Ogden, 1988;
Gopnik, Slaughter et al, 1994; Beal, 1994; Wimmer et al, 1988; Yaniv & Shatz, 1988;
Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). The second group of studies also touch
on issues of design and/or methodology (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Wellman, & Bartsch,
1988; Pemer, 1988; Chandler et al, 1989; Hala et. al., 1991; Clements & Pemer, 1994;
Siegal, & Beattie; 1991; Dalke, 1995; Glenn et al, 1993; Sodian et al, 1991).

Children's theories of knowledge
Differences in theories of knowledge between older and younger children appear to be the
single and most significant explanation for differences in conceptualization of the mind.
Children younger than four years have problems understanding and utilizing sources of
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knowledge, making causal links between perception and belief, distinctions between seeing
and knowing, mind and action, and representational change.

Children's understanding and utilization of sources of knowledge.
One set of studies on children's theories of knowledge are those dealing with children's
understanding and utilization of sources and/or origins of knowledge (Pillow, 1989; Pratt &
Bryant, 1990; Sodian & Schneider, 1990; Sodian & Wimmer 1987; O'Neil and Gopnik,
1991; Taylor, 1988; Ruffman & Olson, 1989; O'Neil et al, 1992). Sodian & Wimmer (1987)
Pillow (1989) and Pemer et al. (1987) found that four, but not three-year-olds, understood
that a person's knowledge or belief about something is not only contingent on that person's
perceptual access to knowledge; but also on other sources such as inference. Three-year-olds
fail to attribute and/or credit knowledge to individuals who acquire it through means other
than direct perceptual access. The result is that children miss valuable information coming
from other sources. For example, they distrust information that comes through other people.
To the extent that the child mistrusts sources of information other than direct perception, his
theory of mind is limited.

Although children trust perception as the most reliable source of information, they only trust
it when it applies to them and not to others (Pratt & Bryant, 1991; Taylor, 1988). An input
that comes through other minds, although not totally disregarded, is considered as potentially
unreliable. For example, in studies by Robinson (1994) Pemer et al. (1987) and Pemer and
Wimmer (1988) using the unexpected change design, children chose to remain with their
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own previous belief, which was inferred from the picture of the box, rather than relying on
new second hand knowledge. That is, children gave greater weight to what they themselves
experienced rather than what they were told by other people. Failure to credit others with
knowledge even when those other individuals have had access to information, results in
wrong mental state attributions and consequently in poor prediction and explanation of the
individual's actions. Furthermore, failure to acknowledge the impact of new information on
one's mental representations, such as in the unexpected change task, leads to faulty
predictions and also shows limited awareness of one's own mental life and consequently, a
poor theory of mind.

Younger children do not only neglect information that comes through other minds or from
sources other than direct perception (O'Neil & Gopnik 1991), but also have problems
identifying the sources of their own beliefs. O'Neil and Gopnik found that three-year-olds
could not distinguish knowledge that they acquired through the various senses. They
concluded that failure to distinguish sources of information placed limitations on a child's
ability to recognize changes in his own mental states. In addition, not knowing which
information came from what sources also places limitations on a child's ability to assess the
accuracy and trustworthiness of information. If one relies on untrustworthy information,
neglects reliable sources of information, treats with equal trustworthiness or suspicion
information from different sources, the result is false impressions and inaccuracy in
predicting and explaining overt action (Nisbert & Ross 1980). The differences between
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children of different ages in understanding the mind therefore, may be due to differences in
proficiency in utilizing sources of knowledge.

Inability to make causal links between perception and belief, and distinctions between
seeing and knowing.
The inability to make causal links between perception (all senses) and mental states is the
fourth problem associated with deficient theories of knowledge. To Wimmer et. al. (1988),
it appeared that children younger than four had problems making causal links between
informational sources (Robinson, 1994; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987; Sodian & Schneider,
1990; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Sodian, 1988; Pillow, 1989; Keenan, Ruffin.an, & Olson, 1994;
Hogrefe, Wimmer & Pemer, 1986) and resulting knowledge (Gopnik, et. al., 1994; Yaniv
& Shatz, 1988; Taylor 1988 (a), (b); Gopnik et al 1994; Taylor, 1988 (a), (b)). Yaniv et

al.(1994) also found that a related problem was one of perception. Children had problems
making distinctions and links between seeing and knowing. Recall that in the Wellman and
Bartsch (1988) and Wellman (1992) belief-desire reasoning scheme, perception is the source
of beliefs, and belief is a major construct in the framework for reasoning about the mind.
When a child cannot make these links, and fails to make distinctions between them, he fails
to acknowledge or credit knowledge to self and others, resulting in poor predictions and
explanations.

Representational change
Another explanation for differences in understanding between age groups is understanding
of the concept of "representational change" (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Gopnik & Graf,
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1988; O'Neil & Gopnik, 1991; Ruffman & Olson, 1989). Representational change is defined
as the ability to acknowledge changes (or stability) in one's own and other people's mental
states. For example, in Maxi's false belief story, the child needs to realize a lack of
representational change in Maxi's mental state between the time he saw the chocolate and the
time he came back to look for it. At the same time, he should also recognize representational
change that took place in his own mental state because of his knowledge about the new
location of the chocolate. Pemer et. al. (1987) found that children younger than four failed
to recognize and acknowledge changes in their own mental states even after they had been
shown the contents of the package. Three year olds insisted that they had always thought that
the package contained the current contents even after being reminded of their initial response
to the question. In some cases, they chose to remain with their original belief despite new
information that the box had crayons and not M& M's. Four-year-olds on the other hand, did
not appear to have this problem. They acknowledged representational change when new
information was made available. Children who failed to recognize and utilize
representational change made faulty predictions.

Causal links between the mind as an entity and the individual's action
The fifth problem is the inability to make causal links between the mind as an entity and an
individual's action. This problem is tied to changes in the child's theory of mind between
ages three and five years. This explanation relates to broader conceptual deficits in threeyear-olds and qualitative changes in theory of mind in older three-four-and five-year-olds
(Pemer, 1991; Wellman, 1992). For Wellman (1992), and Wellman and Hickling (1994), it

55

is a child's inability to understand the mind in a homuncular function. This is the awareness
that a mind is not only a container or repository of information/ mental states, but also a
processor of that information, and that as an entity it is linked to actions. The ability to
understand the mind as an information processor Wellman (1992) suggested is a dramatic,
major conceptual theory change, and a developmental milestone towards a competent theory
of mind.

A similar explanation, but from a different perspective also comes from Perner (1991, 1990)
and Wimmer, Perner and Davis (1990). Perner and his colleague suggested that children fail
to make causal links between the mind and action because of their inability to understand the
representational nature of the mind. Children younger than four fail to understand that the
mind is not a copy of the world, but only a representation of it. The representational nature
of the mind may be linked to the metaphysical component of folk psychology, the
understanding that there is independence between the mind and the world (Astington &
Forguson, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1992). Thus, despite what the world looks like at
a particular time, an individual will act on what is represented in his mind and not what the
true and current situation is. Three-year- olds or younger children who act a "situational
theorists" totally ignore mental states because they match the desire to have an item and its
location without acknowledging change in others' mental state or representation. Recall that
according to Perner (1991), situational theorists ignore mental states, yet mental states are
the "language" of the mind. This leads to poor predictions and explanations, and
consequently reflects a poorly developed theory of mind. A child's understanding of the
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representational nature of the mind is measured by the false belief method. That
understanding is anchored in representational and metarepresentational ability.

The problems outlined and discussed above result in different theories of knowledge and
consequently in different theories of mind or modes of thinking about the mind at different
ages. Knowledge and/or belief plays a central role in one's understanding of the nature and
function of the mind. A theory of mind is as good as the knowledge base from which it is
constructed. What is clear from these studies is that, instead of having an integrated
knowledge base, younger children appear to have a loosely organized, and sometimes
conflicting, explanatory framework. It is evident from these studies that children's
understanding and utilization of sources of knowledge, and the consequences of knowledge
on mental states, affect their theories of knowledge, consequently their theories of mind. In
tum, the richness or deficiency in that theory of knowledge affects their level of
conceptualization and/or reasoning about the mind. To the extent that a theory of knowledge
is loosely organized, offers contradictory and often unreliable predictions and explanations
of intentional overt human actions, has deficits in underlying processes such as
representational change and the representational nature of the mind, the child displays a poor
theory of mind. 0 Ider children appear to have more efficient theories of knowledge and have
developed key underlying processes and constructs for a competent understanding of the
nature and function of the mind.
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2.3.3. Explanations from design issues
The third category of explanations for three year olds' problems in understanding the mind
has been attributed to problems in research design. Several researchers charged that the false
belief method, which is or became, the "litmus test" for the presence of a theory of mind and
widely endorsed by a large body of subsequent studies, underestimated children's
competencies (Wellman & Bartsch 1989; Chandler et. al 1989; Hala et al., 1991; Dalke,
1995; Siegal & Beatie, 1991; Hala et al., 1991; Fodor, 1992, 1991).

Wellman (1992) believed that false belief understanding is not the only test for the presence
of a theory of mind and that mental state attribution is an equally valid and reliable test.
Chandler et al ( 1986) and Hala et al. ( 1989) believed that if children were given meaningful
tasks that personally involved them, they would display competent theories of mind at
younger ages. Along the same lines, Dalke (1995) suggested that the false belief design did
not apply to context-sensitive problem-solving schemes that were part of the child's general
cognitive structures. Rather, it created artificial reasoning structures. From an ecological
perspective, Dunn (1991 (a) (b), 1995) suggested that natural environments such as the
family are good contexts for testing for the presence of a child's theory of mind. Children as
young as three who are often faulted for deficits in conceptual understanding about the mind
through the laboratory false belief task, show their understanding in teasing, joking, and
differential communication with members of the family. Thus, although children fail
laboratory tasks, their everyday lives and interactions with other people show that they have
a theory of mind. This methodology appears to be appropriate because it searches for the
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presence of theory of mind in everyday interactions. Recall that folk psychology is developed
informally through interactions with others, and it is a commonsense understanding of
everyday, intentional, overt actions. Despite the opposition to the false belief method,
however, it remains the most researched, replicated, and endorsed design as a valid and
reliable test for the presence of a theory of mind.

2.4.

Factors influencing the development of a theory of mind

The role of environmental and/or contextual factors on the development of a theory of mind
remains largely unexplored and a literature search on this topic shows that few studies exist.
The major focus of the last decade has been identifying and describing developmental norms
for a theory of mind during the preschool years. Dunn (1988, 1991(b),1994) studied the role
of the family and Pemer et al. (1993) the role of siblings.

Dunn investigated the development of a theory of mind within a social understanding
framework. She studied the role of interaction within families and made the following
findings. First, children used family relationships to test and develop their emerging theories
of mind. Everyday situations in which siblings cooperate, compete, and confront each other
offer opportunities for developing an understanding of other people. The intensity of sibling
relationships provides children with opportunities to anticipate and predict each other's
actions in order to effectively cooperate or compete with them. This finding is consistent
with Pemer et. al.'s (1993) finding that children with more siblings had more advanced
theories of mind compared to those who had no siblings. The second finding was that
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children relate differently to different members of the family. Dunn's conclusion was that
because each relationship presents a different context for understanding other people, each
relationship is negotiated differently. This suggests that children develop a theory of mind
about each member of the family, because over time, they learn to read their minds. Dunn's
last finding was that some families foster the development of theory of mind more than
others. Dunn (1988) and Dunn and Brown (1993) found that family contexts that linked a
child's actions to their effect on other people fostered their understanding of internal states
and also the link between internal states and actions.

2.5.

Consequences of a theory of mind.

To date there are few studies on the consequences of having a theory of mind. Dunn (1991,
1995) found that as children's theories change, so do their relationships with family
members. More powerful models of the mind help them predict, anticipate and explain their
own and other people's actions, and that understanding helps them negotiate their
relationships differently with different family members. A child's relationships with other
members of the family is dependent in part on the ability to discriminate between the minds
of individual family members.

Astington and Jenkins (1995) found that children's overall performance on false belief tasks
was linked to some measures of interaction during pretend play in school contexts. Children
who passed false belief tasks engaged in more purposeful joint play because of their ability
to predict and explain their peers' actions. Joint play requires making appropriate adjustments
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in relation to other peoples' thinking processes. In their study, Lalonde and Chandler (1995)
found a relationship between children's developing theories of mind and teacher ratings of
some aspects of social maturity. Those who passed theory of mind tests appeared to have
been rated as more mature than those who failed. These two studies are linked to successful
adaptation to school contexts where cooperation is expected. The implication one may draw
from these studies is that children with advanced theories of mind adjust better in school
contexts than those with lower levels of reasoning about the mind.

Finally, Astington (1993) on the basis of findings that were beginning to emerge, suggested
that the underlying processes of a theory of mind have significant impact on schooling. The
studies reviewed so far show that representation and metarepresentation are crucial aspects
for developing a theory of mind. These same processes are also relied upon, valued, and
developed by schools. Astington believes that "schooling" involves a way of knowing and
understanding the self, others, and the world; a kind of knowing that is different from that
which is used out of school contexts. It relies on representation and metarepresentation, both
of which are responsible for the development of a competent theory of mind and important
for school learning.

Two implications can be drawn from Astington's propositions. First, that children with
poorly developed theories of mind may find schooling difficult and/or may lag behind their
peers and second, that individuals who find themselves in schools that encourage these skills
while their culture places priorities somewhere else are also likely to encounter learning
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problems. Problems they may encounter could be due to discordance between the school
modes of reasoning on one hand, and indigenous cultures on the other. Also important is the
notion that schooling facilitates children's representation and meta representation skills
which in turn boost the development of a theory of mind. There is also the possibility that
unschooled children miss opportunities for developing competent theories of mind, unless
they get the opportunities in other contexts, such as in apprenticeship contexts at home.

2.6. Crosscultural research and a child's theory of mind
Crosscultural research on a child's theory of mind is sparse. Most studies carried out in the
last decade were in Western social cultural contexts. However, there is a large body of
research in anthropology on thinking (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Kim & Berry, 1993) and
cognition (Cole, 1990; Wertsch, 1985; Rogoff & Gauvain, 1986), from which inferences
about the development of a theory of mind can be drawn.

A large body of literature in anthropology shows that different cultures encourage different
types of thinking (Hardman. 1981; Rosal do, 1982; Duranti, 1985; Murkus & Kitayama,
1991; Schweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987 cited in Heelas & Lock (1981); Kim & Berry,
1993). For anthropologists, the major argument is that different cultures develop different
folk psychologies, and therefore different theories of the mind. Folk psychologies are cultural
tools used by different societies to script conceptualizations of the mind; consequently scripts
for how the mind works will vary from culture to culture. Crosscultural studies in cognition
suggest that different cultural contexts have different agendas, priorities, modes of
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development, and consequently different cognitive outcomes. It is therefore possible that a
theory of mind as an aspect of cognition, may also be a product of culture.

The post Piagetian approach of situating development in cultural context supports the
anthropological position. Vygotsky (1978) lays out a fundamental argument for cognitive
development in cultural context. Vygotsky denies the strict separation of the individual from
his social environment. He believes that each culture defines the parameters and priories for
development. For Vygotsky, cognitive development, which he refers to as "higher mental
functions" is embedded in culture. Vygotskian researchers such as Wertsch (1995), Rogoff
( 1990), Rogoff and Gauvian (1986) encouraged the study of cognition in cultural context
because they believed that culture scripts development differently. For example, the
Bushmen of the Kalahari are unlikely to learn about computers and children from Western
societies are not likely to encounter pressure to learn about tracking animal footprints. The
essence of this cross cultural literature is that culture is an organizer of human development,
one aspect of which is a theory of mind.

Some crosscultural research on child's theory of mind has been carried out (Wahi & Johri,
1995; Avis & Harris, 1991; Gardner et al, 1988; Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong & Qui, 1983).
Avis and Harris (1991) found belief-desire reasoning in two to six year old children from a
North African preliterate society. This study confirmed Western findings that three and fouryear-olds use belief-desire reasoning. Gardner et al. (1988) tested Japanese children on their
understanding of apparent and real emotions, an aspect of "desire" in the belief-desire
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reasoning system, and found that despite cultural differences between Western and Japanese
related to the expression of emotions (Ekman, 1973), an age trend similar to one found in
children from Western cultural environments existed . A general conclusion drawn from
these studies is that the mode of reasoning (belief-desire) and its correlates found in children
from Western societies appear to exist in non Western cultural environments. It is important
to note however that, currently there are too few studies to draw any generalizations about
development across cultures.

One study presents findings inconsistent with studies from Western cultural societies and the
crosscultural studies reviewed above. Wahi and Johri (1995) replicated the mental-real
distinction task, a correlate of a theory of mind, in three to eight year old Indian children, and
found that culture was a significant variable. Three findings emerged from the study. First,
three and four year-olds from both poor and upper class family backgrounds were unable to
make the distinction. Recall that children in Wellman and Estes (1986) study performed at
72%, 86% and 92% for three, four, and five year olds respectively. Wahi and Johri children
performed at 28%, 76% and 81 % for ages 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 respectively. These results show that
children in Wellman and Estes study significantly out performed Indian children. Within the
study itself however, findings consistent with age trends were found. Performance improved
with age. They suggested that these findings could not be explained by a developmental lag
alone, because three and four year olds from both affluent and disadvantaged homes
performed about the same level indicating a broader cultural factor.
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The second finding was that, overall, there was a significant difference between affluent and
disadvantaged children. The affluent group performed better than those from disadvantaged
homes. The study suggested that this finding was a function of culture. They attributed
differences between social classes as a function of exposure to Western-oriented schooling.
Advantaged children had more access to Western oriented schooling that emphasized
metacognition (Wahi & Johri, 1995). This conclusion appears to be consistent with
Astington's (1993) concept of second order level thinking and her suggestion that schooling
encourages second order thinking. Wahi and Johri also attributed differences between Indian
and Western children in attainment of the mental-real distinctions to cultural priorities in
development. Mental-real distinctions were probably not a priority for Indian communities,
they suggested. This suggestion is consistent with crosscultural studies in cognition that
propose that each culture scripts development differently. On the basis of these results, they
questioned the universality of a theory of mind despite results from other cross cultural
studies (Avis & Harris, 1991; Flavell et al., 1988; Gardner et al., 1988) that supported
findings from the West.

These studies, although few and scattered do three things for cross cultural research on a
theory of mind. First, their scarcity emphasizes the need to investigate this issue before
making widespread generalization of its existence crossculturally. Second, the diversity of
cultures demand more investigations to develop a data base for understanding how the
phenomena play out in different cultures. Third, research that has been done crossculturally
presents conflicting evidence e.g., (Avis & Harris, 1991 and Wahi & Johri, 1995). These
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three issues create a knowledge gap about children's understanding of the mind in general,
and in other cultures in particular. Cross cultural research may help illuminate on how the
phenomena plays out in different cultural contexts.

2. 7.

Conclusion.

The research reviewed in this section suggests that children do not haphazardly reason about
the mind. Their understanding of the nature and function of the mind and the problems they
struggle with is organized into a belief-desire reasoning system. Older children have more
powerful modes of reasoning than younger ones, and the reasoning between them is
qualitatively different. In studies of a child's theory of mind carried out in the last decade,
the theory-theory tradition has been the most productive in both scope and explanations for
a child's understanding of the mind. Other perspectives have remained largely speculative
and theoretical. Despite its lack of productivity compared to the theory-theory, the innate and
enculturation hypotheses present the strongest justification for carrying out cross cultural
studies. Rather than making the assumption that children's understanding of the mind is
similar or different everywhere they present the researcher with ambiguities and paradoxes
that requires new research. This study is a step toward that agenda.

The enculturation hypothesis not only presents persuasive arguments for examining a child's
theory of mind in cultural context, but also directs the next generation of studies of cross
cultural studies to examine external factors that may impact on the development of a child's
theory of mind. Crosscultural studies can search for the universality of this phenomena and
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also explore the influence of the environment on a child's understanding of the mind. The
major question is, 'how do children in different non-Western societies reason about the
mind?' It is a question that should be investigated by the next generation of research on a
child's theory of mind. This study will investigate the existence of belief-desire reasoning
in children from a literate but non western cultural context.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1.

Design

The research design, the phenomena under investigation (belief-desire reasoning), and the
instruments used in this study are framed by the theory-theory tradition. The purpose of the
study is to search for evidence of the existence of belief-desire reasoning, an explanatory
framework for reasoning about the mind found in children from a less industrialized nonWestern, but literate socio-cultural contexts. A pilot study to explore and field-test
instruments was carried out and the findings were used to improve the design of this study
(Dyanda, 1996). The study searched for the existence of belief-desire reasoning in eight-yearold, indigenous, schooled and unschooled children in Zimbabwe. This translated into the
following design.

Ethnicity
School experience
Schooled
UnSchooled
Total

=

Shona, Ndebele
Schooled and unschooled
Shona
Ndebele

50
50
100

50
50
100

Total
100
100

200

To search for evidence of belief-desire reasoning in eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and
unschooled Zimbabwean children, the study used a between and within group design. This
design enables one to compare the performance of schooled and unschooled, Ndebele and
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Shona and the four groups (Shona schooled, Shona unschooled, Ndebele schooled and
Ndebele unschooled). Children were classified according to their school experience and
ethnicity. This was an appropriate design for examining between and within group
differences (Kerlinger, 1986; Hays, 1994; Cook & Campbell, 1976; Cone & Foster 1993).

The decision about the size of the sample used was made following Cone and Foster's (1993)
guidelines on liberal and conservative requirements for sample size in quantitative research.
The conservative approach includes any sample size between seven and twenty per variable.
This study worked with eight variables. Gender, grade level, number of siblings, religion,
and residence (demographic variables), ethnicity and school experience (independent
variables) and belief-desire reasoning (dependent variable). Because the study hoped to shed
light on the universality of belief-desire reasoning through evidence from children in
Zimbabwe, a minimum of twenty subjects per variable was adopted to maximize the power
of statistical analysis, results, and generalizability of findings to Zimbabwe. The study used
a sample of 200 subjects.

The dependent measure was belief-desire reasoning. Three different methods were used to
search for the existence of belief-desire reasoning. The majority of studies on a child's
theory of mind carried out in the last decade used experimental methods. This study followed
that approach as well. The instruments were the "mental state attribution" from Bartsch and
Wellman (1989) and Wellman and Bartsch (1988); false belief (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983)
and unexpected change (Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). All three methods search for
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the child's understanding of the mind through belief-desire reasoning, but from different
perspectives. The mode of presentation was story narratives about everyday, intentional and
overt human actions. Language ability on its own has not been found to be an impediment
for developing a theory of mind (Chandler, 1988; Happe', 1995). However, controls in the
form of recall questions to ensure that children understand the events in the narrative/story
before they are presented with the critical question are encouraged, so that a child's failure
cannot be attributed to poor memory.

3.2. Geographical location of the study
Zimbabwe is divided into eight geographical provinces and four of them were used in this
study: Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Midlands, and Matebeleland North. These provinces
were selected for two reasons. First, to generalize results to Zimbabwe, a representative
sample of Zimbabwe's eight provinces was necessary. Second, these provinces represent
typical populations of the two ethnic groups, but sampled from different regions of the
country. The dominant ethnic group for Matebeland North is Ndebele. The Ndebele are
mainly located in two provinces, Matebeleland North and South. The Shona predominate
in Mashonaland East and Manicaland. Midlands is the central region, and has a mixture of
the two ethnic groups. Midlands was chosen to represent the population in the central region
of the country. In addition, it had the potential for explaining some of the data because it is
the only region where significant interaction between the two indigenous psychologies is
evident.
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3.3. The study sample
3.3.1. Characteristics of the sample
The sample consisted of eight-year-old, schooled, and non schooled children from
Zimbabwe's two indigenous ethnic groups, the Shona and the Ndebele. The Shona make up
80% of the Zimbabwe's population and Ndebele 19%. The other groups are 100,000
White/Caucasian of British and/or other Western origin, 20,000 Asian, and 20,000 people
of mixed origins. Zimbabwe has a population of approximately 11 million people (O'Toole,
1988).

The decision to use age eight was based on Western based studies and on my pilot data.
Western based data show that belief-desire reasoning emerges between ages three and four
(Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Astington et al., 1988), and continues to develop through
childhood (Wimmer & Perner 1983; Wellman, 1992 Perner, 1992; Astington, 1993;
Astington et al., 1998; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994; Wimmer & Perner, 1988; Bartsch &
Wellman, 1998; Robinson, 1994; Wimmer et al, 1988; Sodian, 1994; Wellman & Bartsch,
1994; Astington & Gopnik, 1988.). This study assumed that if belief-desire reason existed,
it should be evident by age eight. In addition, my own pilot data from schooled Shona
children from three provinces appeared to show that a developed belief-desire reasoning
system was more evident in seven and eight year olds than four and five year olds.

The sample also included the other characteristics summarized below. Of the 200 children,
86 were male and 114 female; 86 were defined as following the Christian religion; 89 were
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traditional; 23 mixed, i.e., Christian and traditional, and two could not be classified. The two
children who were not classified did not respond to requests for their family's religion. The
study used four out of the eight political regions of Zimbabwe. Eleven (11) children were
from Mashonaland East, 49 from Manicaland, 53 from Midlands, and 87 from Matebeleland
North. The study also requested information regarding the number of siblings for each child.
One child had no siblings, 15 had one, 31, two; 55, three; 31, four; 65, five; and two did not
provide information about the number of siblings they had. Although overall children were
classified as schooled and unschooled, for those in school, specific grade levels were
requested, and were as follows: Forty nine (49) were in second and 51, in third grade.

3.3.2. Method of selecting subjects
The study used purposive sampling to eliminate children who had known developmental
problems that affected cognitive development and performance, and also geographical areas
that had pervasive malnutrition in the past. Developmental delays, malnutrition and some
cognitive handicaps have been linked to poor cognitive development and performance. It was
important for the study to minimize poor performance due to causes other that the absence
of belief-desire reasoning. Zimbabwe does not have standardized instruments to screen
children who may be developmentally delayed, cognitively handicapped, nor systematic
records to determine if malnutrition had occurred at some point in time. In the absence of
formal and reliable instruments and records to screen children, intensive informal interviews
with parents, guardians, and teachers were carried out to screen children. In addition,
children were asked to retell short stories from the culture to further screen them for memory
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problems. Children who could not satisfactorily retell the story or recall episodes of the story
were eliminated. Two measures required the ability to listen and respond to narratives and
it was important for the study to also rule out poor performance due to poor memory.

Schooled children were located through their educational districts and schools. Because non
schooled children were unlikely to be involved in formally organized activities (such as
schools), they were located through informal contacts such as neighbors, relatives, village
leaders, community centers, and places where they worked e.g., in grazing lands herding
cattle. Children who were not in school were selected from areas surrounding selected
schools to minimize variation in environmental conditions between groups of children.

3.4.

Study variables

3.4.1. Independent variables.
The study used two variables, ethnicity and schooling, to create groups from which evidence
of belief desire reasoning was sought. These two variables are often linked to the
development of cognition, including reasoning about the mind (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Kim
& Berry, 1993 Olson, 1971; Brown, 1978, Huttenlocher, 1976; Rogoff, 1990; Cole, 1990).

Post Piagetian research emphasizes examining children's development in cultural context
(Feldman, 1992). Ethnicity is one of the significant variables that defines cultural context in
non-Western societies (Mbiti, 1975; Gelfand, 1979; Bourdillon, 1987; Gelfand, 1992).
Ethnic systems of reasoning about people and the world are passed down over generations
through apprenticeship systems (Shumba, 1994; Bourdillon, 1987). Ethnic groups define

73

sources of knowledge and language about the mind, standards for judging peoples' actions,
and provide experiences for fostering that understanding. The experience of schooling has
been found to be a significant variable influencing cognitive development in non-Western
societies (Wellman, 1992; Wahi & Johri, 1995; Olson, 1977; Brown, 1978; Huttenlocher,
1976).

For example, Western type education systems have been found to impose

fundamental changes on people's ways of knowing and views of the world, and differences
in thinking modes between schooled and non schooled individuals have also been found
(Olson, 1971; Brown, 1978, Huttenlocker, 1976; Wahi & Johri 1995). These variables were
therefore considered appropriate independent variables for the study.

The study

operationalized these two variables as follows:

Ethnicity
Zimbabwe's indigenous cultures are patriarchal (Shumba, 1994). The consequence of this
system is that the child's ethnic group is determined by the ethnic group of the father
regardless of inter-ethnic marriages. For the purposes of this study however, special
definitions were used to define the child's ethnic group. A child was assigned to an ethnic
group only if both his parents were from the same group. Children from inter-ethnic
marriages were excluded from the study.

Schooling experience
Children who were defined as having no experience in schooling excluded children who had
dropped out of school. Only children who had never been to school, or who had attended
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school for less than a term (semester) were regarded as unschooled. Eight-year-old schooled
children would normally be in their third year of schooling; however, there is great
variability in school entry age in Zimbabwe. Although the official school age entry level is
six, it is not uncommon to find eight-year-olds in first or second grade. Because of the
government's goal of universal primary education, no child is barred from school or any
grade because of age, unless the child's age is too different from the other members of the
class. Since age, and not grade level, was the initial criterion for subject selection, the study
recruited eight-year-olds in second grade as well as those in third. These children participated
because I believed they could explain data related to schooling experience if grade level
trends were found.

Biographical variables
A limited number of variables for biographical data that had potential to explain some of the
data were also considered. These were gender, grade level, number of siblings, religion, and
geographical residence. Except for one, number of siblings, investigated by Pemer et al.
(1993) and Dunn (1991 a, b; 1994), no studies have examined their relationship to the
development of a theory of mind. This study used them as exploratory variables.

3.4.2. Dependent Variable
There was one dependent variable in the study; belief-desire reasoning. Both the content and
key underlying processes for this mode of reasoning were measured. Three different designs
were used to search for this dependent variable.
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3.5.

Instruments/ Materials.

There are no standardized instruments in the field to test for the presence of a theory of mind.
However, there are three measures frequently used and endorsed as competent tests for
searching for children's understanding of the mind through belief-desire reasoning. They are
the Wellman and Bartsch (1988), and Bartsch and Wellman (1989) mental state attribution,
Wimmer and Pemer (1983) false belief, and Pemer et al., (1987) unexpected change designs.
Historically, these three instruments are viewed as land marks in the study of a child's theory
of mind and they were used to collect the data.

3.5.1. Mental state attribution method (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988 and Bartsch &
Wellman 1989, Appendix II.)

This instrument tests whether a child uses a belief-desire mode of thinking in reasoning about
the mind, and ifhe does, how competently he uses it. This understanding is sought through
children's mental state attribution of belief and/or desire to the characters in a story. The tasks
in the instrument use two major constructs of belief and desire within the belief-desire
reasoning system. There are two parts to this measure. One part (Subtest 1) tests forward
reasoning (prediction) and the other (Subtest 2) backward reasoning Gustification). This
study tested forward reasoning through prediction, and backward reasoning, through
justification of those predictions. One modification to the instrument was made. Instead of
using one character and name across all four short stories, different character names were
used in each story to help children distinguish between the narratives. This modification
helped to deal with the problem of redundancy in using one character in all stories. It also
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helped clear up possible confusion that could arise in using one character in similar tasks.
Wellman's studies used the same character in all tasks. Data from my own pilot study
showed that children were confused by this use of character names. For example, the
children in the pilot found the narratives confusing when in the belief attributed to the same
character differed because although the stories were similar in content, and the same name
was used in all, the beliefs attributed to that character were different in each story. The
children challenged the interviewers saying, "that was not what the previous story said
about...(name of character)."

This method is a reliable and valid test for belief-desire reasoning for five reasons. First, by
giving children tasks that explicitly include belief-desire constructs, it provides children with
the opportunity to demonstrate how efficiently they use or invoke that particular system and
no other system. Second, by requiring them to explain their predictions, children are also
provided with the opportunity to invoke any alternative systems. Thus, in the same measure
one is able to test children's use of and competence in using the system, and also provide
children with opportunities to invoke other system (s) than belief-desire. Third, the method
requests children to listen to the narrative framed by a belief-desire mode, and then asks them
to reason from it. Thus, instead of speculating that the child is probably using belief-desire
reasoning, (which is the case in the original false belief and unexpected change designs) the
child has to invoke it. Fourth, through justification of prediction, it tests children's
understanding of the constructs of beliefs and desires when attributed to the same character.
Finally, an historical perspective on the study of a child's theory of mind, this measure has
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made significant contributions by providing an alternative assessment method, and also new
findings about the development of the belief-desire reasoning systems.

3.5.2. The Traditional false-belief task: Wimmer and Perner (1983) (Appendix III)
This method is the oldest and most frequently used measure in the field. The child is
presented with a narrative of a character with a false belief about the location of an item. The
child is then asked to predict (forward reasoning) the characters action from that false belief.
This measure not only searches for evidence of reasoning from false belief, but also reveals
the child's understanding of the representational nature of the mind. In the false belief design,
understanding the mind as representational is the litmus test for the presence of a theory of
mind (Wimmer, & Pemer, 1983; Pemer, 1991).

This instrument has historical significance. It was the first instrument designed to test for the
presence of a theory of mind and has been used repeatedly over the years. Over time, it
became and is regarded as a valid and reliable litmus test for the presence of a theory of
mind. Although attempts have been made to improve its design by changing the language,
materials and questions (Glenn et al. 1993; Siegal & Beattie, 1991 ), the major tenets of
"false belief' design have remained intact. Despite criticisms and modifications, there is
more consensus on its validity and reliability than for any other instrument in the field.

I made an addition to this instrument that did not affect the overall design of the study. In
addition to predicting the actor's behavior from false belief, children were asked to justify
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their predictions. This addition was necessary to rule out other alternative reasoning systems.
Furthermore, children's justifications could include qualitative data that would reveal other
reasoning or alternative systems and/or reasoning strategies.

3.5.3. Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) Unexpected change task (Appendix IV)
A child is presented with a familiar box (SMARTIES in the UK, M&M's, in the US) with
different contents, e.g., crayons. Before the container is opened, the child is then asked to
predict (forward reasoning) the contents of the package. After prediction, the child is
requested to predict what another person may think is in the package before opening it. The
purpose of this task is to determine if children understand their own and other people's minds
through their understanding of representational change. Representational change is one of
the most important aspects of belief-desire reasoning and understanding the mind (Lachohee
& Mitchell, 1994; Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). Unlike the other
two instruments that request children to recognize representational change, and predict the
actions of other people, this instrument searches for the child's understanding of his own
mind as well.

Three changes were made to all instruments to suit the Zimbabwean context relating to
content, language, and mode of presentation. The content of the tasks were replaced with
experiences familiar to Zimbabwean children. For example, in the Wellman and Bartsch
instrument, herding cattle replaced searching for a kitten under the porch or piano. Herding
cattle is a common experience for the majority of indigenous children in Zimbabwe. In the
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false belief measure, sweets (local term for candy) replaced chocolate, and cupboards were
replaced by bags. Indigenous Zimbabwe children have more experiences with candy than
chocolate and most rural homes do not have cupboards. In the Unexpected change task,
SMARTIES (UK) M&Ms (US) boxes were replaced by a the box of detergent box. In one
remote study area, however, the detergent box was replaced by a box of matches because
some children did not recognize the detergent package. Second, the language of the
instruments was changed; they were translated into the two indigenous languages of Shona
and Ndebele. Although English is the medium of instruction in schools from third grade, the
language of commerce and industry, and some aspects of government, it is not the first
language of most Zimbabweans.

Language is often a significant variable in discussions of cognition (Bartsch & Wellman,
1995; Fox, 1992). One's language marks descriptions and understandings of the mind, and
is sometimes viewed as a cultural tool for thinking (Wellman, 1992; Vygotsky, 1978). In
addition, crosscultural studies on language show that languages differ in syntax, lexicon, and
semantics (Maratsos, 1988). The language about the mind that children would have
encountered by eight years of age are likely to be that of first language, rather than English.
For these reasons, the instruments were translated from English to the two indigenous
languages. Children's responses were translated into English before coding.

The narrative mode of presentation was considered appropriate because Zimbabwe has a
long- standing oral tradition. However, the story narration was modified to the local folktale
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leading sentence "Once upon a time .... ", and stories were not read, but told. Pilot data
information suggested that some younger schooled children viewed the stories and the
questions as formal comprehension passages similar to those in school; for example, instead
of identifying the characters and the beliefs and desires attributed to characters, some
children replied that they got the answer from the passage. For example, "It is in the passage
"or" I heard that as you read." When a narrative does not have a leading folklore sentence,
such as "Once upon a time .. ", it is usually not regarded as a story, but a narration of ordinary
everyday events; ordinary everyday events are not stories in the Zimbabwean context. A
leading sentence of "Once upon a time" alleviated that problem and also focused the child
to the characters in the story. Furthermore, because Zimbabwe has an history of oral tradition
children understand "stories" as those told from memory rather than read from books. Beside
these changes, the structure and principles of designing these tasks remained close to the
original designs and did not affect the overall designs of these measures.

In summary, three measures and designs were used to search for evidence of belief desire
reasoning. Inherent in these measures is not only a search for the content of the reasoning
system, but for the understandings about the mind a child acquires through the childhood
years if and as he develops a belief-desire reasoning system. Using three instruments rather
than one, was recommended by Astington and Jenkins (1995) as a way to not only
compensate for the weaknesses each may have when used alone, but also maximize the
aspects of understanding of the mind being studied. The researcher hoped that together these
three measures would present a comprehensive and rigorous test for belief desire reasoning
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and the presence of a theory of mind in Zimbabwean children from which generalizations
about the Zimbabwean context can be made. Such rigorous testing is necessary to gather
credible evidence of a developed model of belief-desire reasoning.

3.6.

Procedure

3.6.1. Task administrators
Two sets of research assistants worked in each region. The first set screened children for
obvious developmental delays, cognitive competence through story telling, and any known
health problems. The second set administered tasks in all three research instruments.
Research assistants for screening children and administering tasks had to be different for
each region not only to reduce costs, but also because of language and dialect differences.
All research assistants were first speakers of the language spoken by the children.

All research assistants except two had four years of secondary education plus one or two
years of teacher training experience. In Matebeleland North however, task administrators
had only two years of secondary education. These were community members who spoke the
children's dialect. Their supervisor, however, had four years of secondary education and a
teaching experience of over ten years. Supervisors in two other regions had the following
educational background: one supervisor had a Masters in Educational Psychology and the
second a B.Ed. in Teacher Education.
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3.6.2. Training/or task administrators
To reduce task administration differences, intensive training was carried out in all regions.
The major purpose of training was to reduce task administration differences and prepare the
research assistants to tell rather that read stories. All research assistants worked under
supervisors.

3.6.3. Task administration
Research assistants who collected data did not code children's responses, and vice versa.
Supervisors and research assistants were blind to the hypothesis of·the study and the
principal researcher was not actively involved in collecting and coding children's responses.
This approach was designed to reduce experimenter bias by limiting unintentional
interference with data collection and coding processes (Cone & Foster, 1993). However, the
principal investigator trained and supervised research assistants, and acted as referee during
coding.

The three tests used in this study each had varying number of subtests. For the Wellman and
Bartsch and Wimmer and Pemer, there were two subtests in each measure; one for
prediction, and the other for justification. The Pemer et al had three subtests, and all were
for prediction. The mode of presentation and structure of the tasks was similar in all three
measures. Because the designs were similar, to minimize fatigue and task confusion, tests
were presented in two sessions, rather than one, but on the same day and within the same
time block. The Wellman and Bartsch measure was administered on its own because it had
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eight tasks, and the other two together because the Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et. al had
two and three tasks respectively. The order of testing in the Wellman and Bartsch test as
well as presentation was random.

Standard answer sheets (Appendix V) were used to record children's responses. Justification
responses were written down as the child dictated them. All stories were told not read,
however each interviewer had a standard story sheet for reference whenever necessary.
When the examiner read the story it was done as discretely as possible. All answers were
recorded at the time of the child's response, and all biographical data was completed before
testing.

Schooled children were tested in schools, and non-schooled children wherever they were
because it was not possible to transport them to one particular place. Attempts were made
to get quiet rooms or places for administering the tests. The interviews took place in a quiet
area or room with

the examiner and interviewee sitting facing each other. Test

administrators picked children for testing from a common pool, so that a child was not tested
by the same examiner in all three measures. Children who had been tested went to a separate
room/place from those still to be tested in order to prevent subject interaction before testing
was complete.
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3. 7.

Data analysis

Two kinds of analysis were used in this study. First was the global description of overall use
and performance of the children in each measure, Second was an inferential analysis that
compared performance between and within group performance using the independent/study
and demographic variables. The descriptive level reports frequency scores to determine the
level of children's use of belief-desire reasoning and the inferential, mean scores to compare
the level of use between and within groups.

3. 7.1. Type of responses and scoring
Two types of responses were collected, coded, and analyzed for all measures except for the
Pemer et al. One type of response was for prediction (forward reasoning) and the other for
justification/explanation (backward reasoning). Each measure was scored and analyzed
separately. The unexpected change measure had prediction tasks only. Responses were
scored in the following two ways: First, as categorical data where children's responses were
scored as positive when a child invoked belief-desire reasoning and negative when he did
not. Second: as continuous data. A child was awarded a score of one (1) for invoking beliefdesire reasoning and a zero (0) for negative responses. This coding system is common and
is frequently used by studies in the field.

Inter coding agreement was set at r.95, a level viewed as appropriate for inter-coder
reliability (Cone & Foster, 1993). Differences between coders were referred to a third coder
(principal investigator) or through decided through discussion whenever necessary. Coders
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were told that their data would be rechecked by an anonymous second coder. Cone and
Foster (1993) and Romanczyk, Kent, Diament, and O'Leary (1973) argue that this approach
is necessary to prevent inflated agreement of estimates. Inter-coder differences were very
minimal, agreement was r.97. Disagreements in coding arose in task 4 of the Wellman and
Bartsch test. Children's responses could either refer to the change in the character's mental
state, or the character's access to new information. Some children did not specifically refer
to access to new information, but to the character that gave the information. One coder
ignored scoring responses with informational access and the other the name of the character
who gave the information. These disagreements rose due to lack of clarity during training.
Once the issues were clarified, there was general agreement on the coding.

3. 7.2. Statistical analysis
3. 7.2.1.

The Chi-Square (X2) statistic was used with categorical data. Categorical data
was used to determine the number of children who invoked a belief-desire
reasoning system and those who did not. The Chi-Square was used to check
if children's responses as a group were above the level attributed to chance.
A X 2 is an appropriate statistic for use with categorical data (Hays, 1993;
Popham & Sirotnik, 1992).

3.7.2.2.

A 2X2 ANOVA was used for continuous data and comparison of four group
means. This statistic was used to compare performance between and within
groups. This statistic is appropriate for examining between and within group
differences (Hays, 1993). It was also used by Wahi and Johri, 1995.
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3.7.2.3.

T-tests were used to compare performance between the two ethnic and school
experience groups.

3. 8. Performance Criterion
There are no set standards for determining performance criterion in either the theoretical
literature or the research. The study relied on common practices in the field, specifically
those relating to the three instruments. In previous research three-year-olds who scored at the
70% level were credited with a theory of mind, and significance levels were set at p <.05
level (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989;
Pemer Leekam & Wimmer, 1987). Since this study is looking for a developed model of
belief-desire reasoning and the presence of a competent theory of mind, the cut off point for
crediting children with belief-desire reasoning and a theory of mind was set at the 80% level
in each measure. The significance level was set at p<.05 level, is a common significance
level for social science research (Kerlinger, 1986). Since each measure had different number
of tasks, performance constituting the preset 80% level in each measure was different.

The Wellman and Bartsch had four tasks, and each task had two parts, making a total of eight
tasks. These eight were divided into two subtest. Subtest one was for prediction scores and
subtest two required children to justify their predictions. On overall performance, only
children who were positively scored for belief-desire reasoning on all six, seven, or eight of
the tasks were considered predominant and competent users of belief-desire reasoning.
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Children who invoked belief-desire reasoning on half the tasks were described as invoking
belief-desire, but with low competence; those who scored below four but on at least one,
were described as presenting a mixed pattern and less competent; and finally, those who did
not invoke belief-desire reasoning on all tasks were described as non and inefficient users
of belief-desire reasoning. Each subtest had four tasks. Competency in each of the two types
of reasoning consisted of frequencies for children who were positively scored on all four and
three tasks. Those who were scored positively on half the tasks were described as presenting
a mixed pattern and also as low competency users, and those who were scored positively on
one, were described as occasional and inefficient users. Finally, children who were
negatively scored on all four tasks, were not only non users, but also inefficient in using a
belief-desire framework. The Wimmer and Perner had two tasks and only those who
invoked belief-desire reasoning in both were described as predominant and competent users
of belief-desire reasoning. Those who invoked belief-desire reasoning on one task were
described as presenting a mixed pattern. The Perner et. al. measure had three prediction tasks
and only children who were positively scored on all three were considered predominant and
competent users of belief-desire reasoning because the measure searched for representational
change in all three tasks simultaneously. Those who were positively scored on two of three
tasks were described as presenting a mixed pattern. In the Wimmer and Perner and Perner
et al, measures, each subtest had one task.
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3.9.

Informed consent

Informed consent was sought from all children as well as their parents and/or guardians.
Because of the literacy level of some parents especially rural parents, consent was also
sought orally. Informed consent was therefore in both written and oral forms. In at least two
regions, parents were reluctant to give individual consent. In these areas consent for all
children and their parents was referred to and given by the traditional chief and/or village
headman. This practice is not unusual in rural Zimbabwe. However, all children who
participated in the study, including those who were given a blanket consent by their chief,
were individually asked if they wanted to participate in the study. The form for informed
consent was translated into the two ethnic languages (See Appendix VI for sample of
informed consent for parents, and Appendix VII for children.)

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter presents results for the four research questions the study set out to investigate.
Each question was answered by results from three measures; those of Wellman and Bartsch,
Wimmer and Pemer; and Pemer, Leekam, and Wimmer. In this study the correlation
between these instruments were as follows: Pemer, Leekam, and Wimmer and Wellman and
Bartsch and Wimmer and Pemer were r= .20 and .19 respectively; Wimmer and Pemer and
Wellman and Bartsch, r= .42.

To answer these questions, three measures on theory of mind framed by B-D were used to
search for the existence of B-D including underlying processes and skills related to B-D
reasoning. In addition, two of the measures (Wellman & Bartsch, Wimmer & Pemer) also
had the capacity to reveal other systems and/or explanatory frameworks that children used,
if they did not use belief-desire. Since each instrument was independent, data were analyzed
separately. The data answering each question were of two types; frequency and performance
mean scores. Frequency scores were used to determine the prevalence of B-D in children's
responses and their competency levels in using B-D. Performance scores were used to search
for differences in performance between and within groups. The overall performance scores
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and/or frequencies of occurrence in each measure are presented before subtest results. Each
question will be answered it turn, beginning with the major and specific question.

Specific question
4.1.

Do eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and unschooled children in Zimbabwe
construct, develop and use a belief-desire explanatory conceptual framework to
reason about the mind?

Except for the Pemer et al. measure, two sets of data from each instrument provided answers
to this question. First the child's ability to predict the characters' actions given their mental
states, and second, justification for those predictions by referring to the character's mental
states. The Pemer et al. did not include a justification, but did include three prediction tasks.

Overall the study found that eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and unschooled children
in Zimbabwe use a theory of mind framed by a B-D conceptual explanatory framework. In
all three measures, children reached the preset 80% belief-desire frequency of occurrence
level. In addition, there were no differences within and between groups on two measures; the
Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et. al. On the Wellman and Bartsch, school experience was
found to have an effect on B-D. The schooled children did better than unschooled children.
These findings emerged from results of four subquestions that guided this investigation. The
results are presented under each subquestion.
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4.1.

What conceptual explanatory framework do eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled
and unschooled children in Zimbabwe invoke to predict and explain every day,
intentional and overt human action?

The results for this question in all three measures are presented as frequency of occurrence
and competency in B-D. The study found that eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and
unschooled children in Zimbabwe invoked a B-D conceptual framework to predict and
explain the characters' actions in the various narrative situations. This evidence emerged
from children's ability to predict and justify the actors' actions by attributing and/or imputing
mental states of "belief' and "desire" as the cause of their actions. The evidence supporting
this conclusion is presented from results of three different B-D measures. Children's
performance in each measure will be presented in turn.

4.1.2. Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch measure
The Wellman and Bartsch measure had eight tasks. Four required the child to predict the
actors' actions and the other to justify those predictions. The purpose of these tasks was
threefold; first, to search for the existence ofB-D through evidence of children's use; second,
search for other systems that children might use in place of, or with B-D; third, assess their
level of competency in using the B-D system. Evidence for the existence of B-D and/or other
systems was expected to emerge from children's justifications of their predictions.
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Table 1

Frequency of occurrence and competency in B-D (Wellman & Bartsch)
Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

2

1

2

1

.5

3

3

1.5

4

3

1.5

5

8

4

6

16

8

7

48

24

8

119

59.5

Total

200

Score

100

The table shows the frequency of occurrence of B-D made by Zimbabwean children as a
group. Fifty-nine percent (59.5%) of the children invoked B-D on all eight tasks, 24% did
so on seven tasks and 8% on six. These three sets of data showed that 183 (91.5%) of the
Zimbabwe children invoked a B-D framework. These children were described as
predominant and competent users ofB-D. Five percent (5.5%) who were scored positively
on four and five tasks were described as users but of low competency and 3% presented a
mixed pattern. They were scored positively on less than four out of eight tasks. Those who
were positively scored on less than half were described as users but as less competent users.
Based on 91.5% frequency of occurrence and competency, Zimbabwean children as a group
were described as predominant and competent users ofB-D when assessed by the Wellman
and Bartsch measures.
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The next two tables present data on children's use and competency in two subtests of the
Wellman and Bartsch measure. The subtests searched for children's competency in forward
(prediction) and backward Gustification) reasoning. Forward reasoning (subtest 1) searched
for children's competency in predicting actors actions given their mental states; and
backward reasoning for the competence in explaining that prediction by attributing mental
states of belief and/or desire as the cause of the actions. Children's overall performance in
the two subtests showed that most children were predominant and competent users of B-D.
They met the 80% preset level for prevalence and competency. The results from the two
subtests are presented in tables 2 and 3 below.

Table 2

Score

Performance on prediction (forward reasoning): Subtest 1 (Wellman &
Bartsch)
Frequency

Percent

0

1

.5

1

2

1

2

6

3

3

28

14

4

163

81.5

Total

200

100

In table 2, 81.5% of children made positive predictions in all four tasks, 14% three; 3% in
two, 1% in one; and one child (.5%) did not invoke B-D reasoning on all four tasks. Two sets
of frequency of occurrence (81.5% and 14%) suggested that 95 .5% of Zimbabwean children
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were predominant users ofB-D reasoning and competent in forward reasoning. They could
positively predict the character's actions given his mental state. Three percent (3%) presented
a mixed pattern and two children ( 1% ) were occasional and not competent users, and one
child (.5%) did not invoke or show competency in B-D reasoning. With a performance of
95.5% frequency of occurrence and competency level in forward reasoning, Zimbabwean
children as a group were judged as competent not only in forward reasoning, but also using
B-D reasoning.

Table 3

Performance on justification (backward reasoning): Subtest 2 (Wellman
& Bartsch)
Frequency

Percent

0

3

1.5

1

5

2.5

2

6

3

3

38

19

4

146

73

2

1

200

100

Score

No response
Total

Table 3 shows that 73% of the children justified their predictions by invoking a B-D
framework on all four justification tasks; 19% on three tasks ; 3% on two; 2.5% on one, 1.5%
did not invoke B-D reasoning on any justifications, and 1% did not respond to requests for
justifications. Two sets of frequencies of occurrence for B-D (73% and 19%), suggested that
92% of the children predominantly invoked a B-D framework when they justified their
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predictions. They attributed mental states of belief and desire as the cause of the actors'
actions. No framework (s) other than B-D reasoning surfaced. Seven percent (7%) of the
children, i.e., those who scored less than three, gave "non mentalistic" responses; that is they
made no reference to the mental states of belief or desire. Children's overall performance
showed that children were not only competent in backward reasoning, but also users ofB-D.
That is, they invoked mental states of belief and/or desire to justify the characters' actions.
No other alternative framework emerged in children's responses.

Children negatively scored for B-D (Non mentalistic responses)
One of the purposes of justification tasks was to search for other explanatory frameworks
that may be present either replacing, or working with a belief-desire system. Seven percent
(7%) of the children who were negatively scored on some or all tasks gave non- mentalistic
responses as the cause of the actors' actions. When requested to justify their predictions, they
referred to some external cause unrelated to the actors' mental states. For example, to the
question "Why do you think Ranga (the name of the character) would search in location

A?, the child responded "... because that's where there is plenty of grass or because that's
where they normally graze. " There was no reference to the actor's mental states or the actors'
belief about the location of the cattle. Another variation of the non mentalistic thinking were
those responses that were definite about the location of the cattle when the narratives were
tentative. For example, to the question, "Why do you think Ranga will search/or the cattle

in location A, they responded" ... because that's where they (the cattle) are."
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These types of responses were not scored positively for B-D for two reasons. First and
foremost, although they made sense to experienced herders of cattle in Zimbabwe, because
there was no reference to the actor's mental state, but to some conditions outside the
individual, they could not be scored positively for B-D reasoning. The key issue in B-D
reasoning is that every day, intentional and overt human actions are guided by the
individual's internal mental states. Second, there was some level of ambiguity in these
responses. It was not clear whether children assumed that the character knew his cattle
always grazed there, that they would graze where there were good pastures, or that the child
had heard in the story that the cattle were actually there. The last of these responses appeared
to reflect some memory problems. While children who justified their prediction on the basis
that there were good pastures in location A tended to get their memory questions right, those
whose responses appeared to be definite about the location of the cattle had problems with
memory questions.

Overall children's performance on the Wellman and Bartsch measure suggested that eightyear-old indigenous, schooled and unschooled children in Zimbabwe use a theory of mind
framed by B-D reasoning. Furthermore, children's performance on prediction and
justification subtests showed that they were competent in the two important types of
reasoning that the Wellman and Bartsch measure search for; forward and backward
reasoning. Their performance in both types of reasoning showed that they attributed mental
states of belief and/or desire to predict or explain the actors' actions. Few children provided
non-mentalistic responses on justifications for their predictions.
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The next section presents three tables on results from the Wimmer and Pemer measure.
There were two tasks; one for prediction and the other for justification of that prediction.
Although both forward and backward reasoning were being tested in this measure, its
primary purpose was to search for a child's understanding of the representational nature of
the mind; a key underlying skill/process and marker for understanding how the mind
functions. It searched for the child's understanding of the representational nature of the mind
through his awareness of the consequences of having a "false belief."

Since the measure had two tasks, only children who were scored positively on both tasks
were judged as competent in understanding the mind as representational. Those who were
positively scored on one were described as presenting a mixed pattern and displaying low
competency in the use ofB-D reasoning. The overall performance showed that the majority
of children not only understood the consequences of a false belief, i.e., searching in the
wrong place, but invoked and/or imputed false belief to the actor as the cause of his actions.
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4.1.3.

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner measure

Table 4

Frequency of B-D reasoning occurrence and competency on
understanding the representational nature of the mind. (Wimmer &
Perner)

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

6

3

1

9

4.5

2

185

92.5

Total

200

100

Table 4, shows that 92.5% of the children invoked B-D reasoning on both tasks, 4.5% on
one, and 3% did not do so. Most of the children (92.5%) predominantly invoked and
attributed the mental state of false belief as the cause of the actor's wrong search. The 92.5%
frequency of occurrence of attribution of the mental state of "false belief' in children's
responses and their competency in understanding the mind as representational, suggested that
most eight-year-old Zimbabwean children were predominant and competent users of a B-D
reasoning system.

The following two tables present data on two subtests of the Wimmer and Pemer measure.
The first subtest (prediction) was to search for the child's ability to reason from false belief
(predict the actor's action state given his mental state of false belief), and subtest two
Gustification) the child's ability to invoke and impute the mental state of "false belief' as the
cause of searching in the wrong place.
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Table 5

Performance on the prediction task: Subtest 1 (Wimmer and Perner)
Frequency

Percent

0

7

3.5

1

193

96.5

Total

200

100

Score

Table 6

Performance on the justification task: Subtest 2. (Wimmer and Perner)

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

10

5

1

189

94.5

1

.5

Non Responsive
Total

200

100

Table 5, demonstrates that 96.5% of the children positively predicted where the character
would search first, while seven (3.5%) did not. From table 6, we can see that 94.5% invoked
and imputed the mental state of false belief as the cause of the character's searching in the
wrong place, while 5% did not. One child did not respond to the justification question. The
five percent (5%) who were scored negatively for B-D reasoning in table 6 reflected "realist
thinking." To the question "Why did Rudo (the character's name) search in location B (the

wrong location according to the actor's belief?) these 5% replied " .... because that is where
the candy is right now.) Thus they ignored the actor's mental state of false belief and the
character's lack of access to new information about the item's movement from location A to
B. The other 94.5% replied that the actor would search in the wrong place because of his
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false belief about the location of the item even if they knew he was not going to find it since
it was now at a different location than what he believed. Overall, therefore, performance on
the Wimmer and Pemer measure suggested that as a group, eight-year-old indigenous,
schooled and unschooled Zimbabwean children understood the representational nature of the
mind. The justifications for their predictions showed that they understood the consequences
of acting on a false belief.

4.1.4. Peiformance on the Perner et. al. measure
This measure had three prediction tasks. Children who were scored positively on all three
tasks could be described as having the capacity to "read" their own and other people's minds
because the underlying skill and/or process of representational change was tested
simultaneously by all three tasks. Children who scored positively on less than two were
described as having a mixed pattern and as low competency users of the system. Overall
performance on the Pemer et al. measure presented evidence that most of the children
understood the consequences of representational change, and therefore were able to read their
own and other people's minds. The evidence is presented in tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Table 7
Score

Frequency of B-D reasoning occurrence and competency on
representational change (Perner et al.)
Frequency

Percent

1

4

2.0

2

9

4.5

3

187

93.5

Total

200

Percent
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Table 7 shows that 93.5% were able to predict their own and other people's minds because
they displayed efficient understanding of representational change. These children were
described as competent "readers" of their own and other people's minds because competency
in reading one's own and other people's minds was evidence ofB-D reasoning at work. Four
percent (4.5%) achieved a score of two out of three tasks, while four children (2%) scored
positively on only one out of three. This 4% was described as presenting a mixed pattern and
as low competency users, and the 2% as occasional and less competent users of B-D
reasoning. Every child invoked B-D reasoning on at least one out of three tasks.

The following two tables show the results of children's performance on the three subtests.
Table 8

Performance on prediction task 1: Subtest 1 (Perner et al.)

Frequency

Percent

0

6

3

1

194

97

Total

200

100

Score

Table 9: Performance on prediction task 2: Subtest 2 (Perner et al.)

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

1

0.5

1

199

99.5

Total

200

100
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Table 10: Performance on prediction task 3: Subtest 3 (Perner et al.)

Frequency

Percent

0

7

3.5

1

191

95.5

2

1.0

200

100

Score

I don't know
Total

Table 8 shows that 97% of the children could predict the expected contents of the package
based on their belief about of the usual contents of the package. Three percent (3 %) named
something other than the expected contents. Table 9 shows that 99.5% recognized changes
in their own mental states while maintaining the stability of their original mental states,
reflecting an awareness of their own mental activity. It appears that children who had
predicted other contents in Task 1 now predicted what they originally expected to find, but
chose to predict otherwise. Further probing of these children indicated that some though that
they were being tricked. These children were probed further and four of them said that they
thought they were being tricked. Two others refused to explain why they originally thought
there was something other than what they expected. Table 10 shows that 95% were able to
predict what other people would say despite changes in their own mental states in Task 2,
one child said he did not know, and 3.5% said they could not predict other people's thinking.
Performance on all three subtests showed children performing over the preset 80% frequency
of occurrence level suggesting that children were predominant and competent users of B-D
reasonmg.
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The results the three measures presented so far (tables 1-10) suggest that to the question "Do

eight-year-old indigenous, schooled, and unschooled children in Zimbabwe construct,
develop and use a belief-desire explanatory conceptual framework to reason about the
mind?" the answer is that yes they do. Zimbabwean children as a group predominantly and
competently used a B-D reasoning explanatory conceptual framework to reason about the
mind. They predominantly and competently invoked the mental states of belief and/or desire
to predict and justify the actions of the characters in the narratives. Their predictions were
not only consistent with B-D reasoning, but their justifications revealed that the content of
their conceptual reasoning framework was belief-desire. All underlying processes, skills, and
important markers consistent with B-D reasoning were searched for and found in all groups
and in most of children. Few children displayed non mentalist thinking on the Wellman and
Bartsch measure and "realist' on the Wimmer and Pemer measure.

4.2.

How well do eight-year-old indigenous, schooled and unschooled children in
Zimbabwe petform on B-D reasoning tests?

4.2.1. Performance as a group
The first set of data answering this subquestion was presented in tables 2-10. There was
evidence that Zimbabwe children as a group, predominantly invoked and competently used
B-D reasoning in all measures. In all three measures, children met the preset 80%
performance level in both invoking and competently using B-D reasoning. On the Wellman
and Bartsch measure, (Table 1) the children's responses were above chance at the p<.000
level X2 (7, N=200) 472.32, p<.000; subtest 1, Table 2 { X2 (4, N=200) = 484.85, p<.000);
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subtest 2, Table 3, X2 (5 , N = 200) = 485.02 , p<.000. The overall Wimmer and Pemer
performance in Table 4 was above chance at the p<.000 level. X 2 (2, N=200) = 315.13,
p<.000). and subtest 1, table 5; X2 (1, N=2000) 172.98, p<.000, and subtest 2, table 6; X2 (2,
N=200) 337.33, p<.000}. On the Pemer et.al. measure, overall performance was above
chance at the p<.000 level X2 (2, N=200)= 321.9900, p<.000 (table 7) and subtest 1, Table
8; subtest 2, table 9; and subtest 3, table 10; X2 (1, N=200) =176.72, p<.000, X2(1, N=200)
= 196.02, and X2 (N=l, N=200) 348.0100, p<.000 respectively. As a group therefore, eightyear-old, indigenous, schooled and unschooled Zimbabwean children performed
competently.

The second set of data emerged from analyzing children's performance in specific groups.
These results are presented below. The performance criterion for overall performance as well
as performance in each measure was similar to that presented in Tables 1-10. Only overall
performances in each measure are presented.

4.2.2. Performance of specific groups: Frequency of occurrence
Further evidence showing that children performed well on theory of mind measures emerged
from an analysis of children's performance when grouped by their ethnicity, school
experience and both school experience and ethnicity. The next section presents inter-ethnic,
inter-school experience, and lastly performance based on school experience and ethnicity.
When school experience and ethnicity were used to classify children, four groups emerged;
Shona schooled, Shona unschooled, Ndebele schooled, and Ndebele unschooled. Overall,
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the study found that all groups met the preset 80% level of frequency of occurrence and
efficiency in using B-D reasoning.

4.2.2.J.

Inter-ethnic performance

Table 11:

Frequency of occurrence and competency on the Wellman and Bartsch
measure: Shona group
Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

-

-

3

-

-

4

2

2

5

7

7

6

9

9

7

25

25

8

57

57

100

100

Score

Total

In Table 11, we can see that 91 % of Shona children were positively scored for B-D reasoning
(57% who were positively scored for B-D reasoning on all eight tasks, 25% on seven, and
9% on six). The rest (9%) were scored positively on at least four or five of the eight tasks.
These presented a mixed pattern and were considered low competency users. The 90% level
of performance by Shona children was evidence that they predominantly invoked, and were
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competent in B-D reasoning. They surpassed the preset 80% mark for being described as
predominant and competent users ofB-D reasoning.

Table 12

Frequency of occurrence and competency on the Wellman and Bartsch
measure: Ndebele group
Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

2

2

2

1

1

3

3

3

4

1

1

5

1

1

6

7

7

7

23

23

8

62

62

Total

100

100

Score

Table 12 demonstrates that 92% of Ndebele children invoked B-D reasoning, with 62%
doing so on all eight tasks, 23% on seven, and 7% on six. Of that 8% invoked it sometimes.
Of those 8%, 5% invoked it on less than half the tasks. Overall, the evidence showed that
Ndebele children predominantly invoked B-D reasoning (92%). Although some did not reach
levels where the data could confidently report a robust theory of mind, every child did invoke
B-D reasoning in at least one or more tasks. No child scored negatively on all tasks. Ndebele
children met the preset 80% level of performance to be described as predominant and
competent users ofB-D reasoning.
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The performance of both ethnic groups on the Wellman and Bartsch measure showed that
both groups scored at over a 90% frequency of occurrence level and another 10% displayed
a mixed pattern. That over 90% of the children in both ethnic groups invoked B-D reasoning
was evidence that both groups not only predominantly invoked B-D reasoning, but also used
it competently.

Table 13

Score

Frequency of occurrence and competency on Wimmer and Perner
measure: Shona group
Frequency

Percent

0

2

2

1

4

4

2

94

94

100

100

Total

Table 14

Frequency of occurrence and competency on Wimmer and Perner
measure: Ndebele group
Frequency

Percent

0

4

4

1

5

5

2

91

91

100

100

Score

Total

Table 13 shows that 94%, invoked B-D reasoning, 4% did sometimes and 2% percent did
not. Table 14 shows that at least 91 % of the children invoked B-D reasoning on both tasks,
5% on one of the two, and 4% did not at all. Both groups met the preset 80% level for use
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and competency. These results therefore suggested that both ethnic groups were predominant
and competent users of B-D reasoning.

Table 15

Score

Frequency of occurrence and competency on the Perner et. al. measure:
Shona group.
Frequency

Percent

1

3

3

2

6

6

3

91

91

100

100

Total

Table 16

Score

Frequency of occurrence and competency on the Perner et. al. measure:
Ndebele group.
Frequency

Percent

1

1

1

2

3

3

3

96

96

100

100

Total

Table 15 and 16 show that 91% of Shona and 96% ofNdebele children showed evidence for
B-D reasoning on all three tasks. In either group, both ethnic groups were positively scored
on at least one of the tasks. No child was scored negatively for B-D reasoning on all three
tasks. Both ethnic groups met the preset 80% level of use and competency and so can be
described as predominant and competent users ofB-D reasoning.

109

4.2.2.2. Inter-school experience performance
The performance of children across school experience in all three measures showed that both
school experience groups met the preset 80% level to be described as predominant and
competent users of B-D reasoning. This evidence is presented in Tables 17 to 20.

Table 17

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch: Schooled group.
Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

-

-

3

1

1

4

1

1

5

2

2

6

7

7

7

25

25

8

64

64

100

100

Score

Total

Sixty-four percent (64%) of schooled children were positively scored for B-D reasoning on
all eight tasks, 25% on seven, 7% on six out of eight (Table 17). These three sets of scores
constitute 96%. All (99%) but one child, were positively scored for B-D reasoning on four
or more of the eight tasks, however, only 96% (64% who invoked B-D reasoning on all
eight tasks, 25% on seven and 7% on six ) of those were described as predominant and
competent users of B-D reasoning. Schooled children met the preset 80%.
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Table 18

Score

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch :Unschooled children

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

I

2

2

2

I

I

3

2

2

4

2

2

5

6

6

6

9

9

7

23

23

8

55

55

Total

100

100

Fifty-five percent (55%) of unschooled children invoked B-D reasoning on all eight tasks,
23% on seven, and 9% on six (table 18). Overall all children did invoke B-D reasoning on
at least one task, 95% of them on at least four or more. Eighty-seven percent (87) of
unschooled children (55% who invoked belief-desire on all eight tasks, 23% on seven and
9% on six) predominantly invoked B-D reasoning. Since they met the 80% preset level, they
were described as predominantly invoking B-D reasoning and as competent users of the
system.

The frequency of occurrence for B-D reasoning on the Wellman and Bartsch measure in
schooled and unschooled children irrespective of ethnicity suggested that both groups were
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predominant and competent users ofB-D reasoning. Both met the 80% preset level for use
and competency in B-D reasoning.

Table 19

Score

Performance on Wimmer and Perner measure: schooled group

Frequency

Percent

0

2

2

1

2

2

2

96

96

Total

100

100

Table 20

Score

Performance on Wimmer and Perner measure: Unschooled group

Frequency

Percentage

0

4

4

1

7

7

2

89

89

100

100

Total

Ninety-six percent (96%) of schooled children (table 19) and 89% unschooled (table 20)
children predominantly and competently invoked B-D reasoning. Both met the preset 80%
level. Two percent (2%) of schooled (Table 19) and 7% of unschooled children (Table 20)
presented a mixed pattern. Another 2% of schooled (Table 20) and 4% of unschooled (Table
21) were negatively scored on both tasks.
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Overall, under the Wimmer and Pemer measure, the results suggested that both schooled and
unschooled children could be described as predominant and competent users of B-D
reasoning. Over 80% (96% schooled and 89% unschooled) of the children in each group
invoked B-D reasoning on both tasks. Children's level of competency in this measure was
evidence of their understanding of the representational nature of the mind, an important
marker for the presence of a theory of mind framed by B-D reasoning.

Table 21

Performance on the Perner et.al. measure: Schooled group

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

2

2

2

3

3

3

95

95

100

100

Score

Total

Table 22

Performance on the Perner et.al. measure: Unschooled group

Frequency

Percent

1

2

2

2

6

6

3

92

92

100

100

Score

Total
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Table 21 shows that 95% of schooled children were positively scored for B-D reasoning on
all three tasks, 3% on two, and 2% on one. No child was negatively scored on all three tasks.
All children scored positively for B-D reasoning on at least one or more of the tasks. Ninetytwo percent (92%) of unschooled children invoked B-D reasoning on all three prediction
tasks, 6% two of three, and 2% (two children) on at least one of the three (Table 22). The
performance levels of both groups presented evidence that they both understood
representational change, an underlying skill for reading one's own and other people's minds.
Schooled and unschooled performance on the Pemer et. al. measure indicated that over 90%
of children in either school experience group predominantly invoked B-D reasoning. Overall,
the evidence suggested that both groups were predominant and competent users of B-D
reasoning since they met the preset 80% level of performance.

The next set of data relates to performance of children when classified by two study
variables; school experience and ethnicity. Overall all four groups (Shona schooled, Shona
unschooled, Ndebele schooled and Ndebele unschooled) reached an 80% level of B-D
reasoning frequency of occurrence and competency. Consistent performance of about 90%
level between and within measures was not only evidence that all four groups predominantly
invoked a theory of mind framed by B-D reasoning, but were also competent in using it.
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4.2.2.3.

Peiformance by ethnicity and school experience; Shona schooled, Shona
unschooled, Ndebele schooled and Ndebele unschooled

Table 23

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch: Shona schooled

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

-

-

3

-

-

4

1

2

5

1

2

6

2

4

7

13

26

8

32

64

Total

50

100

Sixty-four percent (64%) of Shona schooled children invoked B-D reasoning on all eight
tasks, 26% on seven and 4% on six tasks (table 23). All children invoked B-D reasoning on
at least four or more of the eight tasks. Ninety-four percent (94%) {64% who were score
positively on all eight, 26% on seven and 4% on six} of the Shona schooled children
predominantly and competently invoked B-D, reasoning while 4% presented a mixed pattern.
Four percent (4%) invoked B-D reasoning on four and five out of eight tasks.
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Table 24

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch: Ndebele Schooled

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

-

-

3
4

1

-

2

-

5

1

2

6

5

10

7

12

24

8

32

64

Total

50

100

The results show that 64% ofNdebele schooled children invoked B-D reasoning on all eight
tasks, 24% on seven, and 10% on six. All children invoked B-D reasoning on at least three
or more tasks and 96% of them on half or more. Overall, 96% (62 % who invoked B-D
reasoning on all eight, and 24% on seven, and 10% on six) ofNdebele schooled children
predominantly invoked B-D reasoning while 4% presented a mixed pattern. An overall
performance of over 80% was evidence of children's predominant use of and competency in
B-D reasoning.
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Table 25

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch: Shona unschooled

Score

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

-

-

3

-

4

1

2

5

5

10

6

7

14

7

12

24

8

25

50

Total

50

100

Fifty percent (50%) of Shona unschooled children were positively scored for B-D reasoning
on all eight tasks, 24% on seven, 14% on six. All children were positively scored for B-D
reasoning on at least four or more tasks. Overall the results show that 88% of Shona
unschooled children predominantly and competently invoked B-D reasoning while 12%
presented a mixed pattern. An over 80% level of frequency of occurrence was not only
sufficient evidence of a high prevalence of B-D reasoning, but also that the children were
competent users of this system.
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Table 26

Score

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch: Ndebele unschooled

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

2

4

2

1

2

3

2

4

4

1

2

5

1

2

6

2

4

7

11

22

8

30

60

Total

50

100

Table 26 shows that 60% ofNdebele unschooled children were positively scored for B-D
reasoning on all eight tasks, 22% on seven, and 4% on six. Ninety percent (90%) of the
children were positively scored on four or more of the eight tasks while 10% were positively
scored on less than half of the eight. All children were positively scored on at least one or
more out of the eight tasks, but these appeared to show a mixed pattern. Overall, the table
shows that 86% (60% scored positively on all eight tasks, 22% on seven, and 4% on six) of
the Ndebele unschooled children predominantly invoked B-D reasoning. Performance above
the 80% preset level, evidence of prevalence and competent use of B-D reasoning.
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Overall, performance on the Wellman and Bartsch measure suggested that all four groups
were predominant and competent users of B-D reasoning.

Table 27

Score

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner: Shona schooled

Frequency

Percent

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

50

100

Total

50

100

Table 28

Score

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner: Ndebele schooled

Frequency

Percent

0

2

4

1

2

4

2

46

92

Total

50

100

Table 29

Score

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner: Shona unschooled.

Frequency

Percent

0

2

4

1

4

8

2

44

88

Total

50

100
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Table 30

Score

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner: Ndebele unschooled

Frequency

Percent

0

2

4

1

3

6

2

45

90

Total

50

100

Tables 27, 28, 29, and 30 show that all (100%) Shona schooled (Table 27); 92% Ndebele
schooled, (Table 29); 88% Shona unschooled (table 29); and 90% (table 30), Ndebele
unschooled performed beyond the 80% preset level. While Shona schooled children reached
ceiling effects (100%), 4% Ndebele schooled, 8%, Shona unschooled, and (6%) ofNdebele
unschooled children presented a mixed pattern. An over 80% performance level showed that
children had the capacity to understand the representational nature of the mind, an important
marker and underlying skill for understanding the presence of theory of mind framed by B-D
reasomng.
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Table 31

Performance on the Perner, et. al.: Shona schooled

Percent

Frequency

Score

0

-

-

1

2

4

2

2

4

3

46

92

Total

50

100

Table 32

Performance on the Perner, et. al.: Ndebele schooled

Score

Frequency

Percentage

0

-

-

1

-

-

2

1

2

3

49

98

Total

50

100

Table 33

Performance on the Perner, et. al.: Shona unschooled

Score

Frequency

Percentage

0

-

-

1

1

2

2

4

8

3

45

90

Total

50

100
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Table 34

Performance on the Perner, et. al: Ndebele unschooled

Score

Frequency

Percentage

0

-

-

1

1

2

2

2

4

3

47

94

Total

50

100

In Table 31, 92% of Shona schooled children were scored positively for B-D reasoning on
all three tasks, 4% on two, and another 4% on one. Children invoked B-D reasoning on at
least one or more of the tasks. In Table 32, 98% percent ofNdebele schooled children were
positively scored for B-D reasoning on all three tasks, and one child (2%) on two. From
Table 33, we can see that 90% of Shona unschooled children were positively scored for B-D
reasoning on all three tasks, and 8% on two and 2% ( one child) on one task. No child was
scored negatively for B-D reasoning on all three. All children invoked B-D reasoning on at
least one or more tasks in Table 34, 94% ofNdebele unschooled children were positively
scored for B-D reasoning on all three tasks, 4% on two out of three and two percent (2%) on
one. Eight percent (8%) of Shona schooled (Table 31 ), 2% Ndebele schooled (table 32), 10%
Shona unschooled (Table 33) and finally 6% Ndebele unschooled (Table 34) presented a
mixed pattern. Overall, the performance of all four groups on the Pemer et.al. reached the
80% preset level. Children displayed an understanding of representational change, an
underlying capacity for understanding the nature of one's own and other people's minds. This
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performance also suggested that all four groups predominantly invoked B-D reasoning and
were competent users of the system.

To the question, "How well do eight-year-old indigenous, schooled and unschooled

children in Zimbabwe peiform on B-D reasoning tests?", the evidence suggested that
Zimbabwean children as a group, and between and within groups, met the preset 80% level.
Their performance as a group was beyond chance levels. All groups performed well enough
to be described as predominant and competent users ofB-D reasoning. All important markers
consistent with B-D reasoning were searched for and found.

4.3.

What difference if any, exists in pelformance on B-D reasoning tests among the
different groups of children as defined by their ethnicity and school experience?

To find if any differences in performance and/or explanatory systems existed between ethnic
groups, school experience, and ethnicity and school experience groups, the following
statistical tests were performed. T-tests were performed on the means of the two ethnic
(Shona, Ndebele), and two school experience (schooled, unschooled) groups. To search for
differences between the means of four groups (Shona schooled, Shona unschooled, Ndebele
schooled and Ndebele unschooled), a 2x2 ANOV A was performed.

Overall the study found that on the Wellman and Bartsch measure, there were no significant
differences in performance between ethnic groups, but there were betwee school experience
groups. No statistically significant differences were found on the other measures on either
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ethnicity or school experience. The results for each measure will be presented in turn.
Presentation of the group comparisons will start with school experience, followed by
ethnicity and finally ethnicity and school experience respectively.

4.3.1. Comparison by school experience
Comparison of performance by school experience using a T-test showed that although the
unschooled performed less well than schooled children, there were no statistically significant
differences between schooled and unschooled children on the Wimmer and Perner t-=1.62
p<.106 and Perner et al. measure, t-= .62 p<.539. There was however a statistically
significant difference between schooled and unschooled children on the Wellman and
Bartsch measure t-2.40 p<.017. On the Wellman and Bartsch measure, results suggested
that, although both groups reached the preset 80% level for frequency of occurrence and
competency in use of B-D reasoning, the schooled performed better than unschooled
children.

4.3.2. Comparison by ethnicity
Comparison of performance by ethnicity using T-test showed no statistically significant
differences between the two ethnic groups across all three measures t-=.39, p<.70 on the
Wellman and Bartsch, t-=.90 p<.370; on Wimmer and Perner, and t-1.44 p<.151 on the
Perner et al). Overall these results suggested that there were no significant differences in
performance and use between the two ethnic groups.
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4.3.3. Comparison by ethnicity and school experience

Table 35

Performance on the Wellman and Bartsch
Table of means
Ndebele
M
7.46
6.96

Shona
Schooled
Unschooled

M
7.46
7.10

SD
.90
1.11

SD
.93
1.88

Analysis of Variance: Performance between and within groups on Wellman and
Bartsch
Source

D.F.

Sum Sq.

Main Effects
Ethnicity
Schooling
2-way interaction
Ethnicity schooling
Explained
Residual
Total
199
N=200

2
9.490
.245
1
.245
2
.245
1
1
.245
9.735
3
196 317.260
326.995 1.645

Mean Sq.

F ratio

4.745
9.245
.245
.245
.245
3.245
1.619

2.931
.151
5.711
.151
.151
2.005

F
Prob.
.056
.698
.018
.698
.698
.115

The schooled groups in either ethnic group had the same mean of7.46, followed by Ndebele
schooled (X=7.10), and Shona unschooled (X 6.96) respectively (table 35). A review of
these means showed that both unschooled groups scored lower than schooled groups. A 2X2
ANOV A showed a significant main effect for school experience F(l, 196) = 2.931, p <
.056), but not for ethnicity F(l, 196 = .151, p<.698). There were no statistically significant
differences among the four groups (Shona schooled, Shona unschooled, Ndebele schooled,
and Ndebele unschooled) on ethnicity. No interaction was found between ethnicity and
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schooling F(l, 196 =.151 p<.698. There was however a significant difference between
schooled and unschooled children F(l, 196) = 5.711 p<.018.

Table 36

Performance on the Wimmer and Perner
Table of means
Shona
M
2.00
1.88

Schooled
Unschooled
N=SO per group.

Ndebele
M
1.88
1.86

SD
.0000
.4677

SD
.4352
.4522

Analysis of Variance: Performance between and within groups on Wimmer and Perner
Source
Main effects
Ethnicity
Schooling.
2-way interaction
Ethnicity
Schooling
Explained
Residual
Total
N=200

D.F.
2
1
1
1

196

Sum Sq.
.530
.125
.405
.245

1
.245
3
.775
.153
199 30.795

Mean Sq. F ratio F Prob.
1.730
.180
.265
.125
.816
.367
2.644
.405
.106
.245 1.600
.207

.245
.258

1.600
1.687

.207
.171

.153
.155

Results from table 37 showed that the highest mean score was achieved by Shona schooled
(M=2.00) followed by Ndebele schooled and Shona unschooled both with M=l.88), and
lastly Ndebele unschooled. Although these means were different, they were not statistically
significantly different F(3, 196) = 1. 730, p<.180 and there were no interaction effects F {1,
196, 1.600, p<.207. The results suggested that all four groups performed at the same level.
There were no statistically significant differences in performance competency and use ofB-D
reasoning between and among them.
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Table 37

Performance on the Perner et.al.
Table of Means

Schooled
Unschooled
N=SO per group.

Shona
M
2.88
2.98

SD
.43
.38

M
2.88
2.92

Ndebele
SD
.14
.34

Analysis of Variance: Performance between and within groups on Perner et. al.
Source
Main effects
Ethnicity
Schooling
2-way Interactions
Ethnicity
Schooling
Explained
Residual
Total
N=200

D.F.
2
1
1
1

Sum Sq.
.290
.245
.045
.045

Mean Sq.
.145
.245
.045
.045

1
3
196
199

.045
.335
23.220
23.555

.045
.112
.118
.118

F ratio F Prob.
1.224
.296
.152
2.068
.380
.538
.380
.538
.380
.943

.538
.421

Table 37 shows that both Ndebele unschooled and Shona unschooled groups scored higher
than Shona schooled and Ndebele schooled groups. The Shona unschooled had the highest
mean of M=2.98, followed by Ndebele unschooled and with M=2.92 and Ndebele schooled
and Shona schooled both with a mean of M=2.88. A comparison of the four-group means by
a 2X2 ANOV A (table 40) showed no main effect for ethnicity or school experience F(2, 196)
= 1.224 p<.296 or interaction F(l,96)=.380, p<.583. These results suggested that all four
groups performed equally well despite the differences in their means. These differences were
not statistically significant.
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Several social background factors were also collected to help explain some data. These were
number of siblings, religion, and gender. All three were found to have no main effects and
interaction patterns to influence the dependent variable.

To the question "What difference if any, exists in performance on B-D reasoning tests

among the different groups of children as defined by their ethnic group and school
experience?", the study found no statistically significant differences in the performance of
the four groups across all three measures. On the two group comparisons, no statistically
significant differences were found on the Wimmer and Perner and Perner et al., but on were
on the Wellman and Bartsch. On the Wellman and Bartsch, there were statistically
significant differences between the schooled and unschooled groups. Schooled children
performed better than unschooled children. The lack of difference in performance between
ethnic groups across all three measures and school experience groups on the Wimmer and
Perner, and Perner et al., suggests no relationship between ethnicity and belief-desire
reasoning. However there may be a relationship between some skills in the Wellman and
Bartsch measure and schooling experience.

4.5.

Summary of results

Overall the results of the study showed that
(1) Eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and unschooled Zimbabwean children

predominantly and competently invoked a belief-desire conceptual explanatory framework
to predict and explain every day, intentional and overt human action. They invoked,
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attributed and/or imputed mental states of belief and desire to individuals as the cause of
their actions. The ability to attribute belief and desire to the characters for predicting and
explaining their actions was evidence that children understood that the mind formed the
causal link between the individual and his actions.

(2) All groups performed beyond the 80% preset level for describing a group as
predominantly and competently using a belief-desire framework. Major developmental
milestones consistent with powerful models of theories of mind within a B-D reasoning
framework were searched for, and found in all groups of children.

(3) There were no statistically significant differences in performance between and within
groups on two measures; the Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et.al. On the Wellman and
Bartsch measure, there was a significant difference between schooled, and unschooled, but
not between ethnic groups. The schooled performed better than unschooled children.

(4) There appeared to be no relationship between ethnicity, school experience, ethnicity and
school experience, and B-D reasoning on two measures; Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et.
al. There was a main effect for school experience on the Wellman & Bartsch, but not for
ethnicity. There was a significant difference in performance between schooled and
unschooled children. The schooled out performed the unschooled children. Three social
background characteristics of gender, religion, and number of siblings appeared not to
influence the use of, or to have any relationship with B-D reasoning.

CHAPTERV
DISCUSSION
The study's aim was to contribute to the debate on the universality of a theory of mind by
searching for its existence in specific groups of Zimbabwean children. The broader question
was whether B-D reasoning is a universal explanatory conceptual framework constructed,
developed and used by children to reason about the mind. This study found that eight-yearold, indigenous, schooled and unschooled Zimbabwean children predominantly and
competently invoked B-D reasoning to predict and explain every day, intentional and overt
human actions. This answer emerged from the high frequency with which children invoked
B-D reasoning in responding to questions put to them, and their efficiency in using the
system. In addition, children also demonstrated evidence of using the processes and/or skills
underlying B-D reasoning such as, the representational nature of the mind, representational
change, forward and backward reasoning.

The results from the Wellman and Bartsch measure provided evidence that children were
competent in both forward and backward reasoning; they invoked, attributed and/or imputed
belief and/or desire as the cause of the individual's actions, demonstrating their
understanding of the causal link between the individual and his actions. The Wimmer and
Pemer measure provided evidence that children understood the representational nature of the
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mind and the independence between mind and reality; and finally, the Pemer et al. measure
provided evidence of understanding the role of representational change in predicting and
explain one's own and other people's actions.

The findings are consistent with those from Western cultural contexts (Pemer, 1991;
Wellman, 1992; Astington et al, 1988; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994) and one study (Avis and
Harris, 1991) carried out in North Africa. These findings conflict with those of Wahi and
Johri who found culture to be a significant variable. However there are consistent with Wahi
& Johri & Astington (1993) on the effect of schooling. There was a main effect for schooling

on at least one measure.

The following discussion, will examine the framework invoked by the Zimbabwean children,
the underlying processes and skills displayed, the children's competency in using B-D
reasoning, and the extent to which these results and findings may contribute to the debate
on the universality of a theory of mind. Finally, the study will suggest possible directions for
future cross cultural research.

5.1.

Zimbabwean children's use of B-D reasoning.

The discussion of children's use of B-D reasoning focusses on the content and underlying
processes and/or skills of the explanatory system that children invoked to predict and explain
every day, intentional and overt human actions. The content of the explanatory system
invoked by children centers on the mental states that children attributed and/or imputed to
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the characters in the narratives to predict and justify their actions. Processes and skills
underlying the development of the explanatory system displayed by children will be
examined in the context of children's efficiency in using B-D reasoning. In addition, non
mentalist and/or non B-D reasoning responses will also be examined.

Theory of mind measures used in this study were of two types. The first required children
to only predict (Pemer et al.), while the second required prediction and justification of the
character's actions (Wimmer & Pemer and Wellman & Bartsch). Tasks that required the
child to not only predict but also justify that prediction had the capacity to elicit the nature
and/or content of the framework that the child used. A belief-desire framework includes the
use of mental state terms of "belief'' such as think, know, guess suspect, assume and
"desires" such as want, hope, or wish among others. Wellman (1992), suggests that in the
belief-desire framework, the two mental states of belief and desire are the content and
language of the B-D reasoning conceptual explanatory framework.

From the results of this study, there is evidence that children used a belief-desire framework
to explain every day intentional overt human action. They invoked and imputed mental states
of belief and/or desire to predict and explain the characters' actions. Of particular importance
to examine in Zimbabwean children's use ofB-D reasoning, however, was their predominant
use of the mental state of belief over desire. Desire was almost nonexistent in their
justifications for predictions. If Zimbabwean children displayed a predominance of belief
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over desire, was this still a belief-desire or different explanatory system altogether? Why was
desire absent in most children's responses?

5.1.1. Zimbabwe children's predominant use of "belief" over "desire."
First, the literature, particularly the work of Wellman and Bartsch, sheds some light on
whether or not Zimbabwean children's predominant use of belief over desire was part of a
belief-desire explanatory system or something different. Discussing the developmental path
for B-D reasoning, Wellman (1992, 1991), Bartsch and Wellman (1989, 1995) suggest that
it progresses from simple desire, desire-belief, and lastly belief-desire psychology. The first
stage (simple desire psychology), shows children's exclusive use of desire over belief; the
second (desire-belief psychology), predominant use of desire over belief and lastly, a
competent system (belief-desire) that equally considers both and also searches for the most
relevant mental state to predict action or explain the observed one. In the last stage, the child
not only considers both beliefs and desires, but also clearly understands distinctions between
them in terms of their reliability in predicting and explaining every day, intentional and overt
human action.

According to Wellman's and Bartsch's stages ofB-D reasoning development, children in the
first stage completely ignore belief and in the second, use desire over belief. Despite that
imbalance in use of mental states, they are still described as using a belief-desire framework.
Wellman (1992) also suggested that children progress from desire-belief to belief-desire
when they suddenly discover that desire is not always a reliable mental state to predict and
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explain intentional, overt human actions. The ability to consider both mental states and then
choose the one that can successfully predict or explain the other person's actions is also a
reflection of Wellman's last stage of development; a more powerful model ofB-D reasoning
compared to simple desire or desire-belief psychology. There is a possibility, therefore, that
children in this study found the mental state of belief more reliable than desire to
successfully predict and explain the characters' actions.

Since Wellman and Bartsch's two and early three-year-olds exclude "belief' in the first stage
of their development of the framework, but are still described as operating within the
framework, and there is also a possibility that Zimbabwean children's choice of belief over
desire reflected their belief that "belief' more successfully predicted and explained the
characters' actions than did desire. It seems unlikely that Zimbabwean children's predominant
use of belief over desire is evidence of a different explanatory framework. Literature does
not appear to suggest that an exclusion of desire implies that a different framework is being
used. Rather, it may be evidence of a more powerful model of B-D reasoning, because
children in Wellman's later stages of development appear to gradually rely more on belief
than on desire. Use of belief over desire would seem to fit within a belief-desire conceptual
explanatory framework.

The second explanation for this finding emerges from other studies carried out so far.
Researchers other than Wellman and Bartsch exclude or ignore the mental state of desire
from their discussions or investigations. They concentrate on children's understanding of
belief. For example, the Wimmer and Pemer measure often regarded as the "litmus test" for
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the presence of a theory of mind and the "unexpected change task" from Pemer et. al, credit
children with a theory of mind on the basis of their understanding or use of belief alone and
not both belief and desire. A review of literature on discussions and disagreements
(Chandler, 1988; Chandler & Hala, 1994; Chandler Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Hala, Chandler, &
Fritz, 1991; Pemer, 1989; Wellman and Bartsch, 1989) on children's developing theories of
mind, finds they often center on children's understanding of belief rather than desire. From
the literature therefore, it appears that the nature of the framework itself is such that it either
allows one to choose which mental state is relevant in searching for the presence of a theory
of mind, or that the mental state of belief appears to have received more prominence in
research and children's responses because it is the more relevant one in predicting and
explaining people's actions and/or determining the presence of a theory of mind framed by
B-D reasoning.

Since research appears to have a bias toward investigating children's understanding of belief
over desire, and credits individuals with a theory of mind within a belief-desire framework
by searching for their understanding of belief alone, this study rules out the notion that
Zimbabwean children were using a framework other than belief-desire. Children relied on
a mental state that is often the focus of significant research and discussion as a marker for
the presence of a theory of mind.

The third explanation comes from the level of competence displayed by children in using a
belief-desire framework. Although children appear to have predominantly used belief more
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than desire, they understood stories that used both belief and desire mental state terms. If
desire was not part of the framework they develop and use, then children should have found
it difficult to understand the stories because they included a mental state unfamiliar to them
in judging people's actions. The level of competency that children displayed, over 80%
frequency of occurrence and competency across three measures sometimes reaching ceiling
effects, would have been difficult to achieve if one of these mental states was "nonsensical"
or unfamiliar to them in predicting and explaining human actions. Their level of performance
on all three measures suggested that desire was part of a meaningful framework to and for
them. Desire was probably just irrelevant to them for these tasks. A search for an explanation
from the culture through an examination of folk tales showed that desire was a meaningful
mental state for predicting and explaining everyday, intentional and overt human actions. A
review of children's stories where people's actions are normally examined, showed that desire
did feature. This use by the culture suggests that desire is a meaningful mental state to
children in predicting and explaining people's actions.

The fourth explanation comes from the possibility that the nature and/or content of activity
in the Wellman and Bartsch measure elicited from children a pragmatic approach to an
activity very familiar to indigenous children in Zimbabwe. A desire to go and look for cattle
in location B, when one believes they are in location A, appears not to fulfil one's goals of
finding the cattle. The desire to search for the cattle in location A had to be consistent with
the belief that they could be found there, suggesting belief would be the more relevant and
appropriate mental state to invoke. Desire alone would not be enough. Inability to find lost
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cattle, a chore most indigenous children perform from an early age of four or five, has
consequences in the culture. Children get punished for failing to find lost cattle because
cattle are not only the center of livelihood for most indigenous families (Makamure, 1992;
Tsodzo, 1992; Bere-Chikara, 1992; Dore, 1992), but also the most valuable asset. The
importance of cattle in the culture is clearly stated by Makamure (1992).

A man's social status is determined by how many herd of cattle he
possesses. The larger the herd the more he is regarded as an
important person in his society. ... the man with the largest herd gets
the greatest honor at all functions ... p 14.

Despite the importance society places on cattle, they are largely tended by small children.
Through apprenticeship systems, over time, children become not only skillful at this task,
but also aware of the role cattle play in their family and tribe; consequently, finding them
when they are lost is crucial. A desire alone would not be enough -one has to find the cattle.
The most pragmatic and efficient approach that leads to finding the cattle, in this case
reference to belief, would get preference over others.

In this study, it appears Zimbabwean children believed "belief' was a more reliable mental
state to "read" and justify one's own and other people's actions than was "desire." Thus,
although children in this study appeared to totally exclude desire in their responses, they
probably found belief a more relevant mental state in the tasks given them which may
explain the predominance of belief over desire. There is a possibility that the predominance
of belief over desire could have been due to the nature or content of the tasks in the modified
version of the Wellman and Bartsch measure, and not necessarily a reflection of a different
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explanatory framework. Even if the nature of the tasks themselves were not implicated in
eliciting these responses, belief over desire also emerged in the Wimmer and Perner
measures which had nothing to do with herding cattle. There appears therefore to be a
broader explanatory conceptual framework at work, rather than just the nature of the task.
I believe this explanatory system is belief-desire reasoning. Overall therefore this study rules
out the notion that Zimbabwean children's predominant use of belief over desire reflects the
use of a different framework.

5.1.2. Non-mental state non-B-D reasoning responses to request for justifications of
predictions

Another finding under the content of the explanatory framework that needs attention is that,
on the Wellman and Bartsch measure, children who were negatively scored on some or all
justification tasks gave responses that were non-mentalistic, and consequently non B-D
reasoning. To the question "Why do you think the character would search at location A and
not B ?", children responded that the location had plenty ofgood pastures and water for the
cattle. Were these non mentalistic responses a reflection of a different framework other than

belief-desire at work? There appear to be two explanations for these findings. The first can
be found in the nature of the content for the Wellman and Bartsch measure; and the second,
that non mentalistic responses was a reflection of less powerful models within B-D
reasoning, rather than a different framework at play.
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5.1.2.1.

Non mentalistic responses in the Wellman and Bartsch measure

The above discussion made reference to the possibility that children took a pragmatic
approach to an important and familiar activity in their lives. In the local Zimbabwean
context, the reply " ... he will search there first because that is where there is plenty of

grass, " made sense because that is the more logical and reliable approach to take when
searching for lost cattle.

Children appear to have relied on a common strategy used by children or herders of cattle
in searching for lost cattle, and children's knowledge and experience of habits of cattle when
they do not have a herder. In the local Zimbabwean context, a clever herder searches for lost
cattle in areas where the pastures are greener and where there is plenty of water for them to
drink because without a herder cattle stray to greener pastures. There is a possibility that
attempts by the study, to make the task more relevant to the local situation, may have made
it too contextually and experientially bound. That is, instead of reflecting on the current
situation as it pertained to the narrative, children may have relied on their knowledge and
experience about the activity of herding cattle.

As indicated above, it is possible that they believed that even if the actor believed the cattle
were in location B when that location did not have plenty of grass and water for the cattle to
graze and drink, the herder would not go there because he would not find them. Therefore
to these children to say that the herder went to location A because there was plenty of grass
could have been the more logical justification. The justification is not based on what the
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herder is thinking in the story, but on the pragmatics of the activity: "You go and search/or

lost cattle where there is plenty of grass and water because that is where one is likely to
find them, rather than where the pastures are poor, or where you believe they are, when
the pastures are poorer." Another possibility is "What is the point of searching in an area
where you believe the cattle are if the cattle do not go there anyway, because the search
should be lead by the characteristic behavior of the animals?", which would lead to the
response " . . . because that is where there is plenty of grass. " The responses therefore,
appear to be context and task bound, rather than reflecting a different and general framework
for responding to all situations, as is the case with belief-desire framework. However, in the
B-D reasoning context these responses were negatively scored because the respondents
ignored the individual's mental state as the cause of his action.

It appears that if children used the logic presented above, maybe their responses contained

an implied assumption that the herder had to believe that the cattle were where there were
good pastures. Children may have reasoned that experienced headers of cattle would not
think the cattle went to a location where there were poor pastures. Thus a justification such
as

'~.Because that is

where there is plenty ofgrass," might have presumed that the character

had to believe that was where the cattle were because there were good pastures, since cattle
stray to good pastures. From a B-D reasoning perspective children made a wrong choice, but
from the children's point of view the two may have been consistent in their minds, i.e., "Who

would believe the cattle were in location A when there were no good pastures?" Thus, in
terms of the priority justification, it was not that the character believed the cattle were in A,
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but that there was plenty of grass and water for the cattle, that is why he believed the cattle
were there and the herder had to search there. At some level therefore an implied
understanding of belief cannot be ruled out, although it was not explicitly stated in children's
responses. Rather than suggesting that these non mentalistic responses were a reflection of
a different framework, if the implied assumption argument is not accepted, at best these
responses were ambiguous. They required further probing to establish if belief was implied.

The third possible explanation is that there is a possibility that the non mentalist thinkers
were reflecting the quality or level of efficiency of their models of theories of mind rather
than using a different conceptual explanatory framework. In the Wellman and Bartsch
measure, one of these less powerful, less developed consequently less efficient models is
referred to as non-mentalist (Wellman, 1992). In the Wimmer and Pemer measure these non
mentalist thinkers are classified as 'realists'. In cases where a child is using realist thinking
(as for example in the Wimmer and Pemer measure where a character puts an item in
location A and then in his absence it is moved to B), when children are asked to predict
where the character would search, realist thinkers predict the character will search for candy
where it currently is, because there is no point in searching where the item no longer is, ifhe
really wants it (Mitchell, 1994). This kind of thinking is also non mentalistic because it
disregards the mental state of the individual and makes a direct link between the sought after
item and its location. In other cases, non-mentalistic thinkers misunderstand the belief
question, but nonetheless make a correct prediction. Recall that Pemer (1991 ), describes non
mentalist thinkers in Wellman and Bartsch as "situation theorists." Situation theorists may
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correctly predict the actions of the character even when they substitute "thinking that" as
thinking of, or preferring location A. For example a statement such as "Jane thinks that the
cat is under the piano" may be understood as "Jane is thinking of the piano so she will search
under the piano or the cat prefers resting under the piano so she has to search under the
piano." This preference approach appears to be what the argument between Pemer (1989)
and Wellman and Bartsch (1989) was about. Pemer argued that three-year-olds do not
understand belief and that in some cases, to these children, a belief is understood as a
preference. He argued that situation theorists substitute belief for preference and still make
a correct prediction. For example, if the belief question says "John thinks that the cattle are
at location A, " a non mentalist thinker can equally predict location A not because he

understands the role of belief, but because he just substituted preference for belief. Thus,
besides the fact that the non-mentalist thinker may misunderstand "belief', this kind of
thinking appears to be desire driven, a characteristic of early stages in Wellman's B-D
reasoning developmental framework & less powerful model.

In the Wellman and Bartsch measure, Zimbabwean children who revealed non mentalistic
responses appear to have used this logic. For example, the logic could have been as follows:

"If the character searches in location A, when the pastures there are poor, he is not going
to get them. He should search where he is likely to find them

if he is desperate to find

them" (desire driven). There is therefore a direct link between the desire to find the cattle

and their location. There is no regard for what the actor himself believes is the location of
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the cattle. It almost also appears as if it was a preference of location between greener and
poorer pastures.

In the Wimmer and Perner measure the logic could have been, "The candy is now in
location B and if Rudo (the name of the character) wants this candy, she has to search
where it is and not where she thinks she left it, because its no longer there.

If she goes to

search where she believes she left the candy she won't find it. " Again, there appears to be
a direct link between the item and its location and no regard for the belief of the character
about its location. This is an example of "copy theorists" who do not understand the
independence between the mind and the world out there (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1992).
This type of thinking suffers from deficiencies in understanding the representational nature
of the mind, distinctions between beliefs and desires, understanding of belief itself visa-vis
preference, and also representational change.

If the child understood the mind as representational and the role of representational change

in predicting people's actions he would be aware that the current location of the item does
not influence the character's search because his mind represents the old location. Thus,
although he likes the candy, he is going to make a wrong search because his mind has a
different reality. If the child understood representational change he would acknowledge lack
of access to information by the character on the item's new location, because the character
did not know that it was moved, and that the character was relying on that old mental state
to make a prediction. The lack of awareness about changes in one's own and other people's
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mental states, is a characteristic of less powerful models of theories of mind within B-D
reasoning (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O'Neil & Gopnik, 1991;
Ruffman & Olson, 1989).

In both cases (either in the Wimmer & Pemer or Wellman & Bartsch measures), non
mentalistic and realist thinking appears to be desire driven at the exclusion of belief. Because
desire drives their thinking, these children disregard "belief," when it is probably the more
reliable mental state for the search. Here again, the child makes a direct link between the
location of the item and the desire to have it, disregarding the mental state of the character
who is looking for it. Wellman (1992) enlightens us on the less powerful models children use
in the early stages of the development of theories of mind. Desire driven models are limited
in their capacity to predict and explain every day intentional and overt action, which is why
older children gradually disregard them and/or rely more on belief. Non mentalistic thinking
is a characteristic of less powerful models within the B-D reasoning system. The difference
between non-mentalistic and mentalistic thinkers is that the former have less efficient
models. Less efficient models such as those shown by non mentalistic and realist thinkers
are part of the B-D reasoning system and not a reflection of another theoretical framework
at play.

Whether Zimbabwean eight-year-olds should reflect less powerful models than those
displayed by three year olds in other cultures cannot be answered by this study. Other than
the reasoning that it is possible with a normal sample of two hundred children to have some

144

with less powerful models of thinking, this study did not search for age norms for the
development of theories of mind for Zimbabwean children. In addition, the content of the
tasks themselves (in the Wellman & Bartsch measure) could have been implicated in
drawing these non mentalistic responses. Other reasons could also lie in the study's inability
to establish baseline cognitive development equivalency data before testing. One cannot rule
out that some of the non mentalistic thinkers probably were reflecting their general cognitive
functioning levels, because these non mentalistic thinkers appeared to have had problems
with memory questions in general.

Another answer ruling out non mentalistic thinking as a different theoretical conceptual
explanatory system comes from the arguments between Wellman and Bartsch ( 1989) and
Perner (1989). Perner believed that three-year-olds were non mentalistic thinkers and/or
situation theorists; where as Wellman and Bartsch believed they were not. These arguments,
although over three-years-old efficiency in using B-D reasoning, illuminate the findings of
this study. Wellman and Bartsch and Pemer were not arguing about whether three-year-olds'
non mentalist thinking was a different mode ofreasoning, a mode outside B-D reasoning
system. Rather, they were discussing the progression of its development from non
mentalistic to mentalistic thinking within a B-D reasoning system. For Pemer non mentalist
thinking was a characteristic of three-year-olds and for Wellman and Bartsch it was not. The
move from non mentalistic to mentalist thinking was a developmental milestone children had
to achieve. In this study there is a possibility that these children were still using these early
models reflecting their struggle with a major developmental milestone of B-D reasoning.
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If children were using realist or non mentalistic thinking, rather than suggesting that their

responses were evidence of a model other than B-D reasoning, the evidence suggested that
these children were using a less powerful model of judging every day intentional, overt
human action. Realist and non mentalist thinking is evidence of children's developing
theories of mind within a B-D reasoning framework and not outside of it. Another reason
therefore that this study rules out the presence of a different model of reasoning on the basis
of non mentalist, and/or realist thinking responses is that those responses reflected less
powerful models within B-D reasoning. It is therefore more accurate to describe these
responses as less powerful models which are consistent with the developmental path or
hurdles children have to encounter and accomplish within a B-D reasoning framework, rather
than suggesting that a different framework being used.

5.1.4. Processes and skills underlying the development of a theory of mind.
This part of the discussion focusses on the competency with which Zimbabwean children
used a B-D reasoning framework. Overall there was a very high prevalence rate of invoking
B-D reasoning. Children performed over the 80% preset competence level to be credited with
a theory of mind and sometimes reached ceiling effects. The various processes and/or skills
searched for by the three instruments, processes often used as markers for the presence of a
theory of mind and associated with and also consistent with the development of B-D
reasoning, were searched for and found in all groups of children.
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The Wellman and Bartsch measure searched for two types of B-D reasoning; forward and
backward reasoning. Forward reasoning was tested through prediction and backward through
justification. From Wellman's overall conceptual framework, forward reasoning tests the
child's ability to predict the actor's actions given his mental state, and backward reasoning
his ability to explain a prediction by imputing mental states of belief and/or desire to the
character as the cause of his actions. The two types of reasoning are therefore reverse
processes. A predominant and competent B-D reasoning user should be able to use both
types of reasoning.

Children's ability to demonstrate both these skills was evidence that not only did they possess
the content of

the belief-desire framework, but appropriate skills underlying the

development of the explanatory framework displayed as well. They understood that mind
and/or mental states of belief and desire in either direction were the causal link between the
individual and his actions as the mediating variable. In Western contexts children displayed
these skills by age four (Pemer 1991) or Wellman (1992) by age three If Zimbabwe children
used this framework the study expected to find these skills, because the children were eightyear-old.

The Wimmer and Pemer measure is the oldest and most commonly used instrument in the
field for assessing the presence of theory of mind. It searches for the child's understanding
of the mind as "representational" (Pemer, 1991 ). The concept of the mind as representational
involves the understanding that what the individual thinks is the situation is not a direct copy
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of the situation out there, but only a representation of it. It may differ from reality. One may
believe that the red book is in location A because he put it there when in fact another person
moved it to location B. In this measure a child who understood the mind as representational
was aware that Rudo, (the character who searched for the candy in the location she left it
although it had been moved), did so because that was the reality represented in her mind,
even though it was a different from the actual situation. Zimbabwean children's level of
competency on this measure therefore suggested that these children could be credited with
an understanding of the mind as representational; because they had passed the litmus test for
the presence of a theory of mind. (Wimmer & Pemer 1983; Pemer, 1991). If these children
did not understand the consequences of a false belief, for example, searching in the wrong
place, and if they did not understand the mind as representational, a critical factor in B-D
reasoning, they would have performed poorly. The instrument searched for children's
understanding of the mind as representational and found it in all groups and in most of the
children.

The third measure tested a child's understanding of his own and other people's minds through
an understanding of representational change. According to Gopnik and Astington, 1988;
Gopnik and Graf, 1988; O'Neil and Gopnik, 1991; Ruffman and Olson, 1989,
representational change is the child's ability to acknowledge changes in his own and other
people's mental states. While the other two measures searched for the presence of a theory
of mind through the child's understanding of "other minds," this measure searched for
evidence that the child also clearly understood his own. In this measure, a child's
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understanding of representational change involved a simultaneous acknowledgment of
changes (or lack of them) in one's own and other people's mental states, and also recognizing
the consequences of these changes in mental states. Realist thinkers lacked this ability
because they ignored the mental states of characters, or were not aware of changes or lack
of them in the candy searcher (Rudo), whose mental state that caused her to look in the
wrong place. Representational change is one of the struggles of children's developing
theories of mind. The instrument searched for children's understanding of the concept of the
role of representational change a necessary condition for understanding one's own and other
people's minds and found it in all groups and in the majority of children.

Awareness of one's own mental state and those of other people is not only an aspect of
efficient understanding of other people, but also one that offers successful adaptation to and
with others during play in the early years and can also become an important "Machiavellian"
tool. Dunn (1991, 1995), studying sibling relationships, found that children who had
powerful models of theories of mind were able to anticipate, and predict their siblings
actions. Powerful models reduced conflicts because children could "read" their siblings'
mind. Astington and Jenkins (1995), found that children with more powerful models for
"reading" other people's minds were more successful at joint play because they were able to
make appropriate adjustments to match or anticipate their partners' thinking processes. Dunn
also further suggests that, as early as age three, using their theories of other minds as
Machiavellian tools, children test their relationships with different members of the family,
particularly their mothers. Positive relationships with others or fighting for competing
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interests depends on the child's ability to discriminate his own mind and the minds of other
family members and also to discriminate between them.

Overall therefore children's performance and display of processes and skills consistent with
the development of B-D reasoning not only suggested that Zimbabwean children use a
belief-desire framework, but also that they are competent users of this system. Their
responses in three measures reflected a belief-desire content, errors made were consistent
with less powerful models ofB-D reasoning, and the skills that underlie, emerge from, or are
consistent with B-D reasoning were clearly in place. In most studies of theories of mind,
children are described as having a robust theory of mind after passing one measure. In this
study, children performed well in three separate measures that test for different aspects of
theory of mind. These findings are consistent with those from the West regarding competent
models of B-D reasoning, and with Avis and Harris regarding the existence of B-D reasoning
in other cultures.

5.2.

The universality of a theory of mind

The foregoing discussion showed that there was evidence that Zimbabwean children not only
used a belief-desire framework, and that the content, processes and skills displayed by the
children were consistent with B-D reasoning, but also that they were efficient users of this
system. By age eight, they had a well developed model of theory of mind. A major
conclusion from this study, therefore, was that children from Zimbabwe, a less industrialized,
non Western, but literate society use a belief-desire conceptual framework to reason about
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the mind. The question that arises is what they mean for the debate on the universality of a
theory of mind. The following discussion presents the argument that, on one hand, these
findings contribute positively to the debate on the universality of theory of mind, but on the
other they raise more questions than answers.

5.2.1

The prevalence of B-D reasoning

What do these findings mean to the debate on the universality of theory of mind? I believe
that these findings show the existence and prevalence of B-D reasoning in cultural contexts
different from those where the research has been conducted over the previous decade. In this
study, the prevalence of B-D reasoning was found in four groups of Zimbabwean children
with diverse cultural experiences. Children from two indigenous cultural groups who had
two different school experiences invoked B-D reasoning equally and displayed key elements,
processes and skills consistent with B-D reasoning. The contribution of these findings to the
debate therefore, is that B-D reasoning surfaced in a different cultural context from those
previously investigated. The more often the phenomena surfaces in different cultural
contexts, the better the knowledge base from which to make conclusions about its
universality. From that perspective, these findings therefore add to our knowledge about
children's theories of mind and their prevalence in different cultural contexts. Recall Fodor's
position on the prevalence of theories of mind:
There is so far as I know, no human group that doesn't explain human
behavior by imputing beliefs and desires to the behavior. And if an
anthropologist claimed to have found such a group I wouldn't believe
him (Fodor, 1987 cited in Avis & Harris, 1991: 1.)
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Although eight-year-old, indigenous, schooled and unschooled children in Zimbabwe impute
beliefs and desires to explain everyday, intentional overt human behavior, I believe we still
need more evidence of its prevalence in other cultural contexts before we can be as confident
as Fodor.

5.2.2. Zimbabwe's folk psychology is a "mixed" folk psychology
Despite these findings there are limitations to the extent that one can make conclusions about
universality. The major obstacle is that the findings fail to clarify some issues raised against
assertions of universality of B-D reasoning. Some of the arguments, although speculative at
this stage, are those put forward by Wellman ( 1992) and the "enculturation hypothesis."
Wellman suggests that the development of a theory of mind is linked to self-agency, and selfagency is a Western cultural phenomena. The enculturation hypothesis argues that modes
of thinking such as B-D reasoning are by-products of culture. Diversity in culture puts
limitations on asserting the universality of a theory of mind. From the enculturation
perspective, since B-D reasoning was found in Western contexts, it may be a by-product of
Western cultural environments. Although Zimbabwe's cultural context is not defined as
Western, it has pervasive Western cultural influence. It is not purely indigenous as was the
case in the Avis and Harris (1991) study with Baka children, who were insulated from
Western cultural influences. Today's Zimbabwean folk psychology may be a product of both
Western and indigenous cultures, and therefore it may be a "mixed" folk psychology rather
than one or the other. The complexity of the Zimbabwean cultural context thus limits the
claim of universality of a theory of mind in the face of these two arguments. It is difficult to
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make generalizations that Zimbabwean indigenous children use this mode of reasoning
because one can neither confidently suggest that it is the product of indigenous or Western
cultures alone, nor that indigenous cultures used it before Western cultural influences.
Further still, it is difficult to suggest that indigenous cultures always used a B-D reasoning
framework or continue to use it although there is pervasive Western cultural influence. This
study does not competently tease out entangled variables in a mixed folk psychology to be
able to attribute B-D reasoning as a by-product of one or the other. Schooling, a legacy of
Western cultural influences that showed a significant link with B-D reasoning in the
Wellman and Bartsch measure forms the central argument in the next discussion.

5.2.3. The role and effect of schooling on modes of thinking
Schooling is one of the major Western cultural institutions that has permeated indigenous
cultures in Zimbabwe. The role of schooling in shaping a people's world view has been
documented (Cole, 1990; Yehudi, 1977; Rogoff, 1990 ). In this study, in at least one out of
three measures, schooling was found to have a significant link with B-D reasoning. The
question that arises is whether the superior performance of schooled children on this measure
was due to practice of an already prevalent mode of thinking, or to the Western cultural
influence that is pervasive in Zimbabwe.

Despite the schooled children's superior performance on a B-D reasoning measure, the
unschooled children met the preset 80% B-D reasoning level of occurrence in all three
measures and the performance of unschooled children was not significantly different from
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the schooled children on two other measures. If schooling was the origin of B-D reasoning,
then unschooled children should not have reached the preset 80% level of prevalence in all
measures including the Wellman and Bartsch, neither should they have performed equally
well on two other measures. There were no significant differences in performance between
schooled and unschooled children in the Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et al. measures; two
of the most frequently used measures for testing the presence of a theory of mind. One of
the measures in which these differences did not surface is one often referred to as the
"litmus" test for the presence of a theory of mind. Their schooled counterparts had been in
school for at least two to three years and therefore should have performed much better than
unschooled children.

On the other hand however, it is possible that the Wellman and Bartsch measure did have
greater discriminating power than the other two. The Wellman and Bartsch measure had
eight tasks, while the Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer et al. had two and three respectively.
It is possible that the other two instruments masked schooled children's performance through

lack of differentiation. Wellman (1992) claims that each task in their instrument examines
a child's thinking from a different angle. While the discriminating power of the Wellman and
Bartsch measure may be a probable reason for this difference, it is also important to
acknowledge that despite the limited range of tasks in the Wimmer and Pemer and Pemer
et al., measure. The number of tasks is not always a guarantee that the instrument is
powerful. It is hard to argue that schooling alone accounts for the origin of this mode of
reasonmg.
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The issue of schooling effects cannot be minimized, however. Yehudi (1977) clearly
suggests that schools have specific well defined agendas and people are sent to these
institutions to develop certain modes of thinking compared to others. Is the development of
B-D reasoning one of these agendas? Schooling is one of the Western cultural legacies to
indigenous cultures, one that significantly alters thinking patterns. If B-D reasoning is a
monopoly of Western cultures, then significant differences should have been evident within
and across all three measures between schooled and unschooled children. This suggests that
schooling is not necessarily the origin of that mode of thinking, but may be a reinforcer.
Thus, although the Wellman and Bartsch measure gives us an indication that schooling may
have an influence on the development of B-D reasoning, it does not clarify whether
schooling is the origin, reinforcer, or vehicle for its development. Astington, (1993) and
Astington and Jenkins, (1995) and Wahi and Johri (1995) suggest that a competent theory
of mind is rewarded in Western systems of education. Thus, the better performance displayed
by schooled children on the Wellman and Bartsch measure could have been due to prior
practice and rewards. There is also the possibility that Western institutions other than
schooling could be a source of B-D reasoning. If schooling is not its origin, but rather
Western influence in general, where did the unschooled children meet this influence?

Christianity is one of the dominant religions in Zimbabwe and carries with it Western modes
of thinking. The effect of Christianity in most colonized countries has been to replace
indigenous with Western modes of thinking. If unschooled children or their parents become
Christians, it could have been an avenue for the development of B-D reasoning. It is

155

important to note however, that in this study, a child's religion was found to have no
significant links with B-D reasoning. All groups; Traditional, Christians, and those who
mixed both religions, performed at the same level.

However, despite their admiration for Western influences, especially in modernizing formal
sectors of government, Zimbabwean indigenous cultures including the "well schooled"
populace, remain ambivalent, skeptical, and resistant to acculturation to Western cultural
practices, and to Western views about the world (Shumba 1994; Bourdillon, 1987).
Furthermore, in some Third World countries where there has been Western colonialization,
Western cultural influences faced major challenges soon after independence and sometimes
whole revolutions are waged against them (Kim & Berry, 1993). Governments make formal
attempts to erase, replace, or compete with Western influences (Moghaddam cited in Kim
& Berry, 1993). Indigenous folk psychologies are resistant to manipulation by other cultures

(Kim & Berry, 1993), especially Western cultural influences, because they carry with them
the stigma of colonialization and domination.

Urbanization is also one of the instruments for acculturation, to Western ideologies and is
a common feature of Zimbabwean society. Despite this urbanization, indigenous people are
resistant to Western acculturation, and sometimes assimilation to Western cultural practices
appears artificial. Gelfand (1992) makes the following observation .

... the urban Shona have not so much changed their own customs for
western ones, but have added the latter (Western) to their own
traditional ways...... p 185.
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Writing about the indigenous populations resistance to western acculturation, Gelfand (1992)
writes:
... The Shona have not by any means accepted the moral or spiritual
teachings of the while man. They still prefer their own way of life ....
They have greater regard for their way of life with its morals and
manners. They look askance at much of Europe's behavior.

The level of efficiency at which children used B-D reasoning and displayed underlying skills
casts doubt on the Western origin theory. Is it logical to attribute the high frequency rate of
invoking B-D reasoning displayed by children from two different cultures and school
experiences to acculturation of this mode of thinking through either formal or informal
contacts by the eighth year of children's lives? Eight-year-olds, usually have little contact
with formal organizations that have pervasive Western influences. Families are their closest
cultural influences and as such a mode of thinking such as B-D reasoning may be attributed
to the family, and/or other cultural influences. In rural areas for example, children's first
formal and systematic contact with Western-oriented cultural practices is schooling. Children
in Zimbabwe go to school at age six, sometimes seven or eight. If before age six they had
acquired an indigenous folk psychology, does it disappear and get replaced by the one
imparted through schooling in a period of three years when it took six to develop the other?

Some of the children from the Ndebele sample came from one of the remotest regions of
Zimbabwe where their parents and neighbors had little contact with formal Western cultural
institutions such as schooling and Christianity. The only institution that was beginning to
emerge in that district was Catholicism and the nearest school was about thirty kilometers
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away. More over most of the parents in these remote areas were not very committed to
Christianity and even those who were becoming Christians, continued to cling to their own
religion. Writing about the ndigenous level of acculturation to Christianity Bourdillon
( 1991) says that the attraction to Christianity is most often utilitarian. When they become
"nominal" Christians, they benefit from it because churches provide education, work and
medical facilities to their converts. Bourdillon also suggests that in the majority of cases,
they continue to cling to their own religion and way of thinking. Gelfand ( 1992) also adds
that although Western schooling may be a vehicle for western thought, indigenous
populations demand education for utilitarian purposes and not admiration for western
cultural practices.

Overall therefore, the contribution of this study to the debate on the universality of theory
of mind is two-sided. On one hand, there is a possibility that indigenous cultures use B-D
reasoning regardless of pervasive Western cultural influences. On the other hand, since
children with contact with one of the most powerful vehicle for transporting Western modes
of thinking (schooling) performed better on one measure, this mode ofreasoning probably
cannot be wholly attributed to indigenous folk psychologies.

The Zimbabwe data provide evidence of the extent to which this mode of reasoning is
prevalent in cultural contexts other than the West, but there is no strong evidence about its
universality that can be drawn from it. It is difficult to conclusively say that indigenous
cultures or Western cultural influences alone are responsible for the development of B-D
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reasoning in Zimbabwean children, because the cultural context appears to be no longer
"purely" indigenous or Western. Thus, it may be questionable to conclude that B-D
reasoning is some natural phenomena in, or a by-product of indigenous cultures in Zimbabwe
when there is pervasive Western influences. The same applies to the role of Western
influences. In the face of mixed results and inability to tease out potential variables that may
contribute to the development ofB-D reasoning, in a mixed folk psychology a more logical
and reasonable conclusion from these findings is that B-D reasoning is a common mode of
thinking and reasoning about the mind in children from Zimbabwe, a less industrialized, but
literate society; a mode of reasoning that may have been a product of interaction between two
folk psychologies.

5.3.

Implications for cross cultural research.

One implication for cross cultural research emerging from these findings are that there is a
need to find methods that can tease out variables that get entangled in complex mixed folk
psychologies. Second, studies need to be cautious about adapting instruments to suit local
conditions, and finally, it is important to use multiple measures.

5.3.1. Methodologies that extricate potential variables
In the face of suggestions that the origin of B-D reasoning is Western, it may not be enough
for cross cultural research to just establish that children from other cultural contexts. develop
and construct and use B-D reasoning especially when Western cultural practices are
pervasive in those cultures. Arguments about origin are fundamental to debates on the
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universality of B-D reasoning. There is therefore need to carry out longitudinal studies that
trace the developmental path ofB-D reasoning including the norms for each age. If children
of various ages are followed over time, one can tease out other issues such as schooling and
speak with confidence about its developmental path. For example, although this study found
that children were predominant and competent users ofB-D reasoning and demonstrated that
important B-D reasoning skills were present, little can be said about its developmental path.
Establishing the developmental path and comparing it with routes identified in other cultures
may be another way of establishing the universality of this mode of reasoning. In addition,
longitudinal studies may be important because they study children over long periods of time
in their cultural contexts. Modes of thinking such as B-D reasoning need to be studied along
with the cultural contexts that nurture them (Rogoff et. al, 1984; Rogoff, 1990; Cole, 1993 ).
Such approaches can probably meet the challenge of anthropologists and other
developmental psychologists who assert that modes of thinking are constructed by culture.
Examining the developmental phenomena in cultural context over long periods of time may
help answer the concerns of the enculturation hypothesis and some anthropologists.
Longitudinal studies therefore, have potential and may be an appropriate way of gathering
data about the universality of a theory of mind.

5.3.2. Adopting and adapting measures to suit local cultural contexts.
The second implication relates to adapting theory of mind measures from other cultural
contexts to suit local conditions. In this study, on the one hand it appears that measures
designed for Western cultural contexts were successfully adopted and adapted to suit local
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cultural contexts. Inability to understand tasks was not one of the problems of this study. On
the other hand however, there is also good reason to believe that the adaptions used in this
study elicited context and cultural specific responses. There is a possibility that the activity
used in the Wellman and Bartsch measure (herding cattle) was culturally bound, resulting
in children ignoring the content of the narrative and drawing from their cultural experience
of that activity. It is my belief that the task of herding cattle was culture specific to the extent
that the content of the task may have been implicated in drawing from children non
mentalistic responses. The responses children gave made sense in the Zimbabwean context,
but were scored negatively for B-D reasoning because they were non mentalistic. (They
ignored the mental state of the characters.) Finding appropriate instruments for local contexts
therefore, should be balanced with maintaining reasonably "culture free" measures and tasks
more so when the objective of the study is to search for data that cross cultural boundaries.

5.3.3. Use of multiple measures to assess the presence of B-D reasoning
Since no one instrument has the capacity to test all aspects of the construct of a theory of
mind, use of multiple measures not only ensures that a wide range of skills are searched for,
but also helps determine the strength or robustness of the theory. More important however,
is that issues that may not be elicited by one measure may be picked up by another. While
the Wimmer and Perner and the Perner et al.'s measures failed to pick any differences
between schooled and unschooled children, the Wellman and Bartsch did and vice versa.
Future studies will be able to pursue the issue of schooling, where as, if only one measure
had been used, this important variable could have been missed. Use of more than one
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measure to test the presence of theory of mind in other cultures is therefore particularly
useful in determining the existence or robustness of the theory.

5.4.

Limitations of the study

The limitations of the study were around validity and reliability issues, use of several task
administrators, and inability to use standardized screening instruments to establish
equivalence and/or baseline cognitive competence data, and finally, the limited population
of unschooled children.

5.4.1. Reliability and validity of instruments
A major problem in using theory of mind measures at this stage is their validity and
reliability. These measures have not undergone rigorous psychometric testing. Researchers
appear to choose among them based on their popularity and/or frequent use by other
researchers. In this study, correlational statistics showed very low relationships between
these instruments. Although the low levels suggested that there was some relationship, if
these instruments measured the same construct that of theory of mind, a higher correlation
should be have been found. An examination of these instruments shows that, although they
are all used by theory of mind researchers as tests for measuring the presence of a theory of
mind, they do not necessarily measure the same skills, but rather different aspects of the
same construct. For example, the Wellman and Bartsch forward and backward reasoning, the
Wimmer and Pemer a child's understanding of the mind as representational nature of the
mind; and Pemer et al. representational change. Thus, although at one level they appear to
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be measuring the same skills, on the other, they are measuring different aspects of the same
construct. Moreover, although by inference children rely on some basic underlying skill(s),
there is no direct evidence that there is/are a common underlying skill(s) that these
instruments search for, hence the argument between Wellman and Bartsch (1989), Pemer
(1989), Chandler et al. (1989), and Sodian et. al. (1991) and Pemer, et al. (Sodian et al
(1991 ). Psychometric testing may be able to unravel any common underlying skills that these
measures search for, and researchers may be able to systematically choose between them,
rather than any instrument they prefer, believe is reliable, or assume measures, and/or
searches for the same construct or common underlying skills.

5.4.2. Lack of standardized instruments to establish cognitive equivalence.
The absence of a standardized instrument to establish baseline cognitive competence data,
and lack of reliable health records to screen for environmental factors that may affect the
development of cognition; for example, malnutrition, was a problem.

The study was unable to find reliable instruments to establish cognitive competence
equivalence or base line cognitive data before testing. In the absence of such an instrument,
simple narratives from the culture were used to test children's ability to follow and remember
a story since that was the mode of task presentation. This method of screening although
useful was not fully adequate. The study speculates that some of the less powerful models
of B-D reasoning that emerged from children's responses may have been due to generally
poor cognitive competence.
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The study was not also able to find systematic records on the children's health. In the absence
of formal records that documented the health history of a child, the study relied on
information from parents, guardians and extended family members who sometimes did not
know the child's history, or who were reluctant to share and/or give it. Systematic
malnutrition has been linked to poor cognitive development.

Health records and

standardized cognitive measures would have been more reliable and useful in finding out
more about children's cognitive competence.

5.4.3. Use of multiple task administrators
The third problems was lack of resources, and participation of children from two different
cultural and linguistic groups. Compounding these problems was the fact that in one region,
two administrators had lower academic qualifications compared to those from the other
regions. Because of the need to use community members who spoke a local language and
dialect, the study had no choice but use them. These two administrators had two years of
secondary education, while the others had four as well as one or two years of teacher
training experience. Despite intensive training on task administration, establishing equity in
task administration was problematic. Close monitoring in all regions was necessary. Even
then, there was no way of being sure that a certain a minimum standard was followed by all
task administrators in all regions. The ease and difficulty that some children experienced
during testing could have been influenced by differences in task administrators educational
backgrounds and/or experience or style in interviewing children in general. If all groups of
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children had been interviewed by the same administrators, the conditions would have been
more similar.

5.4.4. Selection of the sample
The fourth problem was related to the selection of the sample particularly the unschooled
children. The two main problems relating to this sample were first, a limited pool from which
to select the sample; and second, authenticating ages. While there was no difficulty in
making a random sample for schooled children once the informal screening was done, the
pool from which unschooled children were selected was limited. Since gaining independence
(1980), Zimbabwe embarked on free universal primary education and that policy resulted in
more children going to school. The pool for unschooled children was therefore made smaller
than that for unschooled children. The determination of ages for the unschooled sample was
also problematic. Most of the unschooled children did not have valid birth certificate records
to authenticate the given ages, whereas all schooled children had. For schooled children, ages
were extracted from official school records, where as for the unschooled sample, the study
had to rely on the children, parents, guardians, peers and friends to determine their age. For
the unschooled sample therefore, there is a possibility that although the ages were given as
eight, some of them may have been below or above age eight.

5. 5.

Conclusion

The findings of the study are that children from a less industrialized, but literate society used
a belief-desire conceptual explanatory system to predict and explain every day, intentional,
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overt human action. Children imputed mental states of belief and/or desire to characters in
narratives to predict and explain their actions. All groups of children did not only
predominantly invoke B-D reasoning, but were also competent in using it. The study
searched for B-D reasoning using three instruments and consistently found important
markers of theory of mind in place. In the Wellman and Bartsch measure, school experience
was found to have some relationship with B-D reasoning, but not in two others. No
significant differences were found between ethnic groups and when children were classified
by both ethnicity and school experience.

An examination of the findings appears to suggest that the debate on the universality of a
theory of mind is far from over. Cross cultural research needs to find methodologies that can
tease out complicated links between variables when there is a mixture of folk psychologies.
Future studies need to search for methodologies that can extricate indigenous and Western
modes of thinking to contribute meaningfully to the debate on the origin and universality
of a theory of mind. However, one of the major contributions of this study to the debate on
the universality of theory of mind was that the study provided evidence that children from
a different non-Western, less industrialized, but
conceptual framework.

literate society use a belief-desire

APPENDIX I
WELLMAN AND BARTSCH (1988); AND BARTSCH AND WELLMAN, (1989) MENTAL
STATE ATTRIBUTION DESIGN: ORIGINAL VERSION

166

167

Appendix I
Wellman and Bartsch (1988) and Bartsch and Wellman, (1989) Mental State
Attribution Design: Original version
Forward Reasoning:

Prediction on an actor's behavior

The stories were presented in a series and sets to control for alternative reasoning
schemes. A set of four stories from that paradigm are described below:

Task

Example of story

Standard belief

Sam wants to find his puppy. It might be hiding in the garage or
under the porch. Sam thinks his puppy is under the porch. Where
will Sam look for his puppy (garage or porch?)

Not Belief

Sam wants to find his puppy. It might be hiding in the garage or
under the porch. Sam thinks his puppy is not in the garage. Where
will San look for his puppy?

Not own Belief

Sam wants to find his puppy. It might be hiding in the garage or
under the porch. Where do you think Sam's puppy is? (When the
child answers the experimenter says. That's a good guess, but Sam
thinks his puppy in the garage. Where will Sam look for his
puppy?

Changed Belief

Sam wants to find his puppy. It might be hiding in the garage or
under the porch. Sam thinks his puppy is under the porch. Where
will Sam look for his puppy?

But, before Sam can look for his puppy Sam's mom comes out of the house. Sam's mom
says she saw his puppy in the garage. So now he thinks his puppy is in the garage. Where
will Sam look for his puppy?

Backward reasoning: Explaining an actor's behaviour.
Here is Jane. Jane is looking for her kitten under the piano. Why do you think Jane is
doing that?
Here is Joe. This is candy. Joe is putting it in his mouth. Why do you think Joe is doing
that?
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Here is Mary, Mary is going to buy an ice cream at the grocery store. Why do you think
Mary is doing that?

Here is Beth. Beth hates apples. But she is taking a bite out of this apple. Why do you
think Beth is doing that?
Here is Jane. Jane hates frogs. But Jane is looking for a frog under the piano. Why do you
think Jane is doing that?
Here is Jane. Jane is looking for her kitten. The kitten is hiding under the chair. But Jane
is looking for it under the piano. Why do you think Jane is doing that?
Here's sam. This is a rock that looks like a peanut. But Sam is putting it in his mouth.
Why do you think Sam is doing that?
Here's Andrew. Andrew is going to the drug store. The drugstore does not sell balloons.
But Andrew is going to the drug store to buy a balloon. Why do you think Andrew is
doing that?

APPENDIX II
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APPENDIX II
Wellman and Bartsch (1988) and Bartsch and Wellman (1989) Mental State
Attribution Measure : Modified Version
TASK 1: STANDARD BELIEF
Farai wants to look for his cattle in the pastures. The cattle may be grazing around
Mutero's area or around Chikoore's. Farai thinks they are at Chikoore's.

Memory Question:
Where does Farai think they are grazing?

Belief Questions
(a)

Prediction: Where will Farai look for the cattle first? (Is it at Mutero's or
Chikoore's?).

(b)

Justification : Why do you say that?

TASK 2: NOT BELIEF
John wants to look for his cattle at the pastures. They may be grazing around Mutero's
area or around Chikoore's. John thinks they are NOT at Mutero's.

Memory Question
Where does John think they are grazing?

Belief Questions
(a)

Prediction: Where will John look for the cattle first? (Is it at Mutero's or
Chikoore's?)

(b)

Justification : Why do you say that?

TASK 3: NOT OWN BELIEF
Ranga wants to look for his cattle in the pastures. They may be grazing around Mutero's
area or around Chikoore's.
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Memory Question
Where does Ranga think they are grazing?

Belief Questions
(a)

Prediction: Where will John look for the cattle first? (Is it at Mutero's or
Chikoore's?)

If the child answers "at Mutero's" in (a) use the Chikoore location in (b). Ifhe answers
Chikoore, use Mutero location in the next question
(b)

Prediction: John thinks they are at (the opposite of the child's answer in (a) Where
will John look for the cattle first?

(c)

Justification : Why do you say that?

TASK 4: CHANGED BELIEF
Chenjerai wants to look for his cattle at the pastures. They may be grazing around
Mutero's area or around Chikoore's.

Memory Question
Where does Chenjerai think they are?

Belief Questions
(a)

Prediction: Where will Chenjerai look for the cattle first? (Is it at Mutero's or
Chikoore's?)

However, before he leaves for the pastures, Rudo tells him that she saw them at
Mutero/Chikoore (opposite of the location the child gives in (a). So now Chenjerai thinks
that the cattle are in Mutero/Chikoore's pastures.
(b)

Prediction: Where will Chenjerai look for the cattle first?

(c)

Justification : Why do you say that?

APPENDIX III
WIMMER AND PERNER (1983) FALSE-BELIEF MEASURE: MODIFIED VERSION
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APPENDIX Ill
Wimmer and Perner (1983) False-Belief Measure: Modified version
Rudo has helped her mother to unpack the things they bought at the store.
"'Mother where should I put these sweets?' Rudo asked.
"Put them in your black bag", mother replied.
Rudo takes the sweets and puts them in her black bag. Rudo remembers where she put the
sweets so that she could come back to take some when she wants to eat them. Rudo loves
to eat sweets. After packing the sweets, she goes to play. In her absence her mother took
the sweets to give some to Rudo's younger sister Tsitsi. But Rudo's mother does not
return the remaining sweets to Rudo's black bag. She put them in her own red bag and left
for the well to fetch some water. While her mother is still at the well, Rudo comes back
from the playground because she wants to eat some sweets. Rudo remembers exactly
where she put the sweets before she went to play.

Memory Question:
(a)

Where are the sweets right now?

Belief Questions:
(a)

Prediction Where will Rudo look for the sweets first?

b)

Justification: Why do you say that?

APPENDIX IV
PERNER, LEEKAM AND WIMMER (1987) UNEXPECTED CHANGE MEASURE:
MODIFIED VERSION.
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APPENDIX IV
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer (1987) Unexpected Change Measure
Modified Version.

Instructions to the test administrators
Take an empty Surf detergent box. Put a handful of soil in the box and close it carefully
so that no soil shows from outside. Call a child and ask the following questions:
(a)

Prediction (self): What do you think is in the box?

(b)

Prediction: Representational change/stability: What did you think was in the box
when you first saw it?

(c)

Prediction: (other minds): What do you think Mutsa (the child's peer or classmate)
thinks is in the box when she first sees it?

APPENDIX V: RESPONSE SHEET
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APPENDIX V: RESPONSE SHEET
I.Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
2. Age:
3. Grade level:
4. Ethnic group
5. Gender
6 .. Region:
7 Number of siblings:
8 Religion:

3 0
4.0
5 None .o
ID
2 0
0
2 Ndebele o
1 Shona
0
2 Female 0
1 male
4 Mat.No.
3 Midi. o
1 Mash Easto
2 Manic. 0
40
5+0
20
30
1 o
1 Christianity o 2 Traditional o 3 Both o 4 Others o

Wellman and Bartsch mental state attribution paradigm.
Task I
(a) Prediction:
1 Chikoore o
2.Mutero o
3 Don't know o 4 Non responsiveo
(b) Justification for response in ( a ) : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Task2
(a) Prediction:
lChikoore o
2 Mutero o
3 Don't know o 4 Non responsive o
(b) Justification for response in a : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Task3
(a) Prediction (own)
1 Chikoore o
2.Mutero o
3 Don't knowo
4. Non responsiveo
(b) Prediction:
1 Chikoore o
2.Mutero o
3 Don't knowo
4 Non responsive o
(c) Justification of response in (b ): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Task4
(a) Prediction
IChikoore o
2.Muteroo
3 Don't knowo 4 Non responsiveo
(b) Prediction:
1Chikoore o
2.Muteroo
3 Don't knowo 4 Non responsiveo
(c) Justification of response in (b): - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(a) Prediction:

Wimmer and Perner: The False Belief Paradigm
2 black bag o
3 I do not know o
4 Non responsiveo

1 red bag o

Justification for response in ( a ) : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Perner, Leekam and Wimmer:
(a) Prediction (self):
1 Surf o
(b) Representational change/stability
1 Surf o
(c) Prediction (other minds)
1 surf o

Unexpected change task
2 I do not know o
2 I do not know o
2 I do not know o

3 Non responsive o
3 Non responsiveo
3 Non responsiveo

APPENDIX VI
PARENT CONSENT FOR SON OR DAUGHTER TO PARTICIPATE
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APPENDIX VI
Parent Consent for Son or Daughter to participate
Dear Parent/Guardian:
I would like to request permission for your child ................................... to participate in a
study about how children reason about the "mind". This study will help me to find out
whether eight-year-olds in Zimbabwe use a system of reasoning about the mind called
"Belief-desire".
The study will involve eight year olds from Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Midlands
and Matebeleland North. Children will be told six short stories and then asked to answer
some questions about those stories. The stories will be administered in two sessions. The
study will also request information about the child's ethnicity, school experience, gender,
region, religion, number of siblings and age.
This study is not assessing the performance of the child as an individual, but as part
of a group of Zimbabwean children. There are no right and wrong answers to the
questions. The study wants to find out what reasoning systems children use, and not
whether they are using the correct or wrong system. The tasks are not harmful to children
and are similar to those used by schools or in everyday conversations. The project has
been approved by the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education/the Government of
Zimbabwe, Erikson Institute, Loyola University and your child's school.
Your child's participation is completely voluntary. There is no penalty from school the
chief/headman or government if you or your child decides not to participate. The child
may withdraw at any time during the study and refuse to answer any questions. Although
the study will schedule the testing so that the child does not miss important lessons or
chores. The total amount of time-on task is expected to be between ten to twenty minutes.
All information will be held as confidential. Only people involved in this project
will have access to this information. Once the information has been collected, all
reference to names will be removed and replaced by a case or code number. In addition,
all publication (s) of information from this study will not identify the child by name, but
code or case number.
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I will also ask permission from your child to participate. A copy of that request is
attached.
I would appreciate if you sign and return the attached form and return it to Att. Ms. Chipo
Dyanda.
Department of Teacher Education,
University of Zimbabwe, Box MP. 167,
Mt Pleasant, Harare
Tel 303211.
Sincerely,
Chipo Dyanda
Graduate Student
Erikson Institute, Loyola University

DI have read the request for permission letter and I give permission for my son/daughter
to participate.
DI do not give my child permission to participate
DI need some more information before my child can participate.
Parent/Guardian's signature_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Child's Name~:------------------
Thank you very much for you cooperation
Adapted from Cone & Foster (1993) Dissertations from start to finish American
Psychological Association: Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX VII
CHILD CONSENT FOR OWN PARTICIPATION.
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APPENDIX VII
Child Consent for own participation.

Your parents have given their permission for you to take part in an activity I am doing
with other eight-year olds from your school/area. I have six stories to tell you, and then I
will ask some questions about the characters in the stories. The questions are not a test. I
just want to find out what you think about the characters in the stories. Your friends will
not be told about the answers you give me.

If you decide you do not want to take part any time during the activity, you can withdraw
any time and if you do not want to answer any questions you may also refuse to answer
them. You will not get punished by your parents or teachers if you refuse to participate or
answer any questions. It is your choice to participate in this activity.
o Yes I want to do the activity
o No I do not want to do the activity
Thank you very much
Sincerely:
Ms. Chipo Dyanda
Signature:
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Adapted from Cone & Foster (1993) Dissertations from start to finish American
Psychological Association: Washington, D.C.
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